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THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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M. Stephen Weatherford, Lorraine M. McDonnell — Clinton and the Economy: The Paradox of Policy Success and Political Mishap

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Book Reviews

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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

G. JOHN IKENBERRY argues that the character of leadership in world politics has changed over the decades and that while the United States may not be able to provide the transformative leadership of the early postwar era, it is also no longer necessary. Ikenberry locates other types and sources of American leadership that are alive and well today.

M. STEPHEN WEATHERFORD and LORRAINE M. MCDONNELL review the formulation and congressional conflict over President Clinton's economic program during the new administration's first year. They argue that the success of presidential initiatives cannot be adequately evaluated without considering changes in national politics over the last two decades, particularly the increasing independence of legislative and executive branches and the growing combativeness of parties.

WILLIAM G. MAYER examines the attempt to limit or discourage negative campaigning and "attack" advertising in contemporary American election campaigns. He argues that negative campaigning is actually a necessary and legitimate part of any election and that it provides voters with essential information about the issues and choices at stake.

LOUIS BOLCE, GEORGE DE MAIO and DOUGLAS MUZZIO look at the political orientations and voting behavior of talk radio listeners in the 1994 elections. The data reveal that talk radio listeners are a politically conservative, attentive, and engaged public.

METIN HEPER and MENDERES ÇINAR examine the difficulties arising from a basic conflict between presidents and prime ministers in the complicated governing structure of Turkey.

ROSEMARY FOOT reexamines the evidence for the inflexibility in the Eisenhower administration's China policy. She concludes that a major part of the explanation came from the administration's fear that a softening of U.S. policy would empower and legitimize a regime bent on undermining Western interests.

In a review essay HUGH HECLO discusses three new books that document different aspects of income inequality in America.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

PRESIDENCY CONFERENCE

On November 15 and 16, the Academy of Political Science will be co-sponsoring a conference on "Presidential Power: Forging the Presidency for the 21st Century." The location will be the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University. Any registration fee for attending panels is waived for Academy members; the fee for two lunches and a dinner is $70. Inquiries may be made to the Academy at 212-870-2500.

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The Future of International Leadership

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

As the century comes to a close, there is reason to worry about the disappearance of American leadership. For most of the postwar era, leadership in world politics was not in short supply. The United States and the Soviet Union were overwhelming (if not completely undisputed) leaders of large alliances of states. Both had the military power, material resources, and expansive ideology to effectively assert their leadership within far-flung regions of the world. Although Soviet hegemony was brutal and coercive, American leadership was largely welcomed in Western Europe and in parts of Asia. For many observers, the political solidarity and economic prosperity in the postwar Western world would not have been as great without American leadership. The United States took the lead in opening markets, protecting allies, and promoting the stability of the noncommunist world. Because of this great accomplishment, many people worry about the waning of American global leadership and the seeming unwillingness or inability of other states to step into the role.

But is American leadership really on the wane? If it is, can other states help provide leadership in various areas of world politics? And if today's major states are not able to provide the "heroic" leadership of earlier eras, are the consequences as troubling as many people believe? This article argues that American leadership, properly understood, is not as scarce as many people believe. To be sure, its overall material capabilities and power position have declined significantly since the early postwar years. But the political institutions and structures of relations that were built under American sponsorship after World War II still provide channels and routines of cooperation. America will not (and probably cannot) play the leadership role it did a generation ago, but that leadership has been reinvented in the form of a dense set of intergovernmental and transnational linkages among the major industrial countries and regions of the world. Conflicts

G. JOHN IKENBERRY is co-director of the Lauder Institute of Management and International Studies and associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. He is writing a book about the politics of building order after major wars.

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and disputes are as ubiquitous as ever, but they have become more domesticated and contained.

My argument can be put simply. Those who believe that American leadership is unlikely, if not impossible, look at past cases, particularly the end of World War II and a mythical version of the nineteenth century, to argue that the necessary conditions are missing: the hegemony needs overwhelming power, a clear purpose, and a large reservoir of political will. The error in the reasoning is not in failing to see that these factors are absent, but rather in failing to understand that they are not necessary in the current conditions, which call for quite a different kind of influence that relies on different instruments and that can thrive in the absence of these factors.

The actual record of American foreign policy in recent years has by no means been a great showcase of global or Western leadership. But the habits and institutional foundations of American leadership are still in place. Put briefly, I argue that the widespread worry about the end of American leadership is partly a result of a misunderstanding of what leadership is and the changing conditions in which it must operate. If leadership means *the ability to foster cooperation and commonalty of social purpose among states*, American leadership and its institutional creations will long outlast the decline of its postwar position of military and economic dominance; and it will outlast the foreign policy stumbling of particular administrations.

To make this argument, it is necessary to distinguish between different types of leadership. It is also necessary to distinguish between different ends or needs toward which leadership might be directed. In this regard, the circumstances in which American leadership must operate have changed substantially over the decades; deep conflicts over the organization and direction of politics and industrial society have become less intractable, at least among the most advanced countries. Likewise, it is necessary to talk about the means or processes by which leadership is exercised—that is to say, the institutions, rules, and norms by which political cooperation is fostered. The far-flung political institutions and relations that the United States built after World War II are still in place, and these overall macrostructures often work despite the steady decline in America's hegemonic position or the failings of its leaders.

My argument unfolds in several steps. First, I examine the concept of leadership itself and the debate about the decline in leadership. Leadership is an overused and underdefined term; clarifications and distinctions are needed. Second, I explore the several types of levels of leaderships in world politics—structural, institutional, and situational. Third, I look at various tools or mechanisms of leadership. In this light, I argue that the United States has lost much of its capacity to coerce, but coercion has never been as great a part of American hegemony as many people think. To the extent that it did matter, those circumstances are largely gone. I argue that the convergence or divergence of state interests—which in turn reflect the changing character of their societies—is an important independent aspect of whether and how leadership is necessary or effective.

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Finally, I argue that the overall American-shaped system is still in place. It is this macropolitical system—a legacy of American power and its liberal polity—that remains and serves to foster agreement and consensus. This is precisely what people want when they look for American leadership.

The Leadership Problem

If there is one consistent complaint in politics around the world today, it is about the absence of "leadership"—local, national, global. "Today," one journalist argued recently, "there seems to be a crisis of leadership." The problem is everywhere. "From the White House through Congress and down into the streets, there runs a cacophony of voices in which no single voice seems to sustain and rise from the crowd." Moreover, this is not just a problem in the United States. "From London to Hamburg, Moscow to Tokyo, leadership seems to be in short supply."[1] In international politics, observers look back with nostalgia at the great years of American global leadership. The United States seems more willing to pursue short-term and narrowly nationalist goals in its trade, aid, and security politics. No country or national leader seems to be articulating visions of the global future.

The sad state of international leadership is lamented in a multitude of foreign policy and economic studies that come out of academia and policy think tanks. A recent study of NATO expansion ends by calling for more American leadership in shaping post-cold war European and Atlantic security. The study's final paragraph calls for more American leadership: 'Without U.S. leadership—both at home and abroad—support for NATO may well wane, and the Alliance itself wither. With that leadership, NATO will last well into the next century as both Europe's premier security organization and the bedrock of the transatlantic partnership."[2] The future of America's security relationship with Europe hangs in the balance; the future could be bright or it could be bleak, and American leadership (its presence or absence) will decide which it is.

Others argue that American or other leadership is also the key to the future of the world economy. In a recent study, Fred Bergsten argues that the primary reason for "pervasive systemic problems" in the world economy recently has been the "difficulty of replacing the American leadership of the earlier postwar period." He goes on to argue that "filling the present leadership vacuum is one of the most crucial challenges facing the system as it enters the 21st century."[3]

[1] Erik Calonius, "Take Me to Your Leader," *Hemispheres*, April 1995, 39.

[2] *Should NATO Expand?* Report of an Independent Task Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 21-22.

[3] C. Fred Bergsten, "Managing the World Economy of the Future" in Peter Kenan, ed., *Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years after Bretton Woods* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994), 349.

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In this view, a major lesson of the past is a "leadership lesson"—that you need a country that sees its role in global terms, managing and stabilizing the world economy. The task ahead is to recreate that leadership.

These laments and calls for leadership have a ring of truth to them. A quick look around the world's political and economic landscape seems to confirm their worries. But it also raises questions. What precisely is international leadership? How is it manifest? What are the consequences if it is missing? Is leadership something that can be summoned up in the words and deeds of presidents and prime ministers, or is it something that resides more in the historical landscape itself? Do you need heroic times to get heroic leaders?

We can begin by clarifying our terms: leadership really has two essential elements—power and purpose. First, leadership is really an elegant word for power. To exercise leadership is to get others to do things that they would not otherwise do. It involves the ability to shape, directly or indirectly, the interests or actions of others. Leadership may involve the ability to not just "twist arms" but also to get other states to conceive of their interests and policy goals in new ways.[4] This suggests a second element of leadership, which involves not just the marshalling of power capabilities and material resources. It also involves the ability to project a set of political ideas or principles about the proper or effective ordering of politics.[5] It suggests the ability to produce concerted or collaborative actions by several states or other actors. Leadership is the use of power to orchestrate the actions of a group toward a collective end.

Varieties of International Leadership

The discussion of leadership has received more thematic than theoretical treatment.[6] To get at its multiple meanings and significance, it is useful to distinguish between three levels at which leadership can be manifest—structural, institutional, and situational. We will see that, while erosion in American leadership is undisputable, critical elements and legacies of it remain.

[4] Sophisticated theories of power acknowledge that the most far-reaching types of power involve the ability to shape the ideas and thinking of other actors as well as the ability to bully and coerce. See Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical Perspective* (London: Macmillan, 1974).

[5] For a discussion of "social purpose" as an aspect of power and political order, see John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982): 379–416.

[6] Discussion of leadership and hegemony in the academic study of international relations was rare until the 1970s, when Kindleberger presented his argument that the Great Depression was triggered by the absence of leadership and Gilpin analyzed the hegemonic experiences of Britain and the United States. See Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–39* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment* (New York: Basic Books, 1975). More recent studies have expanded and refined conceptions of international leadership. See Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead* (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and Oran Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," *International Organization* 45 (Summer 1991).

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Structural Leadership

Structural leadership refers to the underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct the overall shape of world political order. Natural resources, capital, technology, military force, and economic size are the characteristics that shape state power, which in turn determine the capacities for leadership and hegemony.[7]

The most forceful articulation of this structural leadership view is Robert Gilpin's realist theory of order and change in world politics.[8] According to Gilpin, international order is, at any particular moment in history, the reflection of the underlying distribution of material capabilities of states. Over time, that distribution of power shifts, leading to conflicts and ruptures in the system, hegemonic war, and the eventual reorganization of order that reflects the new distribution of power capabilities. The rising hegemonic state, whose power position has been ratified by war, defines the terms of the new world political order. Gilpin allows that the hegemony's "control over" or "governance" of the system is facilitated by the "prestige" of the leading state and by "rights and rules" that govern the specific relations between states. But the preponderance of material power capabilities ultimately allows the hegemonic state to exercise its hegemonic leadership.

Structural theories of leadership and hegemony vary widely.[9] Adopting the "long-cycle" view of world politics, George Modelski advances a notion of "world leadership."[10] According to him, a state comes to dominate an era by riding a wave of rising technological innovation, economic growth, and military power. This dominance takes the form of world leadership, as the powerful state diffuses political, economic and technological innovations. World leadership has a positive impact on world order—coercion is low, stability is maintained, and follower states gain from exchange relations with the leader. A less benign structural view of hegemonic leadership is presented by Immanual Wallerstein, who argues that the world capitalist system itself is a hegemonic order built around coercion, exploitation, and inequality. The leading capitalist states of the world system maintain their hold through unequal exchange, military domination, and political hierarchy.[11]

[7] Structural leadership might be thought of as the potential for leadership, because it refers to the power resources at the state's disposal. As American policy in the interwar period indicates, this potential may not be turned into a strong role.

[8] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[9] For an overview of theories and debates, see David P. Rapkin, ed., *World Leadership and Hegemony* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990).

[10] George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987). See also Modelski, "Is World Politics a Learning Process," *International Organization* 44 (Winter 1990): 1–24.

[11] See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World-Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). For an earlier formulation, see Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16 (September 1974): 387–415.

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What these structural theories have in common is a basic conviction: that leadership is rooted in the distribution of power (defined in terms of material capacities and/or location in the world capitalist system). They also argue that it is not really people or policy that provides leadership, but the structure itself. In a very real sense, hegemonic states cannot help but create order. Leaders of hegemonic states do need to turn their overwhelming power position into a stable political order, but such action is close to automatic. In the long run, powerful states determine the shape of the world political order. Gilpin argues that this capacity to shape the "constitution of the established order" has been based throughout history on victory in hegemonic war. The state that emerges victorious in war has established its capacity to "enforce its will on other states," and this provides the authority to organize and govern the postwar political order.[12]

The other conviction that many of these hegemonic theorists share is the view that once hegemonic power erodes, so too does the stability and openness of the system.[13] The underlying international system is prone toward decay, breakdown, and crisis. It takes the presence and exercise of political power—or hegemonic leadership—to organize and stabilize the system. Taken together, these arguments advance rather strong hypotheses about stability and change within the international system: where power is highly concentrated in the hands of a hegemonic state, the system will be stable and prosperous; where it is decentralized, order is more problematic and perhaps out of the hands of states to organize and manage.

If leadership is rooted in the distribution of power, there is reason to worry about the present and future. The relative decline of the United States has not been matched by the rise of another hegemonic leader. At its hegemonic zenith after World War II, the United States commanded roughly 45 percent of world production. It had a remarkable array of natural resource, financial, agricultural, industrial, and technological assets. America in 1945 or 1950 was not just hegemonic because it had a big economy or a huge military; it had an unusually wide range of resources and capabilities.[14] This situation may never occur again. As far as one looks into the next century, it is impossible to see the emergence of a country with a similarly commanding power position.[15]

[12] Gilpin, *War and Change*, 34.

[13] This argument is made in Robert Gilpin, "Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective" in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds., *Economic Issues and National Security* (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 19–66. See also Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), esp. 20–112.

[14] An important criticism of the hegemonic argument is that it overestimates American hegemonic power at its zenith and therefore sees more subsequent decline than is warranted. See Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization* 39 (Spring 1985): 207–31; and Nye, *Bound to Lead*.

[15] A recent World Bank study projects that the leading national economies in 2020 will be, in order of size, China, the United States, Japan, India, Indonesia, Germany, and Korea. France, Taiwan, Brazil, Italy, Russia, and Britain follow behind.

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If the world has seen the end of great power wars, this also diminishes the likelihood of new hegemonic leadership. What makes these hegemonic moments so consequential is that they follow in the wake of global war, which itself magnifies the power differentials. The destructiveness of war also serves to destroy the old order, clearing the way for the new hegemonic power to call forth a new order. There is reason to think that these great European and world wars are, thankfully, a thing of the past. The shadow of nuclear weapons, the spread of democratic capitalism among the great powers, historical learning—these developments and others suggest that the old pattern of world war and hegemonic order is gone.[16] This is a situation of good and bad news. The good news is that world war among the great powers is probably a thing of the past; the bad news is that, as a result, the classic and perhaps crucial mechanism for producing a hegemonic leader has also vanished.

But this structural view of leadership has limitations. It rightly points to power as an underlying condition of leadership. A preponderance of power does endow a state with the material resources to get other states to do things, but material power alone is seldom enough to induce states to act collectively. As I will argue later, coercion is an overrated instrument of world politics, even for hegemonic leaders. This was discovered by the United States after World War II. Ironically, the weakness of postwar Europe was itself a constraint on the use of American power. The very process of negotiation and agreement between states opens up huge gaps and discontinuities in the translation of hegemonic power into postwar order.[17] Likewise, there are strong incentives for hegemonic states not to just coerce but also persuade other states to embrace the overall norms and principles of order. This also diminishes the absolute and direct role of power capabilities in organizing and managing a world political order. Ideology, institutions, and statecraft also matter in the provision of international leadership.

Institutional Leadership

Institutional leadership refers to the rules and practices that states agree to that set in place principles and procedures that guide their relations. It is not power capabilities as such or the interventions of specific states that facilitate concerted action, but the rules and mutual expectations that are established as institutions.

[16] Gilpin raises the issue of nuclear weapons as a development that might alter the historical pattern of hegemonic rise and fall. See *War and Change*, epilogue.

[17] G. John Ikenberry argues that the United States "got less than it wanted and more than it bargained for" after World War II in Europe. The United States was forced to modify and reorient its global and European postwar plans, while at the same time it was drawn into a more direct role in Europe than American officials desired or anticipated. See Ikenberry, "Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony," *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (Fall 1989): 375–400. See also Charles Maier, "Alliance and Autonomy: European Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in the Truman Years" in Michael Lacy, ed., *The Truman Presidency* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

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Institutions are, in a sense, self-imposed constraints that states create to assure continuity in their relations and to facilitate the realization of mutual interests.

A common theme of recent discussions of the management of the world economy is that institutions will need to play a greater role in the future in providing leadership in the absence of American hegemony. Bergsten argues, for example, that "institutions themselves will need to play a much more important role." Institutional management is important and can "generate results that are internationally greater than the sum of their national parts."[18] The argument is not that international institutions impose outcomes on states, but that institutions shape and constrain how states conceive and pursue their interests and policy goals.[19] They provide channels and mechanisms to reach agreements. They set standards and mutual expectations concerning how states should act. They "bias" politics in internationalist directions—just as, presumably, hegemonic leadership does.

It is useful to distinguish between two levels of institutions and two ways in which institutions matter as a reflection of or substitute for leadership. One level is the surface layer of institutions, which include the wide array of multilateral institutions that knit together the Western and global system: the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and so forth. These institutions matter as they "solve" problems for states. This is the neoliberal institutionalist argument: cooperation between states is difficult; it is hampered by fears of cheating, costs of transactions, and uncertainties about gains. Institutions solve or mitigate these problems. They reduce the uncertainty about the reliability of other states and, once in place, they lower the costs of securing specific agreements.[20]

There is an intuitive appeal to this neoliberal argument. If there is anything to the notion of collective leadership, it springs from this view of how institutions express the joint leadership efforts of several major states. The fact that just a handful of states (perhaps only the United States, Japan, and Germany) form the core of the world economy also reinforces this view that institutionalized leadership can work. It is surprising, therefore, that little real systematic evidence exists that institutions (or regimes) actually do alter the calculations and actions of states.[21] There is no doubt that states can and do ignore institutional rules and

[18] Bergsten, "Managing the World Economy of the Future," 349.

[19] This and other views of institutions or regimes are discussed in Steven Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[20] The major statement of this position is Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (December 1988). Also see Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[21] The most recent attack on neoliberal institutionalism is John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994/95): 5–49. For a vigorous argument that institutions "matter," see Oran Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases

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commitments when they collide with their interests—and when they have the power to resist. The claim has to be that, despite the voluntaristic character of institutions, institutions change the environment or incentive structure in which states conceive and pursue their interests.

The 1995 auto trade dispute between Japan and the United States is illustrative. The United States has ignored WTO rules by moving to impose duties on Japanese luxury cars. This move violates GATT norms in several ways: it circumvents dispute settlement procedures; and it seeks a greater American market share, rather than multilateralizing Japanese concessions. But the GATT norms, nonetheless, arguably have a less direct impact. They provide a standard of measurement of state conduct, and this in turn feeds into the political process of claims, counterclaims, and the ultimate resolution of the dispute. They provide a basis for Europeans to criticize the United States, which raises the "cost" that the United States must face in pursuing the unilateral move. Moreover, if the Europeans want to be credible in their criticism of the United States, the situation creates an incentive for them to abide by GATT standards.[22]

There is a more profound way in which the institutions that span the Western industrial world have an impact on the relations among the states. Stepping back, it is possible to see the complex interactions of the advanced industrial Western world as forming a single, albeit primitive political system, with the United States as its central hub. This view does not stress the importance of specific institutions as such. Rather, it focuses on the macrocharacter of the industrial democracies and their myriad relations and connections. The argument is that the evolution of this complex system has served to domesticate relations among the major Western states. There are tense conflicts between these states from time to time, but the important point is that conflict is contained within a deeply embedded, stable, and increasingly articulated shared political order. Moreover, this complex political order is the legacy of American hegemony—a legacy not just of power but of the specific liberal, democratic character of the American system.

This "deeper" view of institutions draws on a different set of theoretical traditions than neoliberal institutionalism. Institutions do not get created to "solve" problems between states (such as providing information and reducing transaction costs). Rather, institutions emerged as a more intrinsic part of the character and maturation of American hegemony and the wider complex of liberal, industrial democracies. This view of institutions has at least three theoretical parts. First, there is the notion that war has ceased to be part of the context or backdrop of relations among the mature industrial democracies. In this sense, the West has

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and Critical Variables" in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 160–194.

[22] This is noted in a recent *Financial Times* editorial. It argued that the European opposition to the American trade action would have the most impact if it were backed by a consistent European trade policy: "The EU's arguments will carry weight, however, only if it adheres scrupulously to those rules, even when that is politically unpalatable." See "Defending Trade," *Financial Times*, 22 May 1995.

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taken on the characteristics of what Karl Deutsch has called a "security community."[23] Second, the specific character of institutional relations between the industrial democracies is driven by the evolution of capitalism and industrial society. That is, the political structure of relations is adaptive to changes in the economic and industrial order, which have intensified interdependence.[24] Finally, the decentralized and liberal democratic character of the United States polity itself is crucial to the creation and evolution of this system. The fragmented and penetrated American system allows and invites the proliferation of a vast network of transnational and transgovernmental relations with Europe, Japan, and other parts of the industrial world. Diffuse and dense networks of governmental, corporate, and private associations tie the system together.[25]

The upshot is that hegemony and liberalism have produced a rather stable and durable political order. It is not as formally or highly integrated as the European Union, but it is just as profound and robust as a political order. As long as the system allows for democratic states to press claims and resolve conflicts, the system will perpetuate itself. This view of the post-hegemonic Western world does not put a great deal of emphasis on American leadership in the traditional sense. American leadership takes the form of providing the venues and mechanisms for articulating demands and resolving disputes – not unlike the character of politics within domestic pluralistic systems.

This posthegemonic system is still American centered. The United States remains the primary site for the pulling and hauling of trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific politics. Europeans and Japanese do not have elected officials in Washington, but they do have representatives.[26] Although this access to the American political process is not fully reciprocated abroad, the openness and extensive decentralization of the American liberal system assures other states that they

[23] Karl Deutsch et al, *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956).

[24] The literature on industrial society is huge. See, for example, Raymond Aron, *The Industrial Society: Three Essays on Ideology and Development* (New York: Clarion Books, 1966); and Clark Kerr, *The Future of Industrial Societies: Convergence or Continuing Diversity?* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). For an early attempt to extend these industrial society and modernization arguments to international relations, see Edward L. Morse, *Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations* (New York: Free Press, 1976).

[25] This argument is made in Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). See also Thomas A. Schwartz, "The United States and Germany after 1945: Alliances, Transnational Relations, and the Legacy of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 19 (Fall 1995): esp. 556–60. For a collection of case studies, see Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[26] Pat Choate's book about the agents of Japanese interests that thrive in Washington and subvert American policy can be read as an evocative illustration of how the American hegemonic order works. The opportunities for "voice" have made the system remarkably stable and accessible. See Pat Choate, *Agents of Influence* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990). See also John B. Judis, "The Japanese Megaphone: Foreign Influences on Foreign Policymaking," *The New Republic*, 22 January 1990, 20–25.

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have routine access to the decision-making processes of the United States. The American liberal polity's transparency and permeability has fostered an extended liberal polity, reaching outward to the other industrial democracies, with most of its roads leading to Washington. Transnational and transgovernmental processes provide the channels. As a result, the overall system is remarkably stable and legitimate. The United States remains the center of the system, but other states are highly integrated into it; and its legitimacy diminishes the need for the exercise of coercive power by the United States or for balancing responses from secondary states.

Situational Leadership

Situational leadership refers to the actions and initiatives of states that induce cooperation quite apart from the distribution of power or the array of institutions. It is more cleverness or the ability to see specific opportunities to build or reorient international political order, rather than the power capacities of the state, that makes a difference. In this sense, leadership really is expressed in a specific individual – in a president or foreign minister – as he or she sees a new opening, a previously unidentified passage forward, a new way to define state interests, and thereby transforms existing relations.[27]

The classic example of this type of leadership was Prussian leader Otto von Bismarck, who was the singular presence in the transformation of great power politics in Europe in the 1860s and 1870s. His great struggle to unify the confederation of German states and alter the equilibrium of power in Europe was an extraordinary exercise in diplomacy in all its facets – intellectual imagination, political persuasion, and the use of military power. In a classic study of the German leader, Henry Kissinger shows a Bismarck that was relentless in seeking to alter the way German nationalism and national interests were defined. The cynical manipulation of domestic politics was matched by a moral passion in attacking the structural weakness of Germany locked in place by the 1815 Vienna settlement. The unification of Germany had to be orchestrated in a Europe whose stability hinged on a Germany that was not too weak nor too powerful. Kissinger argues that Bismarck's creation was a brilliant act of leadership. But this was also a tragedy. The elaborate balancing act of alliance politics, domestic support, and ideological construction were all extensions of Bismarck himself. It required a brilliant leader to manage such a sophisticated and fragile creation. So it was that the leaders that followed Bismarck, in Kissinger's view, were not up to his capacities, and it all fell apart.[28]

[27] Oran Young refers to this type of leadership as "entrepreneurial" leadership. See Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation." This view of leadership is stressed in Ghita Ionescu, *Leadership in an Interdependent World: The Statesmanship of Adenauer, De Gaulle, Thatcher, Reagan, and Gorbachev* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991).

[28] As Henry Kissinger writes: "Because of his magnificent grasp of the nuances of power relationships, Bismarck saw in his philosophy a doctrine of self-limitation. Because these nuances were not

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Few leaders find such opportunities to turn weakness into strength—to alter world politics by personal passion, charisma, or cleverness. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev may be the most recent case where leadership involves overcoming the limitations of the situation. In this case it might be a case of turning necessity into a virtue. But Gorbachev underscores the role that rhetoric, ideas, and imagination can play in overturning the old order. Gorbachev, like Bismarck, provided leadership in part by imagining a new pathway forward.

Power and Social Purpose

History suggests that hegemonic leadership has really only been within the reach of states that have a preponderance of military and economic capabilities. Less powerful states can project leadership in various ways and in various regional areas, but it is primarily big and powerful states that are most capable of providing sustained leadership in ways that actually serve to shape and stabilize world political order. The great eras of *Pax Britannica* and *Pax Americana* were no exception. Britain and the United States each played a far-reaching global leadership role with a unique combination of industrial, geographical, and military assets.[29]

But, as we have seen, leadership is not simply the exercise of power. It is not simply coercion or arm twisting. It also involves the ability to project a set of common goals or principles that allow a group of states to define and pursue their interests in concerted or congenial ways. Military power and coercion are overrated forms of leadership assets. My argument is that this overrating of traditional power assets and coercion has always been the case, but that it is increasingly the case today.

One constraint on the exercise of power is that even a big and powerful state has an incentive to organize and manage a political order that is considered legitimate by the other states. It is not in a hegemonic leader's interest to preside over a global order that requires constant use of material capabilities to get other states to go along. Legitimacy exists when political order is based on reciprocal consent. It emerges when secondary states buy into rules and norms of the political order as a matter of principle, and not simply because they are forced into it. But if a hegemonic power wants to encourage the emergence of a legitimate political order, it must articulate principles and norms, and engage in negotiations and compromises that have very little to do with the exercise of power.[30]

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apparent to his successors and imitators, the application of Bismarck's lessons led to an armament race and a world war." Kissinger, "The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck," *Daedalus* 97 (Summer 1968): 919.

[29] For a discussion of Britain's ascendant and multifaceted world position in the early nineteenth century, see Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1994).

[30] This argument is made in G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44 (Summer 1990). On the generic problem of domination and legitimacy, see David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power* (London: Macmillan, 1991).

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The United States found itself in this position after World War II. Its overwhelming power position insured that it was at the center of postwar negotiations, but its desire to create a legitimate order provided openings for Europeans to help shape the substantive content of newly created rules and institutions. The result was a postwar economic order that accommodated European designs for economic stabilization, social welfare, and employment security.[31] The search for a legitimate order led the United States to engage the other major states on basic principles and rules of postwar order. But to get agreement, it had to compromise and rethink its original postwar vision. The commanding power position of the United States was essential in this process: it used its wartime assets to force the British to agree to end its far-flung imperial preference area. But in building its hegemonic system, the United States both acted and was acted upon.[32] A political order— particularly a legitimate order—requires architecture and institutions. As a result, at historical moments when newly hegemonic states are creating world political order, ideas and vision matter along with military and economic capabilities.

The Spread of Ideas and Models

In both the British and American eras, what made these hegemonic leaders successful and influential was that they had more than coercive power to offer the world—they also had ideas. The power of ideas was manifest in several ways. First, Britain and the United States each articulated a general set of ideas about the desirable organization of world politics. In each case it was a more or less liberal vision. In the mid- and late-nineteenth century, Britain championed the ideology of free trade, and there is some evidence that commercial relations in Europe were transformed in part by the appeal of these liberal economic ideas.[33] In the twentieth century, American claims to world leadership were wrapped in a neoliberal ideology of economic openness, stable growth, and joint economic management of the world economy. This was an evolved set of liberal ideas, incorporating lessons from the interwar years and the New Deal.[34] In each case,

[31] This argument is made in John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-war Economic Order," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982). See also Ruggie, "Embedded Liberalism Revisited: Institutions and Progress in International Economic Relations" in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., *Progress in International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

[32] See Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power."

[33] See Charles P. Kindleberger, "The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe," *The Journal of Economic History* 35 (March, 1975): 20–55.

[34] For a discussion of America's postwar orientation, see Charles Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II" in Maier, *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); see also John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution" in Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 3–47.

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an ideology of world politics was projected; each stressed the virtues of economic integration and the promise of joint gains.

Whatever the specific impact of British or American liberal ideas, it is probably also the case that the overall robustness of their economy and polity had a lot to do with the persuasiveness of their ideas.[35] In effect, this is another aspect of hegemonic leadership—leadership by example. States are particularly willing to follow a state if that state is successful, that is, if it has developed a particularly appealing and prosperous domestic political order. The appeal of a particular state may rise or fall. Certainly, a part of the appeal of British free trade ideas in the nineteenth century was the demonstrable success of the British economy and its leading edge in the industrial revolution. German industrial and technological prowess in the mid-1930s impressed more than a few British and continental European elites, even to the point that it tempered their opposition to National Socialism.

The appeal of America's booming postwar economy and consumer society was world wide, and this appeal certainly reinforced the hegemonic position of the United States. The cold war struggle with the Soviet Union added to the notion that the United States was being held up as a model to the rest of the world. To be sure, the cold war was a military struggle. But it was also an ideological struggle between two very different types of societies, each claiming universal validity. American leaders understood this fact, and their concern about projecting an appealing and progressive model of advanced capitalist society was evidenced throughout the cold war era in their rhetoric and actions.

In more recent years, other countries have been held up as models. Japan has ridden a wave of acclaim since the 1970s in its stunning economic advancement, as has Germany. Both have seen various aspects of their internal industrial systems copied in other countries. Likewise, the leadership claims of the United States have been undermined to some degree by major failings within the American society and economy. Crime, poverty, homelessness, and economic inequality have all taken the shine off the appeal of the American model, and presumably also diminished the luster of American leadership. It is often said that leadership begins at home, but it may also end there.

Leadership and the Market

Finally, there is another element of world leadership that is more tangible. It is not a coincidence that Britain and the United States rose to hegemonic status as they opened their internal markets to foreign traders. This says something important about hegemonic leadership: that a powerful asset or tool of an aspiring

[35] For the argument that ideas spread because of their merits but also because of their association with economic success and material rewards, see Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework" in Goldstein and Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 3–30.

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world leader is the organization of its own internal economy and society. The ability to encourage policy changes in other states through the opening of one's own economy may be a decisive, but underappreciated, element in the stable provision of leadership.[36]

In the mid-nineteenth century, Britain's abolition of the Corn Laws really set in motion the liberalizing trade policies in Europe and the United States. It was not the direct use of threats or coercion by Britain that triggered liberalization of trade; it was the opening of its own internal market that altered the price of specific goods, shifted the balance within trade coalitions abroad, and generated the incentives for freer trade. The American movement toward lower tariffs in the years before the Civil War was stimulated by trade opportunities within the liberalizing British market.[37] Prussia and the other German states responded in a similar fashion.

This dynamic was even more clearly at work in the United States after 1945. With a large internal market and few serious foreign competitors, the United States was relatively unconstrained in the "strategic" use of domestic market openings. This has long been seen as crucial in facilitating Japanese postwar economic reconstruction and stimulating its export economy. Newly declassified documents have shown just how explicit this strategic use of American markets was in fact during both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. A 1952 document prepared by the Truman administration's National Security Council argued that "[t]he entry of Japanese goods into the United States should be facilitated," and it urged the use of Japanese goods "as a source of supply on a commercial basis for equipment and supplies procured by U.S. armed forces or under United States aid programs for other countries." A 1953 Eisenhower document also declared that "increasing access to markets in the United States" is needed to stem "economic deterioration and falling living standards" in Japan that "create fertile ground for communist subversion."[38] This same logic can be found in American policy toward Europe, where postwar administrations actively invited European imports so as to stimulate European growth and economic stabilization.

Two conclusions follow from this observation. First, if the provision of a market for foreign goods is critical to world leadership, the United States still has a huge instrument at its disposal, even if the preeminence of the American market has declined. The internal market can still be used to encourage liberalization elsewhere. Second, this is also a lesson for Japan. If it wants to play a larger world leadership role, its domestic market must also be opened.[39] It will only

[36] This, of course, is the argument of Kindleberger in *The World in Depression*. The role of the market in the exercise and provision of leadership is also emphasized in the work of Susan Strange. See, in particular, *States and Markets* (London: Pinter, 1988).

[37] See Scott C. James and David A. Lake, "The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846," *International Organization* 43 (Winter 1989): 1–29.

[38] Stuart Auerbach, "The Ironies that Built Japan," *Washington Post*, 18 July 1993.

[39] This argument has frequently been made. See Gerard Baker, "Benefits of Building a Bloc," *Financial Times*, 17 May 1995, 11.

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have the external clout to support an open international order if it opens its internal markets.

Leadership and Social Purpose

Perhaps the most important way in which the United States used its overwhelming power capabilities after World War II was in its occupation and reconstruction policies in Germany and Japan. It was acting on a lesson learned from the disastrous 1919 postwar settlement within Germany—that it was dangerous to leave in place the defeated and humiliated military and political elites that had fought and lost the war.[40] In a less direct way, the United States was also acting on an argument made by Woodrow Wilson and other liberals during the earlier world war—that democratic and liberal capitalist states pose fewer threats to each other, and that they are more likely to cooperate together in a peaceful political order.[41]

In effect, the most consequential act of American hegemony after 1945 was to reorient the "social purpose" of the other major states.[42] From the perspective of fifty years later, it was the political reorientation of Germany and Japan (and to a lesser extent the other Western industrial states) that mattered most. The transformation of the social purpose of these states—how these states define and express the purpose and goals of politics and society—seems to have most altered the course of Western history. It was the transformation of "aims" more than the management of "arms" that most shaped our recent past.[43]

But this brings us to the last issue. If the social purpose of the leading states has been transformed, perhaps the world does not need hegemonic leadership in the way it did in the past. In the 1940s, the great powers of the world were a heterogeneous complex of authoritarian, socialist, autocratic, and liberal democratic states. Today, there is still a mix, but it is ultimately a much more homogeneous complex of states. Perhaps America's liberal hegemonic work has largely

[40] This argument is stressed in David Fromkin, *In the Time of the Americans: The Generation that Changed America's Role in the World* (New York: Knopf, 1995). On the more general lessons learned by FDR from Wilson's experience, see Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945* (New York: Atheneum, 1979); and Robert A. Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

[41] See Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 6.

[42] On American and Western efforts to liberalize postwar German and Japanese political institutions, see John Montgomery, *Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); John Herz, ed., *From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1982); Thomas A. Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).

[43] Of course, the attempt to root out and replace the old fascist and imperialist elites in Germany and Japan was incomplete. Beyond the inherent limits to engaging in this sort of elite transformation, the onset of the cold war tempered the enthusiasm by American officials for doing so.

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been accomplished—at least the work that requires the most concentrated use of material capabilities and military power.[44]

Conclusion

This century has been a century of world leadership. In the 1930s and 1940s the world was overrun by states that sought to organize and rule world politics. All the great powers had hegemonic ambitions of one kind or another. In the decades that followed, the United States and the Soviet Union articulated even more ambitious claims to leadership. Today, we worry about the absence of world leadership, but we might also be grateful that at least the most aggressive and coercive forms of hegemonic leadership are no longer being tendered on the world stage.

There were enough virtues attached to American leadership in the West after 1945 to worry at least about what will happen as the American position continues to decline. The argument of this article is that there are more bases and opportunities for leadership than often thought, including for the United States. But the type of leadership most needed today is not the type that left its mark on the Western world after World War II. The American leadership in the 1940s and 1950s was a transformative leadership; it involved reorienting the basic social and political structures of the defeated states and encouraging a commonality of social purpose. This was done in direct ways through occupation and reconstruction, but it was also done indirectly in the projection of liberal ideology and the opening of America's domestic market.

Today it is not transformative leadership that is needed so much as a less heroic leadership capable of managing complex social and industrial adjustments across the advanced Western world. If the 1940s were a movie, it would be an epic adventure—cast of thousands, great violent battles, leaders on horseback. Today, the movie would be a family drama—no violence, no swashbuckling adventures, but a lot of specific and complex issues to sort out and resolve.[45] The leaders today need to be good politicians who can balance domestic and international pressures, and who can cut deals, make compromises, and resolve disputes. In other words, the international leadership skills needed in today's

[44] By hegemonic work, I mean the use of hegemonic resources to create new institutions and transform the social purposes of other states. Management of the American-led liberal order remains, including the operation of the American security relations with Western Europe and Japan.

[45] Of course, families can be dysfunctional and some even fall apart. My argument is that the first step in preserving the semidomestic character of the Western industrial world is to recognize its historical and institutional dimensions as well as its many achievements. After this, it may be necessary to find ways to further "contain" and "domesticate" foreign policy and economic conflicts within this American system—a need that is underscored by the current American-Japanese trade dispute. This bolstering of the system may involve the creation of more explicit institutional structures for pan-Western policy cooperation and the development of greater reciprocity in market access and policy voice across the system.

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world are increasingly the same skills needed for leaders to be successful in domestic pluralistic systems—not the ability to command troops and confront enemies, but the ability to bargain across many different issues and groups, build coalitions, and seize opportunities for agreement.

It has been remarked that the type of charismatic leader who succeeds in war or revolution is often undistinguished in its aftermath—Winston Churchill and V.I. Lenin come to mind. This may also be true in world politics. Those who wish for the return of a benign hegemonic power that can organize and run the world political order do not understand that the war and revolution are over. What we need are good politicians who understand the type of political order they are operating within.

As we have seen, the early era of American hegemony has left the world (or at least the West) with a remarkably elaborate political order that allows for the management of pressures and adjustments. A complex array of institutions and channels of communication infuse the advanced industrial world. Relations among these countries have been "hard wired" and domesticated. Although much of the material power of American hegemony has eroded, the institutions of reciprocal and legitimate joint governance remain. This system might well remain relatively stable for a very long time. Its stability would only be threatened if a country of rising economic and military capacity challenges its basic legitimacy. The challenge to the system must be one of both power and social purpose.

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Clinton and the Economy: The Paradox of Policy Success and Political Mishap

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The Clinton presidency has been an especially difficult one for scholars to evaluate, and nowhere have the paradoxes been so prominent as in economic policy. Although Bill Clinton's ambitious economic program was trimmed and modified by the Congress, most of it survived and was enacted; on virtually every objective indicator of macroeconomic performance, the country has prospered. Yet the public impression of President Clinton's performance, in the economy as much as in other areas, ranges from an image of well intentioned haplessness to one of insensitive big-government liberalism.[1] When policy and politics seem so much out of synch, evaluation and explanation are difficult and uncertain: without a systematic approach, it is all but impossible to evaluate the alternatives.

Several, sometimes incompatible accounts of the Clinton presidency abound. Some see the strategic missteps of an inexperienced and overeager White House as the source of various policy gaffes—gays in the military and the three ill-

[1] Journalists Bob Woodward and Elizabeth Drew reflect much elite opinion in emphasizing the administration's diffuse policy agenda and fragmented advisory structure. If only, the suggestion goes, Clinton had measured up to the quality of presidential leadership shown by Reagan or Johnson, then the legislative branch would have worked in tandem to accomplish the president's program. See Bob Woodward, *The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

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researched judicial nominations are often mentioned. Though not fatal in themselves, they connoted a lack of sophistication or competence that made the public less willing to credit the president when his initiatives have succeeded. This interpretation sees skepticism as built on early policy failures.[2] Others trace the voters' skepticism to aspects of Clinton's personal image that antedate their experience with his policy leadership. Unable to reverse the public's early doubts about his integrity and character, the president has faced a public that gives him much less credit for his successes (and more blame for his mistakes) than other presidents have reaped in similar situations.[3] Evidence can be found to support each of these views, and thus, as so often happens in evaluating presidents, it is impossible to gain perspective on the different interpretations unless we can frame the debate in terms of a more general, comparative perspective.

In this article, we examine President Clinton's handling of economic policy, particularly during his first year in office. The economy was the issue most central to his winning the election, and it dominated the administration's early agenda. We focus on three factors: the president's economic ideology, his economic and political advisory structure, and his substantive agenda. We portray these as potential resources, but we evaluate Clinton's ability to use them successfully in light of the formidable constraints he faced. These include: the lack of a clear electoral mandate, the economic policies of his predecessors, fundamental changes in the institutional and policy relationship between the president and Congress, and a congressional arena in which a fissiparous Democratic party faced an unprecedentedly unified Republican opposition. The article proceeds in five parts. The first two sections define the criteria for presidential policy success and outline our model of presidential leadership in economic policy. The next two sections discuss the political and institutional constraints confronting the activist ambitions of the new president and summarize President Clinton's

[2] Researchers differ on the reasons for this, with some suggesting that the president's programs have been too liberal and hence have not fulfilled his promise to govern as a New Democrat, while others note that the public has been unusually ill informed about Clinton's proposals and attribute the voters' low level of support to other causes, including media coverage fixated on political competition and strategy rather than the search for policy solutions, the well-funded negative campaigns of conservative interest groups, or an unusually uncompromising tactic of opposition pursued by congressional Republicans. See Harold W. Stanley, "The Parties, the President, and the 1994 Midterm Elections" in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds., *The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), 188–211; Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Samuel C. Patterson, "Congress Bashing and the 1992 Election" in Herbert F. Weisberg, ed., *Democracy's Feast: Elections in America* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), chap. 11; Graham K. Wilson, "The Clinton Administration and Interest Groups" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., *The Clinton Presidency*, 212–233; Paul J. Quirk and Joseph Hinchliffe, "Domestic Policy: The Trials of a Centrist Democrat" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., *The Clinton Presidency*, 262–89; Barbara Sinclair, "Trying to Govern Positively in a Negative Era: Clinton and the 103rd Congress" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., *The Clinton Presidency*, 88–125.

[3] Paul J. Quirk, "Presidential Competence" in Michael Nelson, ed., *The Presidency and the Political System* (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995), chap. 6.

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policy resources. The final section details the formulation of Clinton's economic program and its progress through the legislative process, focusing on the interplay between resources and constraints.

Indicators of Presidential Success

Presidents are judged not only by what they achieve but by how they accomplish it, and thus two conceptions of successful policy leadership can be found in the literature on the presidency. Although measures of outcomes and descriptions of process are ultimately complementary, they focus on different parts of the question of policy success, and each has its own strengths and weaknesses. We combine the two approaches in seeking to evaluate President Clinton's economic initiatives. In this section, we review indicators of the administration's success in Congress and of the performance of the national economy during Clinton's first two years. These data show a strongly positive picture. These outcome indicators have the advantage of quantitative precision and comparability from one administration to the next, but their interpretation is not unambiguous. The numbers alone, whether tracking economic conditions or legislative enactment, cannot provide definitive answers to the causal questions about how and why. Was the economy's robust growth in fact caused by the president's policies, or might it have occurred in the absence of new initiatives? Do the data showing administration victories on congressional roll calls mean that the president exercised influence over the legislature or that the White House adjusted its requests to what the Congress would support? Subsequent sections flesh out these indicators, providing a structured narrative of the economic policy-making process in the president's first year or so. They show a more mixed but, we believe, more valid picture; and it is on the basis of this analysis that we draw several inferences about the degree and sources of the president's economic policy success.

A Supportive Congress and an Improving Economy

President Clinton's success rate in Congress during his first year was exceptional. With Congress approving his position on 86.4 percent of the 191 roll calls on which he took a position, Clinton's first year box score is one of the highest for the whole forty-year period that *Congressional Quarterly* has tracked this performance indicator. Except for Dwight Eisenhower in 1953 (89 percent) and Lyndon Johnson in 1965 (88 percent), Clinton's success rate exceeded the first-year performance of every other president in the series. John Kennedy in 1961 (81 percent) and Ronald Reagan in 1981 (82.4 percent) also had successful first years, but Clinton's performance clearly bettered that of Richard Nixon in 1969 (74 percent), Jimmy Carter in 1977 (75.4 percent) and George Bush in 1989 (62.6 percent). Moreover, the level of support was uniformly high in both chambers (87.3 percent in the House and 85.4 percent in the Senate) and in every

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subject category (92.3 percent on economic issues, 83.8 percent on defense and foreign policy, 82.6 percent on domestic issues).[4]

The performance of the economy during Clinton's first two years was equally robust. Elizabeth Drew summarizes conditions in 1993:

> The economic situation that Clinton had inherited was daunting. Unemployment was 7.7 percent, growth was erratic. The recovery was shaky, and it wasn't producing jobs. Corporations had "downsized," suggesting a fundamental change in the employment structure. Worldwide growth was stagnant. The questions facing Clinton and his advisers were how to spur investment without igniting inflation and how to eliminate a significant portion of the deficit without contracting the economy too much.[5]

By the end of 1994, virtually every indicator of aggregate economic performance had improved: the rate of growth was up; job creation in the economy was at a record pace and unemployment fell steadily over the period; and consumer optimism, profits, and the rate of investment were rising. Even with growing demand, inflation was virtually stilled, showing its smallest increase in twenty-eight years. And the administration cut the deficit and federal discretionary spending, with the ratio of federal discretionary spending to gross domestic product (GDP) falling to its lowest level since the early 1960s, and the deficit shrinking between 1992 and 1994 by more than a full percentage point as a proportion of gross domestic product.[6]

It would be a patent exaggeration to attribute this improvement wholly to government policy over the preceding two years. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to suppose that the economy's strong performance was at least in part due to Clinton administration economic policy initiatives. The combination of sustained growth, low inflation, and a declining deficit in this recovery distinguishes it from its predecessors. The administration's policy changes did move the economy in the right direction, particularly the increase in unemployment benefits early in the term, which had the effect of sustaining aggregate demand, and the emphasis (and visible progress) at lowering the deficit, which assuaged bond-holders' concerns and allowed interest rates to fall. In addition, it is worth emphasizing that incumbents typically get political credit for an improving economy, as registered in popular approval for the job the president is doing or in support for his party in the next election.

Like all summaries, these indicators of economic and political outcomes aggregate over important details. Those details relate to the process by which the

[4] Phil Duncan and Steven Langdon, "When Congress Had to Choose, It Voted to Back Clinton," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 18 December 1993.

[5] Drew, *On the Edge*, 62.

[6] This summary is based on the following statistical tables in the *Economic Report*: growth, Table B-1; unemployment, Table B-40; consumer sentiment, Table B-16; profit rate, Table B-18; investment, Table B-91; inflation, Tables B-3 and B-4; debt and federal discretionary spending, Table B-78. For reference, see William J. Clinton, *Economic Report of the President* (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, [hereafter GPO], 1995).

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Clinton administration presented its economic policy proposals and the Congress considered them. Characteristics of the political process, such as opposition strategies and coalition formation, are particularly important in this case, because media accounts and public perceptions of that process have shaped not only how President Clinton's economic policy results were viewed, but also colored the public's impression of his other policy accomplishments.[7]

Explaining Economic Policy Leadership

In our comparative research on the economic policy leadership of postwar presidents, we have tried to combine the strengths of both the descriptive, historical approach with its emphasis on the president's personal traits and the large policy themes of the time, and the more abstract approach with its emphasis on the way stable institutions structure the use and effectiveness of political resources.[8] Our narrative traces the development and legislative consideration of each of the president's key economic policy proposals, paying special attention to the essential ideas underlying those proposals and to the larger political and economic context in which they were introduced. At the same time, we have structured our inquiry around seven factors that are especially significant in explaining the extent to which legislation consistent with a president's economic policy goals is enacted. By explicitly focusing on only a few key variables, we can make systematic comparisons across presidents and generalize about the determinants of presidential success in economic policy making, as well as explain the track record of individual presidents. The seven factors can be arrayed by the extent to which they are amenable to the president's discretion, and by whether their usual impact on the likelihood of presidential success is as resources or constraints.

Although the notion of resources and constraints is sometimes invoked as if a clean break separated the two categories, in practice it is more illuminating to

[7] Blumenthal, for instance, notes several important legislative victories—the Earned Income Tax Credit, National Service, the Motor Voter Registration Law, Family and Medical Leave—"but those achievements had gone mostly unacknowledged, because of the ragged diversions and the tumultuous, close-run budget battle." See Sidney Blumenthal, "The Education of a President," *The New Yorker*, 24 January 1994, 31–43.

[8] M. Stephen Weatherford, "The Puzzle of Presidential Leadership: Persuasion, Bargaining and Policy Consistency," *Governance, an International Journal of Policy and Administration* 7 (April 1994): 135–65; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "Macroeconomic Policymaking Beyond the Electoral Constraint" in George C. Edwards III, Steven A. Shull, and Norman C. Thomas, eds., *The Presidency and Public Policymaking* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985); M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "Ideology and Economic Policy" in Larry Berman, ed., *Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), chap. 7; M. Stephen Weatherford, "Responsiveness and Deliberation in Divided Government: Presidential Leadership in Tax Policymaking," *British Journal of Political Science* 24 (January 1994): 1–31; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "The Role of Presidential Ideology in Economic Policy Making," *Policy Studies Journal* 12 (June 1984): 691–704; M. Stephen Weatherford, "The Interplay of Ideology and Advice in Economic Policy-Making: The Case of Political Business Cycles," *Journal of Politics* 49 (November 1987): 925–52.

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consider them as defining the poles of a continuum, with any particular factor containing some mix of advantages and constraints. The degree to which the president has discretion over the level, content, or operation of the factors defines this continuum. Consider the following seven factors. The president's *economic ideology* is formed early in his political career, and by orienting perceptions of and responses to political events, it guides the president's later experiences and the political lessons he takes from them. The president chooses his advisers and *structures the flow of advice* in a largely autonomous fashion, but these choices jointly reflect his own policy aspirations, consultations with party leaders, and consideration of what economic challenges his administration anticipates. The president's *policy agenda* gives concrete substance to his larger aspirations, but it is also acutely circumscribed by the administration's political resources and by objective trends and conditions in the economy. The president's ability to shape his resources clearly diminishes as we move to his *electoral mandate:* its magnitude is affected by the attractiveness of his policy ideas, but it is dependent at least as much on the ideas and campaign strategies of his opponents in the presidential race, the success of his party in congressional races, and on the way the media interpret his victory. Some aspects of the *president's relations with Congress* are within the president's control, for instance the ambitiousness of his policy agenda, the quality of the legislative liaison operation, and the extent and skill of the president's personal involvement in lobbying for his program. But others are quite independent, for instance the length of his electoral coattails as an influence on unity in his own party, or the party discipline, ideological distance, and legislative tactics of the opposition. Congress as an institution does not remain stable over time, and the clear trend of recent developments has been to magnify the separation between executive and legislature, and to increase the *assertiveness of Congress vis-à-vis attempts at presidential leadership*. Finally, essentially outside the president's control are the *economic and political legacies of past policies*, exemplified by the federal deficit with its effects both on fiscal flexibility and on the psychological receptiveness of elites and the public to activist initiatives.

Constraints on Economic Policy Leadership

Explaining economic policy entails not only understanding the president's decisions and actions in light of economic conditions, but also placing them into the context of the separation of powers, where constitutional provisions and the recent growth of legislative assertiveness circumscribe presidential activism. In this section, we review the political and economic constraints that formed the context for the Clinton administration's economic policy initiatives.

Electoral Resources: An Ambiguous Mandate and Short Coattails

Electoral resources are surely the most important to the president's relations with Congress, and President Clinton entered office with a modest dowry indeed.

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Clinton won a clear plurality of the popular vote at 43 present, compared to 37 percent for George Bush and 19 percent for Ross Perot; and he carried thirty-two states and the District of Columbia for 370 electoral votes to Bush's eighteen states and 168 electoral votes. The fact that a landslide proportion of the electorate voted for change did not go unnoticed by commentators. Walter Dean Burnham captures the sense in which the election marked the exhaustion of the Reagan revolution and the closing of a cycle of political time:

> Whatever else 1992 was, at its center was the landslide rejection of an incumbent president. It was also a landslide vote of no confidence in the conservative regime that Ronald Reagan and his allies had sought to create on the ruins of interest-group liberalism and that George Bush had been selected (and elected) in 1988 to maintain. This fact makes the 1992 election of far more than usual consequence. Rejections of this order of magnitude have not happened very often over the course of American political history.[9]

But Perot's third party candidacy mitigated the potential for this retrospective rejection to redound to Clinton's favor. Not only was his an unusually strong showing for a third party candidate, but Perot's outspoken insistence on the difference between himself and the major parties was interpreted in the press as weakening Clinton's claim to define his presidency by claiming a mandate. Moreover, Perot's forceful advocacy of the deficit issue had the effect of restricting the new president's maneuvering room in setting his economic agenda, for it undoubtedly heightened the sensitivity of Clinton and his advisers, not to mention the press and the public, to the deficit.

In the Congress, few legislators were likely to feel themselves beholden to the new president. As Gary Jacobson points out, Clinton's vigorous campaign and election probably helped some Democrats survive the effects of several Republican advantages—including redistricting, the House bank scandal, and the Clarence Thomas hearings.[10] Nevertheless, it did not show up in legislative gains for the Democratic party: no net change in the Senate and a loss of ten seats in the House. The high turnover and significant change in the demographic composition of both the Democratic and Republican delegations did have the effect of weakening the center and strengthening the ideological extremes. Moreover, with little turnover in the party leadership or committee chairs, Clinton faced a Congress controlled by members of his own party whose formative, perhaps only legislative experience was in opposition to the president.

The Strategic Context: Separated Powers and an Assertive Congress

An old image of American national politics continues to shape the expectations for presidential leadership that are held by the public and the media. This template

[9] Walter Dean Burnham, "The Legacy of George Bush: Travails of an Understudy" in Gerald M. Pomper, ed., *The Election of 1992* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993), chap. 1.

[10] Gary C. Jacobson, "Congress: Unusual Year, Unusual Election" in Michael Nelson, ed., *The Elections of 1992* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), chap. 7.

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sees the system dominated by a president endowed with a range of formal powers and supported by a cohesive party majority in Congress—with divided government, individualistic legislators, and an assertive Congress all viewed as deviations in need of special explanation.[11] Far from being exceptions, however, these developments are indicators of trends that distinguish the current operation of the separation of powers in terms of both institutional capacity and partisan conduct.

From a presidentialist to a separationist system. Charles Jones has argued that the Founders intended a system of legislative dominance, equipping the Congress with the formal resources to play an initiatory role in the national policy process.[12] Although "presidentialist-responsible party" elections (1932, 1964, and 1980) occasionally give the president sufficient resources to direct the government for a time, such elections are highly unusual and impart no lasting authority to the executive branch. The series of formal changes and informal adjustments in congressional procedures that have taken place since the mid-1960s have, moreover, strengthened the capacity of the legislature to resist, and sometimes to supplant presidential leadership.[13] The most important of these were adopted in the 1970s, largely in response to what was viewed as President Nixon's illegitimate arrogation of traditionally shared powers. Unlike earlier reforms, undertaken to correct perceived congressional inadequacies in leadership and organization, procedures, and analytical capabilities, these reforms were directed at an aggressive president and were more or less explicitly intended to reestablish congressional preeminence. They have contributed to the ability of Congress to carry out its functions of representing interests and serving constituents, but they have also allowed the legislature, now with a growing and independent congressional

[11] As divided government became the norm in the postwar years, Sundquist called for a "new theory" to explain the operation of separation of powers in contemporary politics. Two lines of response to this challenge can be discerned. Some have sought to place divided government into perspective, arguing that divided control is not all that unusual historically, across the states in the United States and in parliamentary systems in other advanced republics, or showing that divided control has few deleterious effects on the ability of the national government to carry out its purposes. Others have argued that the ideal type that underlies the responsible party model was never appropriate for the American political system. Looking back beyond the exceptional case of the New Deal, they give much more prominence to the strain of legislative autonomy in U.S. constitutional history. See James L. Sundquist, "Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly* 103 (Winter 1988–89): 613–35; Morris P. Fiorina, *Divided Government* (New York: Macmillan, 1992); David R. Mayhew, *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946–1990* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Charles O. Jones, *The Presidency in a Separated System* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994); Demetrios Caraley, "Elections and Dilemmas of Democratic Governance: Reflections," *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (Spring 1989): 19–40.

[12] Jones, *The Presidency in a Separated System*.

[13] James L. Sundquist, *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981); Roger H. Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and Michael K. O'Leary, *Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1966); esp. Nelson W. Polsby, *Congress and the Presidency*, 4 ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986).

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bureaucracy, to expand its activities into areas for which the competence of legislatures is less suited—such as program development, coordination, evaluation, and other tasks associated with the role of policy initiator.[14]

From a politics of "partisan compromise" to "disciplined opposition." Less formal changes have complemented these, strengthening the capacity of Congress to claim preeminence in the separated system, and contributing to the frequency with which the inclination toward legislative assertiveness undermines negotiation and leads to conflict. These include the increasing independence of electoral campaigns for Congress, which has had the effect of tying legislators more closely to the short-run preferences of their constituents and enabling them to resist calls from the leadership for compromise; the effect of personnel turnover and term limits in removing from the Congress many of the incumbents who understood from experience the importance of moderating partisanship and who personally embodied institutional norms of comity; and the increasing ideological homogeneity and aggressively partisan strategy of the Republican delegation.[15]

These changes are evident just below the surface of the aggregated data on roll call voting cited above. They make it clear that Clinton's successes have come in a more overtly conflictual partisan environment; a given level of legislative success requires more presidential resources and adroit lobbying than it once did. The last twenty years or so have seen a shrinking of the center in Congress, the pace slow at first but quickening more recently. Two indicators out of several that could be chosen show the trend clearly. First, the pool of possible recruits for a strategy of bipartisanship has declined as the number of conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans has fallen quite steadily from one presidential administration to the next since the 1960s.[16] Second, the number of essentially pure-party coalitions on roll call votes has grown, while the frequency of coalitions that include substantial representation from both parties has fallen.[17] The Congress whose assent Clinton sought was, in other words, a fundamentally different institutional and partisan body from the one that Johnson or even Reagan confronted. Bert Rockman scoffs at the suggestion that old-fashioned centrist solu-

[14] Charles O. Jones, "The Pendulum of Power" in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., *The New Congress* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981), chap. 7.

[15] See Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, "The President in a More Partisan Legislative Arena" (paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995); David W. Rohde, *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Barbara Sinclair, "Change and Continuity in the Legislative Process: The U.S. House and Senate from the 1970s to the 1990s" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995).

[16] For instance, during the Kennedy years, the 87th and 88th Congresses included on average 114 cross-pressured members, while Carter's Congresses (the 95th and 96th) averaged 74. In the 103rd Congress, Clinton found only 37 cross-pressured legislators, and only one of these was a Republican. Calculated from Table 2 of Fleisher and Bond, "Partisan Legislative Arena."

[17] Dating the postreform Congress from the Ford administration, the number of pure party coalitions averaged fewer than ten from Ford through Bush, but rose to forty-eight in the 103rd Congress of 1992–1994. Correspondingly, the number of bipartisan coalitions averaged 26.2 from the Ford through the Bush administrations but fell to 19 in Clinton's first Congress. Calculated from Table 4 of ibid.

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tions could be found, if only Clinton and congressional leaders tried harder. Given the increasingly liberal Democratic congressional delegation and "the solid phalanx of [increasingly conservative] Republican opposition," he concludes that "to put it kindly, the prospects of there actually being bipartisan coalitions range from faint to nonexistent."[18] In a legislative environment in which coalition-building has grown more difficult, our central paradox takes on a different perspective: the surprising aspect is not the tumultuous political process but the president's high success rate.

The growing gap between presidential and congressional Democrats. Another change, less often remarked, is the extent to which Democratic party leaders in Congress had by the end of the Reagan years adjusted to their accustomed institutional position in opposition to the president. The barriers to a Democratic president seeking to translate unified party control into unified government were especially significant in determining the progress of President Clinton's economic program through the Congress, for his most trying challenges frequently came from senior members of his own party.

The implication of this development for the ability of a president to advance an agenda of change is clear when viewed in historical perspective. By the early 1990s, Democratic congressional leaders played almost no role in formulating an economic policy program for their party, thus removing the opportunity for the legislators to develop a sense of common ownership or authorship of the president's program. For such a joint planning process to work in building links between the executive and legislative branches, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, congressional leaders must perceive an incentive for developing an alternative agenda—they must be impelled by the desire and the realistic conviction that they have a chance of taking over the presidency in the near future. Second, the party's eventual nominee for the presidency must be involved in the process. The experience of Democratic presidents since 1960 shows the steady atrophy of this critical experience of interbranch cooperation.

The ambitious agenda of economic policy change that Presidents Kennedy and Johnson promoted had been developed in the Congress over the previous four years, and especially as the Joint Economic Committee [JEC] put together a "shadow government" response to the 1958 recession. Although neither Kennedy nor Johnson were leaders of this group, they were aware of and involved in the process. During the presidential campaign, Kennedy's advisers collaborated with staff economists on the JEC in shaping his New Economics proposals; later, both presidents drew on the JEC in recruiting their own Councils of Economic Advisers; and both the presidents and the Democratic congressional leadership saw the administration's programs continuing the work of the JEC. As with the Kennedy-Johnson years, the two Democratic presidencies since then each followed a long period during which Republicans had controlled the White House

[18] Bert A. Rockman, "Leadership and the Clinton Presidency" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., *The Clinton Presidency*, 325–62.

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and set the tone in managing the nation's economy. In each case, the new Democratic president would face an unruly backlog of demands from groups pressing for action on a wide range of issues impinging on economic policy and performance. Managing these demands, not to mention melding them into a coherent program, would require a modicum of advance planning.

For both the Carter and Clinton presidencies, however, the process of agenda creation was hobbled by the absence from active participation of one branch or the other. In the aftermath of the 1973 oil embargo, the Democrats in Congress had been engaged in working out an alternative agenda, focusing especially on the economy and energy. But Carter had been absent from national politics in these years, and he was not a part of the discussions; nor did his conception of the "trusteeship presidency" foster engagement once he took office. By 1992, however, the explanation was to be found at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. After nearly twelve years in the wilderness, Democratic congressional leaders seemed to feel little impetus for developing a new Democratic party agenda. The Republicans' apparent lock on the White House and the similar lock congressional incumbents and especially party leaders apparently held on their positions in the legislative branch made it seem unlikely that they would be called on to govern.[19] As a consequence, the development of the Democratic economic agenda during this period was largely centered outside of Congress. Its locus was in the Democratic Leadership Conference (DLC), whose leading participants were a cluster of activist governors such as Clinton and Roy Romer. Used to exercising executive power rather than filling legislative roles, they were eager to address national issues. Some members of Congress did participate actively in this collaborative process, but it is telling that they tended to be younger, less-senior legislators such as Mike McCurdy rather than party or committee leaders.

The Legacy of Previous Policies

The federal deficit is clearly the primary material constraint that the Reagan regime has bequeathed to its successors.[20] As we show below, the impact of the deficit has been not only to force cutbacks in the magnitude of proposed innovations such as Clinton's plans for investment in human capital and research and

[19] As Jones puts it, "The congressional Democrats have gotten used to being the opposition party to the White House Republicans. They have provided themselves with the resources needed to play that role aggressively." See Charles O. Jones, "The Diffusion of Responsibility: An Alternative Perspective," *Governance: An International Journal of Political Administration* 4 (April 1981): 150–67.

[20] Kamlet and Mowrey show that this constraint worked long before Reagan, as one president's expenditure commitments narrowed the flexibility for his successors. Reagan's legacy of a virtually permanently diminished revenue stream (via both tax cuts and indexing), however, arguably amounts to a qualitative alteration in this constraint, not only tightening the budget but transforming virtually all policy proposals into budgetary debates. See Mark S. Kamlet and David C. Mowrey, "Budgetary Side-Payments and Government Growth, 1953–1968," *American Journal of Political Science* 27 (November 1983): 636–64.

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development, but also to frame the economic policy program in such a way that any action that would expand spending would require extraordinary justification. The latter effect—the influence of the Reagan legacy in the realm of ideas and politics—has arguably been the more important. Both the conception of the appropriate purposes of government and the strategic opportunities for the conservative opposition to block an activist president have altered the legitimacy test against which Clinton's call for change has been evaluated.

Reagan's insistence that government should be smaller and attempt fewer things has obviously taken root in the American public philosophy. Indeed, Aaron Wildavsky proposed that the infusion of this belief into a transformed conception of the presidency "may be Reagan's most significant contribution. . . . Instead of the Presidency being the institution of 'first resort,' stepping in to solve problems, real and alleged, as soon as (or perhaps sooner than) they manifested themselves, in Reagan's time the Presidency has become the institution of 'last resort,' entering the fray only when others abdicated. And not always then."[21] But the legacy goes beyond the belief that government should be smaller (a conception generally in line with that of Clinton and the Democratic Leadership Council) to the insistence that government is the problem. Wildavsky captured the implication of this shift in his prescient description of "the Republicans of the future": "Every time it looks like the Democrats might lower the deficit sufficiently to do good as they see it, Reaganite Republicans will counter with tax cuts so that taxpayers can do good as they see it."[22]

Policy Resources

We have noted President Clinton's meager electoral resources and the political and institutional trends that work against presidential activism. Against these constraints, the new administration brought significant resources. In this section, we employ the concept of presidential economic ideology to depict Clinton's economic goals, we situate his economic intelligence network by summarizing the background and policy predilections of his major economic advisers, and we outline his economic policy agenda.

Economic Ideology

The notion of the president's economic ideology summarizes the goals that guide the administration's stands on important economic issues and that animate its program of economic initiatives. The notion of an economic ideology connotes more than a goal statement; it brings to mind the image of a cluster of connected beliefs, more or less explicitly structured, in which assumptions and ideas, plans

[21] Aaron Wildavsky, "President Reagan as a Political Strategist" in Charles O. Jones, ed., *The Reagan Legacy, Promise and Performance* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1988), chap. 10, 295.
[22] Ibid., 293.

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and actions are linked logically to a set of core principles. The extent to which a president grounds policy choices in a well articulated belief structure is an empirical question, and it varies with both the president's own issue concerns and the salience of economic issues among the problems confronting the administration. However, presidents (and indeed most politicians) are in the business of recognizing the potential persuasive power of such connections among goals and supporting ideas. As members of the small group of influential activists at the pinnacle of the political elite and as office-holders who regularly must persuade other officials and justify their actions to constituents, top-level politicians typically go to some trouble to articulate the connections among their political stands. In setting priorities among multiple goals, in choosing to defend proposals with arguments that call on one set of values rather than others, and in tracing the anticipated consequences of policy initiatives, presidents and their advisers give us a glimpse into the causal beliefs, values, and assumptions about human nature and the operation of the economy that guide the administration's economic policy.

The president's economic ideology is related to elections and campaigns, but by no means simply or directly. His image of the most desirable economic outcome for the nation is a part of the policy agenda for which the voters chose him, and it shapes his interactions with groups and interest organizations. No president will be insensitive to the preferences of his multiple overlapping audiences, but his ideology is not a proxy for those influences. It is, rather, a tool that allows him to select from their demands, to meld them, or to supervene them by inventing a novel option. And in crisis or uncertainty, the president's own economic lodestone will be the surest guide among a set of alternatives whose future effects can be only dimly gauged.

President Clinton's economic ideology harks back in many ways to that of President Kennedy, most notably in its emphasis on economic growth as the primary vehicle for ameliorating problems of poverty, blocked upward mobility, and an increasingly unequal distribution of income.[23] Like Kennedy, Clinton's emphasis is on building productive capacity rather than stimulating demand, and he takes an activist stance toward investments in public infrastructure, research, and training activities that can be motivated on conventional market failure arguments. Within the category of investment activities, moreover, he shares the Kennedy administration's emphasis that education and training—measures to develop workers' skills—are preferable to investments in plants and equipment, since investments in human capital combine immediate results for families discouraged at their prospects for moving upward in the economy with future productivity gains that are at least as large as those for physical capital.[24] Also like

[23] Clinton did not entirely forsake the redistributive heritage of the Democratic party, but he focused his efforts in this area on the working poor, who he felt had been especially hard-hit by the combination of Reagan administration spending and tax cuts and the pattern of layoffs in the economy.

[24] See Rudiger Dornbusch, "Clinton for Government-Aided Reform," *The Economist*, October 1992, 21–23. This article by one of Clinton's economic brain trust reads like an updated version of the sort of plans James Tobin and Paul Samuelson were proposing to Kennedy in the summer before the 1960

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Kennedy—but unlike the other famous supply-sider Reagan—Clinton's investment subsidies are targeted to spending on research, infrastructure, or training, rather than relying on across-the-board tax cuts for businesses and wealthy taxpayers. And like Kennedy, but unlike Johnson, Clinton's activist orientation toward the economy is twinned with skepticism about social programs of direct intervention, as with his call for welfare reform.[25] Although tracing policy themes back to core values inevitably involves a good deal of conjecture, in Clinton's case both the available biographical information and his own statements suggest that the values of opportunity and responsibility infuse much of his thinking about his economic policy priorities.[26]

Bill Clinton's involvement in politics was already unusually accomplished by the time he was in high school, and he appears all along to have shown the now-familiar penchant for combining the skills of the egregious politico with the knowledge and commitment of the public service "policy wonk."[27] An image grew up during the 1992 campaign that Clinton started out as a radical and moved rightward, but in fact his political stands in several campaigns for student government offices as an undergraduate at Georgetown, his participation in politics while he was a student at Oxford, and his participation in statewide and national campaigns during his undergraduate years and as a law student at Yale are anything but revolutionary. At Georgetown, his platforms gained some notoriety for their focus (unusual in undergraduate elections) on small-scale, practical problems amenable to student government intervention; at Oxford he brought others up short by arguing against their unqualified admiration for initiatives such as Allard Lowenstein's leadership of the "Dump Johnson" movement; and even his now-famous participation in the anti-Vietnam War demonstration in

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election. On Kennedy economic policy, see Ronald F. King, *Money, Time and Politics: Investment Tax Subsidies and American Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). Robert Reich's argument actually strengthens the relative emphasis on human over physical capital: Reich essentially provides an open-economy analysis of the same problems Walter Heller articulated, and uses it to show that publicly-funded incentives for education and training have both a larger and more certain payoff than those for physical capital. Robert E. Reich, *The Work of Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).

[25] The details of Clinton's economic program are outlined below. This summary of general themes draws on Clinton and Gore, on Clinton's Inaugural Address, and on the *Economic Report* for 1994 and 1995. See William J. Clinton and Al Gore, *Putting People First: How We Can All Change America* (New York: Times Books, 1992).

[26] These themes appear repeatedly in Clinton's relationships with adults as he was growing up, including in addition to his mother, several influential teachers in high school and at Georgetown. And they have been central ones for Hillary Rodham Clinton, for whom they are also tied to her theological exposition of her religious beliefs. Maraniss suggests that Bill Clinton came to see Hillary as the personification of the theme of opportunity and responsibility. This theme first appears as a part of his public, political persona during his governorship of Arkansas, although one might argue that it is presaged in his speech at the 1980 Democratic convention. See David Maraniss, *First in His Class: A Biography of Bill Clinton* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 432.

[27] The best source on Clinton's youth and his political experience in Arkansas is Maraniss, *First in His Class*.

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Grosvenor Square was the action of someone who "was always a cautious defender of the establishment." As a campaign worker, Clinton often showed more skill than the candidate at relating the platform's issues stands to ordinary people; and as early as his work on the George McGovern campaign (as state coordinator in Texas), he was grappling with the problem of how the fragmented Democratic coalition could be rebuilt around a new cluster of leading ideas.[28]

Like all of us, Clinton draws his vision and political commitments from his own experience, but it is the experience of someone for whom politics is vocation. For Bill Clinton, active participation in politics came before personal self-interest. Indeed, in the early days, political issues and policy proposals came before observation of the corresponding social problems. It is, for instance, difficult to imagine an issue for Clinton that appears to have the personal relevance borne out of pre-political personal experience that high taxes had for Ronald Reagan. This fact, neither good nor bad in itself, does perhaps help to explain the oft-remarked academic style of Clinton's preference for vigorous debate about different policy ideas and his penchant for taking on the policy analyst's orientation toward weighing alternative outcomes over different time horizons.

In office, President Clinton's conception of the nature of the economic changes needed to improve growth can be seen in his diagnosis of the problem: "I based my whole campaign on my absolute conviction that the fundamental economic problems of this country are long-term problems that have been 20 years in the making."[29] In his view and that of his Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, the 1986 tax reform had worsened the climate for productive investment by favoring consumption over investment and by going too far in eliminating hundreds of business and personal tax breaks.[30] In the wake of the Reagan-era tax cuts, the deficit has become a crucial constraint, but Clinton has been unambiguous in rejecting deficit reduction as the orienting goal of his economic policy planning. Clinton was persuaded by his economic advisers that significant, credible action on the deficit was a necessary preliminary not only to ending the recession and ensuring the financial conditions and monetary policy stance needed for growth, but also as "earnest money" toward his investment program. At the same time, he consistently resisted the notion that the deficit has an absolute claim to economic policy primacy.[31]

The Economic and Political Advisory Structure

If the president's economic ideology summarizes the administration's goals, the organization and staffing of the advisory structure determine the means through

[28] These events are described in more detail at the following pages in ibid., 55, 158, 453, 226, 230, 285.

[29] John R. Cranford, "New Clinton Economic Team Veers Toward the Center," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 12 December 1992.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Blumenthal, "The Education of a President," 31–33.

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which the goals might be sought. The task of the advisory group is not only to formulate campaign promises into a practical program, but to respond to calls for exceptions that would dissipate the thematic consistency and coherence of the administration's plan. The job of advising the president on economic policy is all the more difficult given the multiple audiences, often with conflicting standards and preferences, to whom the advisers must speak. The narrative of presidential economic plans must be framed to be understandable and attractive to the public, including in Clinton's case voters who did not support him in 1992. But the economic policy message is mediated by experts in the economics profession and notables in the business world, who are sought by the media to help interpret its significance and infer its likely effects. Within the government, both the bureaucracy and the Congress must be convinced that the administration's proposals minimize the threat to established programs while addressing the demands of local and regional interests.

The president's economic advisers, in short, play a crucial role as lobbyists for the economic program. Here they face an array of challenges to the consistency and coherence of the administration's program, with the most difficult coming not from enemies but from friends. Opposition to the program on partisan or ideological grounds is generally predictable and may merit only limited attention because of the small likelihood that any feasible compromise will win over an opponent's support. Members of the president's electoral coalition, on the other hand, are only somewhat less likely than opponents to want exceptions, and they have a reasonable claim to special consideration. No simple rule will distinguish which of these demands should be rewarded and which rejected, but the steadiness or fluctuation of the economic policy path will soon show whether the president has managed to assemble a set of advisers who among them combine the needed diversity of ties to societal interests and constituencies with a strong commonality of programmatic vision.

The most prominent tension in the economic advisory system of virtually every recent president has been the one between economic and political advisers. Presidents have sought to resolve the tension in a wide variety of ways, each with more or less workable but imperfect effects. Porter describes President Gerald Ford's Economic Policy Group as freeing itself from this source of dissensus by excluding political inputs,[32] but the result was that economic advice was occasionally undercut at the last moment by political issues that had not been adequately considered beforehand. President Carter strived to include both economic and political inputs at every stage, resulting in "lowest common denominator" proposals that were further watered down in Congress.[33] President Reagan's

[32] Roger B. Porter, *Presidential Decision Making: The Economic Policy Board* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

[33] Erwin C. Hargrove, *Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); M. Stephen Weatherford and Thomas B. Mayhew, "Tax Policy and Presidential Leadership: Ideas, Interests, and the Quality of Advice," *Studies in American Political Development* 9 (Fall 1995): 287–330.

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approach preserved coherence by elevating the political and neglecting the economic, an organizing theme that culminated in the president's proposal to abolish the Council of Economic Advisers. Given this history, along with Clinton's thin electoral margin and the increasing importance of going public as a means of building legislative support for White House initiatives, it is hardly surprising that the most nettlesome question has centered on the role of politics in economic policy discussions. As we explain below, the essential tension in Clinton's economic advisory system has not been among the economic advisers but between the advisers and the campaign personnel whose prominence as political advisers continued after their candidate moved into the White House.

For most presidents, assembling the group who will provide analysis and advice in the administration's primary policy area is one of the most direct and personally involving tests of commitment and competence. Bill Clinton, more knowledgeable about the national economy and current policy commentary than any other modern president, put the question of his advisory apparatus on the agenda early, proposing during the campaign to set up an Economic Security Council, modeled on the National Security Council, with authority to coordinate and formulate advice across the whole range of national and international economic issues.[34] The National Economic Council, as it soon came to be called, is the centerpiece of the administration's economic policy network; and Clinton's early and intense involvement in setting up the advisory structure and selecting personnel appears to have paid off, for the economic team received highly laudatory early reviews. The rocky course of the administration's budget through the Congress brought well deserved criticism of the planning and liaison operations responsible for guiding the measures through the legislature, but virtually all these criticisms have distinguished between the economic and political advisers, locating the administration's strategic problems in the ill managed conflicts between the two camps. On the whole the administration's economic team weathered its shake-down cruise with remarkably positive evaluations.

The key members of Clinton's economic advisory network included the following. Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen was praised both by his former colleagues in the Congress, where he chaired the Senate Finance Committee, and by representatives of business and financial interests. Bentsen's stance as a long-time advocate of using the tax code to encourage investment put him at odds with the 1986 tax reform's philosophy of curtailing tax subsidies in order to lower marginal rates.[35] Robert Rubin, chair of the National Economic Council, is a former co-chair of the investment banking firm Goldman Sachs and a lawyer by training. Rubin's reputation as a knowledgeable Wall Street insider won high

[34] Clinton and Gore, *Putting People First*; Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review* 76 (September 1972): 751-85; Roger B. Porter, "Economic Advice to the President: From Eisenhower to Reagan," *Political Science Quarterly* 98 (Fall 1983): 403–26.

[35] Paul Starobin et al., "Clinton's A-Team," *National Journal*, 19 December 1992, 2892–96.

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praise from financial interests as well as from academics and policy analysts, who were conscious that the fate of the NEC as an organizational innovation depended on a leader who could serve as an authoritative "honest broker" to ensure a balanced presentation of views.[36] Leon Panetta, director of the Office of Management and Budget, earned his selection in part because he was an outspoken deficit hawk. The former chair of the House Budget Committee, Panetta had gained bipartisan praise for his knowledge of budget policy and his parliamentary acumen. Laura D'Andrea Tyson, chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, came to Clinton's attention for her research on trade policy and her work with the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, "perhaps the academic world's most important counterweight to traditional laissez faire philosophy." Tyson quickly established herself within the White House as a well prepared source of analytical input on the economy, and she has often been the lead voice arguing economic principles and the long view against political and campaign advisers.[37] For perhaps a decade, ever since it became clear that neither the Reagan administration nor Congress had the political will to close the deficit opened by the 1981 tax cut, Alice Rivlin, deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget, has been one of the leading spokespersons for fiscal prudence, even if it hurts. The former director of the Economics Program at Brookings, Rivlin pushed consistently for a bigger package of program cuts and tax increases, in order to lower the deficit.[38] Robert Altman, deputy treasury secretary, was both Bentsen's "right hand man" and "a sort of a troubleshooter without portfolio for Bill and Hillary Rodham Clinton," Altman also joined the administration from Wall Street. He essentially held cabinet status during the administration's first year, when he headed the "war room" effort to pass the president's economic program. Secretary of Labor Robert Reich's writings on U.S. economic competitiveness and the importance of strengthening productivity have been among the most influential intellectual forces in shaping the administration's economic program. His brief is fundamentally a market-oriented one, and his ideas for improving education and coordinating school and work training have won praise from both labor and business.[39]

The economic advisory team is distinguished by its analytical and largely consensual approach to the economy. In line with the essential tenets of the president's economic ideology, the focus is on activist measures intended to raise the economy's productive potential over the long run, essentially through investment in human capital and research and development.

[36] Rubin has now replaced Bentsen at Treasury, after a smooth confirmation process. See Paul Starobin, "The Broker," *National Journal*, 16 April 1994, 878–83.

[37] Paul Starobin, "The World According to Tyson," *National Journal*, 18 December 1993, 3025.

[38] George Hager and David S. Cloud, "Clinton Team's Similar Lines Focus on Deficit Reduction," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 16 January 1993, 120–3.

[39] *Congressional Quarterly*, "Profile of Robert Reich," December 1992, 3790.

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Clinton's Economic Agenda

In a speech before Congress on 17 February 1993, Clinton outlined his economic plan. It consisted of three basic parts; deficit reduction, investment spending, and a short-term stimulus package. The plan proposed deficit reduction of $493 billion over five years, with $247 billion coming from spending cuts and $246 billion from tax increases.

The proposed tax increases were of three types. The first included several that would fall on high-income individuals: a new top income tax rate of 36 percent (up from 31 percent); a 10 percent surcharge on those earning more than $250,000 a year; an increase in the proportion of social security benefits taxed for middle-income individuals; and limits on itemized deductions. In a nationally televised address two days before his speech to Congress, Clinton noted that "Seventy percent of the new taxes I'll propose . . . will be paid by those who make more than $100,000 a year." He again stressed the distribution of the proposed tax increases in his speech to Congress: "I want to emphasize the facts about this plan: 98.8 percent of America's families will have no increase in their income tax rates, only 1.2 percent at the top."[40] Second, the plan proposed to increase taxes on corporations, including a new top tax rate of 36 percent (up from 34 percent) for corporations with taxable incomes above $10 million; and limits on corporate tax deductions, including elimination of the deduction for lobbying expenses. The third component, an energy tax, represented about 30 percent of the proposed new taxes, and it ultimately became one of the most controversial aspects of the economic plan. A comprehensive energy tax based on the heat output, or British thermal unit (Btu), of various forms of energy, the tax was advocated by Vice President Al Gore because it finessed several difficult trade-offs. President Clinton noted these advantages in his 17 February speech, while pointing out that the tax would cost the average family only $17 per month.

> Our plan does include a broad-based tax on energy. And I want to tell you why I selected this and why I think it's a good idea. I recommend that we adopt a Btu tax on the heat content of energy as the best way to provide us with revenue to lower the deficit because it also combats pollution, promotes energy efficiency, promotes the independence economically, of this country as well as helping to reduce the debt, and because it does not discriminate against any area. Unlike a carbon tax, that's not too hard on the coal States; unlike a gas tax, that's not too tough on people who drive a long way to work; unlike the ad valorem tax, it doesn't increase just when the price of an energy source goes up. And it is environmentally responsible. It will help us in the future as well as in the present with the deficit.[41]

He then went on to note that for families earning less than $30,000 a year, there would be no net cost at all, because the administration was also proposing

[40] Ibid.; William J. Clinton, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, vol. 1 (Washington DC: GPO; 1994).

[41] Ibid.

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a major expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Long supported by both Democrats and Republicans, and increased by President Reagan as a means of raising the working poor out of poverty, expanding the EITC had been one of Clinton's campaign promises.[42]

The other aspect of Clinton's deficit reduction plan consisted of spending cuts. Slightly more than 30 percent of the proposed cuts were to come from defense. Another major source was health care; many of these cuts had also been proposed by the Reagan and Bush administrations but had been rejected by Congress—for example, a reduction in the federal government's share of Medicaid's administrative costs and their assumption by the states. Other proposed cuts included a reduction in the federal civilian workforce of 100,000 (part of Gore's Reinventing Government initiative), a decrease in agricultural crop subsidies, and increases in the fees charged to mine hard-rock minerals, harvest timber, and graze cattle on federal lands.

Consistent with his campaign rhetoric, Clinton proposed a series of "investments" as the second leg of his economic program. In his 15 February Oval Office speech, Clinton criticized the lack of long-term investment by government during the Reagan-Bush years, and argued that: ". . . while the deficit went up, investments in the things that make us stronger and smarter, richer and safer were neglected. Less investment in education, less in our children's future, less in transportation, less in local law enforcement. An awful lot of money was just wasted."[43]

Clinton recommended spending $100 billion over four years for infrastructure, education, job training, and health care, with an additional $60 billion in tax breaks to stimulate business investment. The proposed expenditures included: basic research in environmental technologies, advanced computers, and materials processing; selective subsidies to help U.S. industry gain and keep an edge in manufacturing technologies; increased funding so Head Start could serve a higher proportion of eligible children; job training and apprenticeships; increased spending on highways, bridges, railroads, and mass transit; and Clinton's campaign promise to put 100,000 additional police officers on the nation's streets.

The final component of Clinton's economic program was $16.3 billion in short-term spending and $12 billion in business tax incentives and other funds in the form of loans and construction obligation authority. Although the stimulus package was presented as a way to reinforce the ongoing economic recovery, it was also characterized by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as "a down payment on the administration's long-run investment program."[44] Spending

[42] "A Better Idea on Tax Credits," *New York Times*, 3 July 1990; Isaac Shapiro and Robert Greenstein, *Making Work Pay: A New Agenda for Poverty Policies* (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1989).

[43] Clinton, *Public Papers*, 105.

[44] Jon Healey, "Spending Increases Come First In Rush To Pass Package," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 20 February 1993, 365–9.

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targets included highway construction, summer jobs, extended unemployment compensation, and Community Development Block Grants. The proposed stimulus funding was spread throughout fourteen major federal agencies and departments, and about half was for programs only indirectly related to jobs and construction—for example, Head Start, aid to the homeless, and housing loans. Because it was designed to be spent as quickly as possible, the stimulus was built around existing programs and funding formulas. The administration chose the $16.3 billion figure in order to stay within the caps on discretionary spending that Congress had established for the 1993 fiscal year.

Almost six months after Clinton presented this economic plan, Congress passed a modified version of it by a vote of 218–216 in the House and with Vice President Gore breaking a tie vote in the Senate. The president got only a portion of what he had proposed; most notably, the final package did not include the Btu tax, and it had shed about three-quarters of the stimulus proposal. Given his limited electoral resources and the institutional and partisan trends that undermined the conditions for executive-legislative comity, however, the fact that the president secured at least a beginning for most of his economic policy innovations and substantially accomplished changes he sought in on-going programs warrants viewing the administration's achievement an overall success. To note a couple of significant indicators, the total amount of deficit reduction ($496 billion) was nearly identical to the amount the president had proposed—and, more to the point, the White House was able to guide the process and determine which programs would be cut. The overall progressivity of the tax system, diminished by the Reagan reforms, was strengthened—at the upper end of the income distribution with the top individual tax rate raised to 36 percent and the corporate rate to 35 percent, and at the lower end with a significant expansion of the EITC. In addition, Congress approved about half of Clinton's investment package.

Explaining the Policy Outcome

The legislative history of the president's economic plan shows the interplay between Clinton's agenda and resources, and the changing institutional constraints of a separated system. We focus on three factors that help explain the final outcome: the ascendancy of deficit reduction over investments in the congressional and public debate; the lack of Republican support and the razor-thin Democratic majorities supporting the plan; and a ragged White House legislative strategy characterized by a lack of consensus and coordination.

From Investments to Deficit Reduction: Congress Reinterprets

Clinton's priorities. Deficit reduction was a part of the Clinton-Gore agenda during the 1992 election campaign. In *Putting People First*, they promised to cut the deficit in half within four years, and they argued that "to reclaim our

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future, we must strive to close both the budget deficit and the investment gap."[45] However, the major emphasis was always on an investment strategy that would lead to job creation, improved education, better health care, and safer neighborhoods.

Public opinion was clearly supportive of focusing on economic stimulation. When asked about the most important economic problems facing the country, Gallup Poll respondents ranked the federal budget deficit a distant third behind the economy generally and unemployment.[46] Even those voting for Ross Perot felt that boosting the economy (53 percent) should take precedence over cutting the deficit (41 percent).[47] Similarly, when asked if it were necessary for Clinton to compromise on either reducing the deficit, not increasing taxes on the middle class, or not cutting entitlement programs, respondents chose postponing deficit reduction (44 percent) over cutting entitlement programs (24 percent) or raising middle class taxes (22 percent).[48] Nevertheless, the presence of Paul Tsongas in the Democratic primary and Perot in the general election raised the salience of the deficit for all the candidates. For Clinton, highlighting deficit reduction in his campaign agenda reinforced his image as a "new Democrat" in contrast to more traditional "tax and spend" Democrats.

But the deficit came to loom larger than this; indeed for a time it dominated the congressional debate and made the investment theme "invisible."[49] One explanation provided by the administration was that OMB's deficit estimates had escalated significantly over the course of the campaign, with the three-year projection increasing by $189 billion between July and January. That change in the deficit was advanced as the major reason for the administration's abandoning the middle class tax cut that Clinton had promised during the New Hampshire primary.[50] Some critics argued that the administration was being disingenuous in attributing its shift in strategy to the unexpected increase in the deficit, given that the Congres-

[45] Clinton and Gore, *Putting People First*, 7.

[46] Lydia Saad, "Economy Still Top Concern; Education, Health Care Issues Gaining," *The Gallup Poll Monthly* 324 (September 1992): 10–11.

[47] Larry Hugick, "Clinton Transition Gains Favorable Reviews," *The Gallup Poll Monthly* 327 (1992): 12–15.

[48] Larry Hugick, "Public Hopeful Clinton Can Solve Nation's Problems," *The Gallup Poll Monthly* 326 (1992): 11–18. The reported salience of the deficit in public opinion polls fluctuated over the course of the campaign and in response to small changes in question wording. For instance, Paul J. Quirk and Jon K. Dalager, "The Election: A 'New Democrat' and a New Kind of Presidential Campaign" in Michael Nelson, ed., *The Elections of 1992* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), chap. 3.

[49] Blumenthal, "Education of a President," 38.

[50] According to Woodward, George Stephanapoulous made three arguments in favor of abandoning the middle class tax cut: the money was not there for it; the media did not expect it and Clinton would be criticized more than praised for honoring a promise now widely viewed as unrealistic; and focus groups and polling by Greenberg suggested that the public never really expected such a tax cut. Bentsen and Panetta agreed with Stephanapoulous's conclusion that the tax cut should be dropped. Woodward, *The Agenda*, 97.

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sional Budget Office's (CBO) August projections had earlier reflected a sharp rise.[51] Nevertheless, it was clear that Clinton's options had been seriously constrained by the policies of his immediate predecessors.

In addition, Clinton was clearly concerned about the deficit as he shaped his economic plan, seeking advice from several key people who numbered the deficit as the most important economic challenge. His selection of "deficit hawks" Leon Panetta and Alice Rivlin ensured that deficit reduction would command considerable attention in administration policy development. In announcing their appointments, Clinton indicated that "you should view their selection as a decision by me that we cannot grow the economy without a very serious and credible long-term deficit-reduction program.[52] Both Panetta and Rivlin had criticized *Putting People First* for its optimistic budget estimates and because it did not go far enough in dealing with the deficit.[53] Although they were the strongest advocates within the administration, they were not alone. Tyson and Alan Blinder at the CEA, and Bentsen, Altman, and Lawrence Summers at Treasury all counseled Clinton about the importance of deficit reduction, linking it to the stability of the larger financial system, most notably the bond market.

Clinton's priorities were also shaped by conversations with others outside his own White House circle. One particularly important discussion was with Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve. In a long conversation about a month after the election, Greenspan argued that a drop in long-term interest rates would do more than any other factor to help the economy. In Greenspan's view, clear evidence that the deficit was being controlled would result in a drop in these rates, and, moreover, a short-term stimulus package would not produce sustainable growth unless interest rates could be kept low. The economic plan had to be credible with the bond market. Greenspan's analysis significantly influenced Clinton's own economic thinking, and the bond market became a critical indicator by which the administration judged the success of its economic policy strategies.[54]

An analysis of Clinton's 17 February speech illustrates the growing prominence of deficit reduction over investments, at least as the plan was presented

[51] Hager and Cloud, "Clinton Team's Similar Lines."

[52] George Hager, "Deficit Hawk Panetta Is Named White House Budget Director," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 12 December 1992, 3803.

[53] Rivlin and Paul Begala, the most outspokenly populist of Clinton's political advisers, were often at loggerheads over economic policy. Frustrated after failing to persuade Rivlin and the other economic advisors, Begala wrote a memo reminding them and members of the Cabinet that: "This is an Economic Growth Package. It is not a deficit reduction package, a shared sacrifice package, or a pain package. . . . It's NOT the deficit, stupid." Woodward, *The Agenda*, 114, 116; Hager, "Rivlin Brings Independent Streak"; Jeff Shear, "The Numbers Runner," *National Journal*, 21 May 1994, 1186–90.

[54] Woodward, *The Agenda*, 69–71. Although coming from a different end of the political spectrum than Greenspan, House Speaker Thomas Foley and Majority Leader Richard Gephardt gave Clinton similar advice about the importance of focusing on the deficit. Gephardt told Clinton, "We all believe in the micro things that you've talked about—training, education, infrastructure, health care reform, and more government backing of high tech research. But we'll never get to those things unless we solve the larger economic problems." See Drew, *On the Edge*, 60–61.

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to Congress and the public. The theme of moving from consumption to investment was clearly stated at the outset, with the president listing permanent investment tax credits, improved education and job training, and national service as high priorities. But the most detailed discussions were reserved for deficit reduction, health care reform, and the economic stimulus. Neither the rationale for an investment strategy nor the policy agenda that followed from it were well developed in the speech. The decision not to elaborate on the investment theme was particularly telling, given that the previous twelve years of presidential economic policy were based on very different assumptions about how to promote economic growth. There was little evidence that members of Congress and the public adequately understood or accepted the assumptions underlying Clinton's investment strategy.[55]

Soon after the February speech, Clinton sought to place the deficit into perspective relative to the investment program, arguing that the size of the deficit and the need to control what programs were cut and what taxes raised to reduce it, had to take first priority if the ground were to be prepared for an eventually successful investment program.

> No matter what I proposed in the way of investment programs, I was going to be operating around the margins of a very large economy. And that, in the end, having control, some control over the discipline and the direction of the economy, was going to be a precondition to making my investment programs work.[56]

Although acknowledging that deficit reduction had to take priority, Clinton emphasized that it should be seen as a precondition for investments, the more positive and important goal.

> I think that you can't turn the deficit reduction into the Holy Grail of American politics. It is important as a part of a strategy, but it is not the ultimate objective. The ultimate objective should be to grow jobs and incomes, stability for the American people. That is what gives us the personal security necessary to stay engaged in the world, to reach out in trade and in other ways, and that's what gives us the money to continue to do the things we need to do.[57]

In the event, guiding the policy process to focus on two goals at the same time proved impossible, and the administration's concern with deficit reduction reinforced the congressional framing of the economic policy debate solely as a question of cutting the deficit. The upshot was that no sustained deliberation took place over the advisability of pursuing public investment as an economic growth strategy, even when groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus pressed for particular investments such as the empowerment zone legislation.

[55] For example, even as late as June 1993, Stanley Greenberg was reporting to the other political consultants that his polling and focus groups indicated that while the message of economic growth and investments was equally popular with that of deficit reduction, the deficit reduction message was cleaner and easier for the public to understand. See Woodward, *The Agenda*, 241.

[56] Ibid., 140.

[57] Blumenthal, "Education of a President," 42.

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With no strong policy rationale, the investment initiatives became the most readily available source of budgetary savings. For instance, when the CBO reported early on that Clinton's plan fell about $60 billion short of its five-year deficit reduction target, the House Budget Committee proposed an additional $63 billion in spending cuts and capped discretionary spending for five years at 1993 levels. The effect was to decimate the initial years' spending in Clinton's investment package, reducing it to less than $1 billion in 1994, and $6 billion in 1995 (to about one-quarter of Clinton's proposed investment program outlays for those two years).[58] In a similar way, the replacement of the Btu tax with a smaller 4.3 cents a gallon gasoline tax necessitated cuts to compensate for the revenue loss. The first casualty was the permanent investment tax credit that Clinton had proposed as a cornerstone of his investment strategy—pared down in the final bill to a small program of write-offs for newly purchased equipment for small businesses only. Another example of the lessened investment emphasis in the final legislation was the approximately 30 percent reduction in the amount of support for empowerment zones, designed to target poor communities with tax incentives for businesses and increased social services.

In the end, then, Clinton's major achievement was not that he convinced Congress to buy into his investment-oriented economic strategy, but rather the more modest but significant accomplishment of persuading the Congress to accept a deficit reduction plan that included significant tax increases and that used the tax system for redistributional purposes through the EITC.

Republican Opposition and Tepid Democratic Support

One of the most striking characteristics of the 1993 budget reconciliation bill was that it was the first time in postwar congressional history that the majority party had passed major legislation with absolutely no support from the opposition. From the time that Clinton first presented his economic plan, Republicans in both houses strongly opposed it. Their major argument was that it represented traditional Democratic tax and spend policy. Instead of reducing the deficit through spending cuts, the Clinton plan combined cuts with new taxes, at the same time that it carved out enough savings to make a place for spending on new programs. When the modified package passed, Republican leaders predicted dire consequences, with Newt Gingrich saying the package would lead directly to a "job-killing recession," and John Kasich telling Democrats that "we'll come back next year and try to help you when this plan puts the economy in the gutter."[59]

[58] When Clinton's aides explained to him what had happened with the spending caps and its effect on his investment package, Clinton started shouting questions, asking how and why this had occurred. Several hours later, he remarked sarcastically, "Where are all the Democrats? I hope you're all aware we're all Eisenhower Republicans. We're Eisenhower Republicans here, and we are fighting the Reagan Republicans. We stand for lower deficits and free trade and the bond market. Isn't that great?" See Woodward, *The Agenda*, 161, 165; Blumenthal, "The Education of a President," 37.

[59] George Hager and David S. Cloud, "Democrats Tie Their Fate To Clinton's Budget Bill," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 7 August 1993, 2122–2129.

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Several factors explain the unity among congressional Republicans and their historically unprecedented refusal to consider any significant compromises with the Democrats. First, the Republican leadership framed the issue as opposition to Clinton's policies rather than as support for a particular Republican alternative. It was easier to maintain unity with opposition as the glue than to get members from different wings of the party and different regions to buy into the specifics of an alternative plan.[60] Second, unlike the Democrats in 1981, the Republicans were not opposing a president with a clear electoral mandate, and they felt that the 19 percent of the electorate who had voted for Perot could be swayed on the deficit issue. Third, the Republicans in Congress were not well treated by their Democratic counterparts. This was particularly the case in the House, where the Democrats used their control of the Rules Committee to prevent Republicans from offering amendments. Moderate Republicans who might have been expected to support the Democrats on some issues were upset that both the Democratic congressional leadership and the White House had failed to consult them about possible areas of negotiation. By the time they were approached, they felt it was too late. One moderate, James Jeffords of Vermont, noted that "there was a feeling that we were being taken for granted." Another, John Chafee of Rhode Island, accused the administration in a floor speech of "hubris" and a "belief that the virtues of its position are so manifest, so evident, that the results will be achieved and a large group in the Senate can be ignored."[61]

Despite their strong opposition, the Republicans had virtually no effect on the final outcome of Clinton's proposal, except in one key instance. The rules of the Senate and the ability of the forty-three Senate Republicans to remain united allowed them to kill the stimulus bill by using the filibuster. Because the stimulus bill involved FY 1993 expenditures, it had to be passed as a supplemental appropriations bill independent of the budget reconciliation bill. It passed the House, but died in the Senate when the Democrats could not mobilize the sixty votes needed to stop the Republican filibuster.[62]

Part of the reason for this outcome lies with the personal styles and ambitions of the major participants, and part must be attributed to the president's unfamil-

[60] The downside of an uncompromising, oppositional strategy was that the Republicans might be viewed by the public as causing gridlock when Clinton made that charge against them (Healey, "Stimulus Plan," 817). But the Republicans knew that Clinton's approval rating was declining and that the proportion of the public who thought the economic plan should be modified or rejected was growing (increasing from 43 to 60 percent between the time of his speech to Congress and the end of February). In addition, Robert Dole acknowledged that the filibuster on the stimulus bill could not become standard operating procedure. The Republicans would have to express their opposition strategically if they were to avoid the gridlock label. See Leslie McAneny, "Solid Majority of Americans Now Support Clinton," *The Gallup Poll Monthly* 330 (March 1993): 6–14; Chuck Alston, "The Minority Strikes Back," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 10 April 1993, 908.

[61] Alston, "Minority," 908.

[62] After four attempts, the Democrats failed to get cloture and the stimulus package died on 21 April. At that point, the Senate agreed on a voice vote to strip the bill down to one provision—a $4 billion emergency appropriation for extended unemployment benefits.

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iarity with the institutional rules and norms of the Senate. Moderate Republicans such as William Cohen of Maine maintained that Republicans were willing to let the bill come to a vote if their amendments could just have been considered. But Robert Byrd, as the bill's floor manager, had planted an "amendment tree" in the bill to prevent further changes in the package. His heavy-handedness galvanized the Republicans, especially Minority Leader Dole who viewed the stimulus bill as a test of his leadership. Clinton, who was involved in the summit with Russian President Boris Yeltsin during this time period, miscalculated the point at which he needed to negotiate. By the time he offered a compromise some two weeks into the filibuster, the Republicans rebuffed the offer as coming too late.[63]

In killing the stimulus bill, the Republicans imposed a heavy cost on Clinton. The bill was small and probably would have had little net effect on the economy. But many in the public were under the impression that Clinton's entire economic plan had been defeated or was headed for such a fate.

The outcome of the overall budget reconciliation was further jeopardized by the softness of its support among congressional Democrats. In the final vote on the conference package, forty-one House Democrats voted against the plan, as did six Democratic senators. At each major step in the legislative process, the bill had passed with similarly thin majorities. For example, eleven subcommittee chairs voted against the House version of the bill. Their impending defection prompted a petition, signed by eighty members, demanding that the Democratic caucus punish any committee or subcommittee chairs who voted against the bill. Although the caucus decided not to take such action, the situation was evidence of how difficult it was to maintain party discipline under these circumstances.

The closeness of these votes exposed Democrats from marginal districts to intensive campaigning by the GOP and made supporting the president difficult. Freshmen members were particularly angry, because they were pressured to vote for the bill, while their more senior colleagues from safer districts were refusing to do so. The consummate example came in the House vote on the conference package, when freshman Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky was persuaded by Clinton and the Democratic leadership to cast one of the deciding votes in favor of the plan. Margolies-Mezvinsky, representing a heavily Republican, Philadelphia Main Line district, had promised her constituents that she would vote against higher taxes and had earlier voted against the House version of the bill. The price she paid for her party loyalty was the loss of her seat in the 1994 midterm election.

House Democrats also felt vulnerable because they had voted for both the stimulus bill and the Btu tax, which were then killed in the Senate. The Btu tax was especially problematic, because it was dropped by the Senate leadership in

[63] Jon Healey, "Republicans Slam the Brakes On Economic Stimulus Plan," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 3 April 1993, 817–20; Woodward, *The Agenda*, 158–159; Blumenthal, "Education of a President," 37–38.

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the face of opposition from Democrats John Breaux and David Boren. Further upsetting to the bill's Democratic House supporters was Clinton's decision to distance himself from the Senate negotiations in a way that he had not done in the House debate.[64] After enunciating a broad set of principles, he left the details to the Senate leadership, deferring to the judgment of Majority Leader George Mitchell and Finance Committee Chair Daniel Patrick Moynihan that pushing for the Btu tax in the Senate would jeopardize his entire plan. House Democrats who had voted for the Btu tax felt betrayed.[65]

The situation in the Senate was different but no less tenuous. Once the Senate version of the reconciliation bill passed on Gore's tie-breaking vote, it was clear that any senator who voted for the bill essentially held a veto over it by threatening to vote against the conference bill. As a result, congressional and administration negotiators sought to fashion a bargain that would pass both chambers. Clinton had four "markers" or principles that he wanted reflected in the final version: the package should provide for $500 billion in deficit reduction over five years; any taxes should impose a greater burden on upper-income taxpayers and minimize the burden on the middle class; there should be incentives for creating jobs; and Medicare should not be cut below the level in the Senate bill.[66] Within those parameters, however, negotiators were free to shape whatever type of package would garner the needed votes.

The lack of party discipline among the Democrats is doubtless associated with the president's thin coattails. Representatives from conservative constituencies wanted to show significant spending cuts, but the package contained as much in new taxes as in spending cuts. Liberals were faced with justifying cuts in entitlement programs. Pro-business moderates were upset that business incentives had been reduced to compensate for the elimination of the Btu tax. Nor did legislators find very persuasive the argument that defeating Clinton's plan would cripple his presidency and bring the party into disrepute. As John Breaux noted, "It's not the president, it's the class of '94"—referring to the twenty Democrats in the Senate up for reelection in 1994.[67]

[64] The bill had changed substantially in its passage through the House, with amendments having weakened its overall economic rationale (reducing by about half the $72 billion the original proposal was designed to raise over five years) and undermined its claim to distributive equity (with exemptions for aluminum, the airlines, and other industries). At this point, CEA Chair Laura Tyson was advising the president that from an economic standpoint there was little reason to retain the tax. See David S. Cloud, "Tyson Sees Self as 'Cautious Activist'," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 23 January 1993, 1458; Woodward, *The Agenda*, 218.

[65] McAneny, "Solid Majority," 9; Editor, "Opinion Outlook, Views on the Economy," *National Journal*, 26 June 1993, 1670; Editor, "Opinion Outlook, Views on the Economy," *National Journal*, 24 July 1993, 1891; Steven Greenhouse, "President Gambles on Spending," *New York Times*, 15 March 1993.

[66] Hager and Cloud, "Budget Bill," 1937.

[67] George Hager and David S. Cloud, "Test for Divided Democrats: Forge a Budget Deal," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 26 June 1993, 1631–5.

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Evaluating the White House Legislative Strategy

President Clinton's economic policy goal, centered on building capacity rather than on immediate returns, was a politically risky one. Unlike the tax cuts of the Reagan years, the pay-offs are not only delayed but also contingent on future circumstances that cannot be predicted with certainty. The difficulty of having to sell such a strategy was exacerbated in this case by the need to cut expenditures and raise taxes in order to pay for the new investments. Judging from their own actions, it is not clear if Clinton and his advisers really understood the level of risk associated with such a strategy. The pay-off could be great, but it would not come in time for either the 1994 or 1996 elections. The challenge for the administration, then, was to convince the American public to buy into a program that required both sacrifice and patience. With neither an electoral mandate nor a serious national crisis to mobilize public support, the likelihood of succeeding was small. Nevertheless, there are several things that the administration could have done differently to increase its chances of success and to reduce the political costs.

A simple story. Effective advocacy rests on a clear and coherent message about the goal of the policy. Accomplishing this is never as easy as it sounds.[68] Throughout his account of the Clinton administration's efforts to advance its economic policy agenda, Woodward notes the tensions between the political and economic advisers. He describes numerous meetings where the economic advisers focused on deficit reduction, the status of the bond market, and other economic indicators, while the political consultants exhorted everyone to get back on the "message" that elected Bill Clinton. He also suggests that the political consultants were often excluded from meetings where decisions about economic policy and strategy were made, and then brought in only after problems developed. Woodward recounts a typical admonition from the political consultants at a White House meeting just prior to the start of the conference committee negotiations:

> Greenberg said that because no one agreed on the purpose of the economic plan, they had been unable to communicate a clear, specific message. The plan did a variety of things, which the president thought was good policy, but it had led to a fractured message. They had not forced themselves to reach a common agreement. They had accepted their differences, which had produced the mixed messages, varying with each administration spokesperson. . . .
>
> . . . Rubin was speaking to the bond market, Paster and Panetta to the Congress, and Bentsen to the Federal Reserve, Begala said. "But we have left off the people who elected Bill Clinton president."[69]

Clinton's political advisers recognized the importance of sending a more coherent message and making the public, rather than political and business elites, the audience. The message they developed harked back to the middle class popu-

[68] Weatherford and Mayhew, "Tax Policy," 287–330.

[69] Woodward, *The Agenda*, 250–251.

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lism that had animated Clinton's election campaign.[70] But it remained vague and was never well developed as a rationale for the investments strategy or an adequate explanation for why the government should increase spending on particular programs when it was cutting back on others and raising taxes.

Political feasibility: knowing the tradeoffs at the beginning. A second area where the administration might have acted differently with better results was in its choice of specific policy options for inclusion in the economic plan. In several instances, an ex post analysis might suggest that the White House gave inadequate attention to questions of political and administrative feasibility. One example of an option that seemed desirable by policy analytic standards was the Btu tax. It would raise revenues, encourage energy conservation, and its distributional effects seemed minimal, as compared with other types of energy taxes. In part because it did contribute to achieving several goals at once, however, its complexity opened it to tinkering to satisfy special interests at the legislative stage, and its administration and enforcement were sure to be complicated and cumbersome.[71]

The stimulus package was another example of a policy option for which the administration may not have adequately considered the trade-offs. Was it worth fighting for? It was an open question whether such a small package could make a difference and whether it could be put into the economy quickly enough. Was it excessively vulnerable? Given that it appeared to have been designed as a sweetener to make tax increases and spending cuts more palatable, it was easy for the Republicans to depict it as filled with pork. Its dubious economic benefits and tainted political image made the stimulus package an easy target for critics.

Organizing congressional liaison. A final weakness of the administration's strategy was its congressional liaison operation. Particularly in comparison with the Reagan administration's precise coordination, Clinton's was disorganized. Throughout the six months that the economic plan was under consideration in Congress, key members of the administration, including Clinton himself, were making overtures to individual members that were uncoordinated with others' efforts, and sometimes even contradictory. Howard Paster, the administration's congressional liaison, resigned before the end of Clinton's first year in office, complaining that Mack McLarty, the chief of staff, had failed to manage the White House and that everyone basically "freelanced." But Paster himself may not have been an innocent critic: at a key point in negotiations over the Btu tax, Bentsen complained that Paster's offers to Dan Rostenkowski involved larger compromises than Bentsen was proposing to others.[72]

[70] Ann Devroy, "Hallelujah! for Economic Change," *Washington Post*, 17 July 1993.

[71] In fact, Moynihan became concerned about how complicated the Btu tax would be after his staff estimated that it would likely add volumes to the tax code. Bentsen also expressed reservation about its administration and initially pushed a value-added tax on energy sources as a more feasible alternative. See Woodward, *The Agenda*, 218; Drew, *On the Edge*, 71.

[72] Woodward, *The Agenda*, 319, 217.

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The problems with the administration's congressional liaison stemmed not just from its lack of coordination, but also from what seemed a lack of understanding of the subtleties of congressional procedures. Despite the presence of Gore, Bentsen, and Panetta, all former members, some of the administration's most serious missteps arose from misunderstandings of congressional process. Perhaps the most egregious example is the imposition of the spending caps that curtailed Clinton's investments—"imposed virtually at the beginning, . . . a result of the newcomers' not paying enough attention to all the details. ('How could we not have spent more time on it?' Clinton raged in private, according to his senior aides. . . .)"[73] But other missteps followed this one, including the miscalculations fueling the Republican filibuster that killed the stimulus bill.

Virtually every interpretation of the Clinton administration's policy-making efforts has pointed to the early disarray in the advisory structure and the resulting fitful legislative strategy. These are serious shortfalls, but their significance must be evaluated in context. The question is whether the shape of his economic plan would have been significantly different when it emerged from Congress if problems with the advisory structure had not existed. We conclude that, given Bill Clinton's lack of an electoral mandate and his desire to be an activist president, he probably could not have secured a more favorable legislative outcome, even with a stronger advisory structure and a more coherent legislative strategy. The electoral constraint and its ramifications in Congress were simply too great. Energetic efforts by the White House liaison operation and the president himself largely saved the final legislative package from their own earlier mistakes. But the cost of a weak advisory structure and the consequent appearance of disarray probably weakened public support for Democrats in the 1994 midterm elections. Had the message about the advantages of an investment strategy been made clearer and more visible, and had vulnerable Democrats been better protected politically throughout the legislative process, the party's losses might have been fewer.

Conclusion

It is easy to lose track of the success of Bill Clinton's economic policy leadership in the wake of media coverage oriented around scandals and pratfalls, and after the historic success of the Republican opposition in the 1994 midterm elections.[74] Some of the successful initiatives were of great significance but relatively easy to accomplish, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act, which had been passed by the 102nd Congress but vetoed by President Bush. A second group of policies was central to President Clinton's goal of increasing economic productivity through investment incentives. More than any others, these policies defined Clin-

[73] Blumenthal, "Education of a President," 37.

[74] For an extended analysis of the media's coverage of the policy process during Clinton's presidency, see Sinclair, "Trying to Govern."

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ton's distinctive approach to managing the economy. They included new programs to foster investment in human capital (an enhanced and simplified program for student loans for college and vocational training, the National Service Initiative) and in physical capital (the National Bureau of Standards innovative private/public partnership to channel government support for new-product research and development, and a targeted investment tax credit). They met stiff opposition in Congress, partly because they proposed new initiatives or substantial changes in the government's role in the economy, and in part because they involved new spending at a time when the federal deficit dominated virtually every policy debate. It is significant that these initiatives were enacted; it is not surprising that they were funded at only a portion of the administration's request. A third category of significant policy changes involved modifications to current programs, where the president's proposals were clearly opposed by the GOP. These included restoring some of the progressivity that the Reagan tax cuts had removed from the structure of individual and corporate taxes, and substantially increasing the Earned Income Tax Credit for the working poor. A final category should perhaps be counted less as accomplishments than as successfully avoiding worse alternatives, but these cases of especially hard decisions display the administration's priorities clearly. One of the signal successes of Clinton's first two years was to cut the federal deficit, an outcome significant not only for its magnitude but also because the distribution of the budget cuts was determined essentially according to priorities set by the White House. For instance, Clinton's proposal to reduce substantially or eliminate more than one-hundred government agencies distinguished him both from "old Democrats" and from his Republican predecessors in the White House. Perhaps the most telling trade-off was Clinton's decision not to propose the middle class tax cut; by forgoing the tax cut, he was able to cut the deficit by a much larger amount, and he was able to win at least minimal funding for several initiatives that were central to his program of investments for long-term economic growth.

In analyzing the paradox of Clinton's economic policy leadership during his first year in office, it is considerably easier to explain the political mishaps than his policy success. The three constraints that have limited most postwar presidents posed major challenges for Clinton. First, he faced a Congress that had become considerably more assertive over the past twenty years in exercising its institutional prerogatives. Through the creation of the budget committees and the establishment of the Congressional Budget Office, Congress had signaled that it intended to be an equal partner with the president in budgetary policy and that it could rely on an independent source of expertise. Changes in the seniority system, coupled with the increased media visibility of individual members, have made it easier for ideologues from both ends of the political spectrum to gain prominence on key committees.

Such institutional changes have made Congress generally more independent in its relationship with the president. But these institutional characteristics can also be used to gain partisan advantage. In killing the stimulus package and in

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attacking Clinton for insufficient attention to deficit reduction, Republican leaders were able to take advantage of a system whose rules and norms now minimized the incentives for back-room compromise and provided considerable pay-offs from public criticism and legislative obstruction.

These same institutional characteristics also gave congressional Democrats more freedom to challenge a Democratic president. Their primary motivation in doing so represented a second constraint for Clinton: the absence of presidential coattails meant they owed him little. To the extent that they supported him, it was based either on prior agreement with his policy proposals or on a belief that voters would blame Democratic office-holders, rather than just the president if his proposals were blocked from enactment. Finally, Clinton was also hobbled by the role that congressional Democrats had come to play as the opposition party. Not only did they lack experience as a governing party, but the institutional changes in Congress had undermined the party discipline needed to shape an effective working relationship with an activist president.

But the explanation for Clinton's political mishaps does not lie completely in factors exogenous to his presidency. His ragged advisory structure, particularly the lack of coordination between the political and economic advisers, made legislative consideration of his proposals more harrowing and unpredictable than they might have been under a better-organized advisory system. One victim of that fragmentation was the failure to communicate a clear, simple story. In fact, most ordinary Americans still lack a distinct image of what President Clinton's economic story is. Given that the story is about the importance of a long-term investment strategy and runs counter to the current, popular obsession with tax cuts and short-term profits, the president's economic ideas and policy themes needed to have been communicated with greater coherence and clarity.

While the political mishaps associated with Clinton's economic policy initiatives may seem overdetermined given the constraints he faced, he did achieve a remarkable policy success. What explains that success? We would argue that the explanation lies in his two greatest resources: his economic ideology and the content of his agenda. Even though it was not always clearly communicated to the public, Clinton does have a coherent economic ideology that formed the basis for a comprehensive set of policy proposals. Not only was his economic ideology informed by academic research and consistent over time, but it had to a considerable extent been tested and refined into a workable agenda in his years as governor of Arkansas, during his chairmanship of the National Governors' Association, and in his work with the DLC. In fact, one could argue that in proposing an economic policy agenda with investment in education and training as the cornerstone, Clinton was advocating a supply-side strategy with stronger empirical grounding than the tax cuts of the Reagan years.

However, given the constraints he faced, Clinton could not be inflexible about modifications to his proposals. The president's clarity about his goals gave him a set of markers that delineated the parameters of what would be acceptable to him, and within those limits negotiation and compromise were possible. Clinton

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did lose the stimulus package, but that was the least important component of his plan. On the most critical part—the investment package—he obtained about half of what he proposed; he also secured all the deficit reduction he requested, and he gained considerable income redistribution through the tax system.

By any measure of legislative success, Clinton's economic policy accomplishments during his first year represent a victory. Certainly, presidential persuasion, tenacity, and hard work played an important role. But in the end, it was the triumph of a policy wonk who had shaped a comprehensive set of proposals from a coherent core of ideas directed toward supporting long-term economic growth.*

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In Defense of Negative Campaigning

WILLIAM G. MAYER

When televised presidential debates were first held in 1960, many commentators deplored them for their shallow, insubstantial nature. But when scholars write about those debates today, they almost invariably comment about how much better the Kennedy–Nixon encounters seem than any of the more recent presidential debates.[1] Students to whom I have shown excerpts from these debates usually have the same reaction. Compared to the Great Confrontations of 1984, 1988, and 1992, the 1960 debates seem more civil, more intelligent, more substantive. Especially noticeable is what is missing from the 1960 debates: the nastiness, the evasions, the meaningless memorized one-liners designed only to be featured on the postdebate newscasts, the boos and applause from the studio audience.

Nostalgia is not in general a helpful tool in policy analysis. Claims about how wonderful things were back in some past golden age usually do severe violence to the facts of history. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that American election campaigns have become significantly worse over the last three decades. The 1988 campaign, in particular, convinced many Americans that there was something seriously wrong with the way we conducted our campaigns for public office. In the years since then, there has been a burst of activity—including study commissions, academic research, grassroots organizing, and legislative proposals, as well as the usual quota of lamentation and hand-wringing—all with

[1] Compare Henry Steele Commager, "Washington Would Have Lost a TV Debate," *New York Times Magazine*, 30 October 1960, 13; and Kathleen Hall Jamieson and David S. Birdsell, *Presidential Debates: The Challenge of Creating an Informed Electorate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

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the intention of figuring out why things have gotten so bad and what we can do to make them better.

This nascent reform movement has a number of specific targets and criticisms, but one of the most widely mentioned is negative campaigning. Whenever commentators compile a catalogue of the most heinous sins in current American politics, negative campaigning and attack advertising usually wind up near the top of the list. As a 1990 *New York Times* article noted, "Ever since the Willie Horton commercial that skewered Michael S. Dukakis's presidential campaign, politicians have been competing to express their outrage over the notion that negative campaigning and superficial news coverage have mired American politics in a swamp of trivia."[2]

Typical are these comments by journalist Walter Shapiro in an October 1990 issue of *Time* magazine:

> American democracy may be the inspiration of the world, but the transcendent spirit has dismally failed to uplift U.S. elections. Once again this year, politics has degenerated into a duel of negative TV spots, even before the desperation tactics that usually erupt in late October. . . . Cleansing campaign finance has stymied reformers for more than a generation. But negative spots—not PACs and pandering to large contributors—are largely responsible for public cynicism toward politics. That is why it may be wiser to target the attack ads themselves rather than the brutal cost pressures that make them necessary.[3]

In a similar vein is a recent law review article by Robert M. O'Neill of the University of Virginia, who examines the constitutionality of various ways of "regulating speech to cleanse political campaigns." His article begins:

> Is there any facet of American politics more urgently claiming national attention than negative campaign advertisements? Is there any doubt that negative advertising was the most pervasive—and most lamented—feature of the 1988 presidential campaign?[4]

[2] Randall Rothenberg, "Politics on TV: Too Fast, Too Loose?" *New York Times*, 15 July 1990. Over the last few years, there has been a huge outpouring of articles about the growth of negative campaigning, almost all of them highly critical. For a representative sampling, see Tom Wicker, "The Road Not Taken," *New York Times*, 24 October 1986; John J. Fialka, "Intense Mudslinging in South Dakota Senate Race Provokes Many to Favor Restricting Political Ads," *Wall Street Journal*, 13 November 1986; John Dillin, "Negative Political Ads Will Be Back in 1988, Says GOP Pollster," *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 November 1986; Clifford D. May, "Analysts Say Political Mud Can Yield Gold," *New York Times*, 4 November 1988; Robert Guskind and Jerry Hagstrom, "In the Gutter," *National Journal*, 5 November 1988, 2782–2790; David S. Broder, "Politicians, Advisers Agonize Over Negative Campaigning," *Washington Post*, 19 January 1989; Curtis Gans, "How Those Negatives Developed," *Washington Post*, 12 February 1989; Robin Toner, "90's Politics Seem Rough as Ever Despite Criticism of Negative Ads," *New York Times*, 9 September 1990; "Getting Down and Dirty," *Time*, 29 October 1990, 41–42; Randall Rothenberg, "Voters Complain Negative Campaigns Are Driving Them Away," *New York Times*, 6 November 1990; and Robert Guskind, "Airborne Attacks," *National Journal*, 31 October 1992, 2477–2482.

[3] Walter Shapiro, "Voters vs. the Negative Nineties," *Time*, 15 October 1990, 98–99.

[4] Robert M. O'Neill, "Regulating Speech to Cleanse Political Campaigns," *Capital University Law Review* 21 (Spring 1992): 575.

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Many elected officials share the sense of outrage. As former Senator Howard Baker declared in 1985:

> There is one singular new development in American politics that violates fair play, and that is negative advertising, the paid commercial, usually on TV or radio, that is a smear attack on a decent person. Not only is the negative ad the sleaziest new element in politics, it may also be the most dangerous. The first victim is the person under attack. But the greater victim is the integrity and credibility of the political system itself.[5]

To many observers, the problem is sufficiently serious to require laws and regulations that would discourage or penalize negative campaigning.[6] In 1991, for example, the Federal Communications Commission issued a "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" (later withdrawn) that would have compelled candidates to identify themselves more prominently in negative ads than in positive commercials.[7] One frequently made proposal, embodied in a 1993 bill submitted by Senators Ernest Hollings, John Danforth, and Daniel Inouye, would require any candidate who uses radio or television commercials to attack another candidate to deliver the attack in person.[8] Another suggestion is to allow television and radio stations to charge higher rates for negative commercials than for positive ones.[9] Some critics have even argued that the United States should follow the example of Venezuela and bar candidates entirely from referring to their opponents by name or by picture in their ads.[10]

Whether any of these proposals stands a reasonable chance of being enacted is unclear; our national campaign finance practices have also been under constant attack for the last fifteen years, with nothing in the way of concrete legislation to show for it. The more likely result, at least in the short run, is a concerted effort on the part of civics groups, journalists, and commentators to create a climate of opinion that would discourage or penalize negative campaigning and that would try to convince voters that the very act of negative campaigning casts the candidate who engages in it in a highly unfavorable light. One of the first victims of the new mood was presidential candidate Michael Dukakis, who had himself vowed that he would not engage in negative campaigning. In 1987, two

[5] As quoted in Thomas H. Neale, "Negative Campaigning in National Politics: An Overview," Congressional Research Service, 91–775 GOV, 18 September 1991, 22.

[6] Bills designed to limit negative campaigning have been introduced in each of the last six Congresses. For a good summary of these efforts, see Neale, "Negative Campaigning in National Politics," 32–43.

[7] "FCC Seeks to Strengthen Rules on Negative Political Advertising," *New York Times*, 14 June 1991.

[8] S. 334, 103rd Cong., 1st sess.

[9] The proposal is discussed in Stephen Ansolabehere, Shanto Iyengar, and Nicholas Valentino, "Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 1993).

[10] The suggestion is attributed to ad maker Bob Squier in Ellen Hume, *Campaign Lessons for '92* (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1991), 154, n5.

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of Dukakis's top advisers were forced to resign from his campaign when it was revealed that they had put together what the press regularly referred to as an "attack video," which juxtaposed clips from British Labour party Leader Neil Kinnock and Delaware Senator Joseph Biden in order to show that Biden had been plagiarizing speeches from Kinnock.

Since then, a number of major media executives and commentators have recommended that journalists take a considerably more active role in evaluating and policing our election campaigns.[11] Most such proposals to date have not been especially specific as to what kinds of standards the media would use in their evaluations or what sorts of practices they would try to discourage, but one target that is often mentioned is the prevalence of negative advertising. During the final weeks of the 1992 presidential campaign, a number of people (including one of the citizen-questioners in the second presidential debate) tried to get the candidates to agree to a moratorium on negative campaigning. Similar proposals have been made in many state and local races.[12]

There is little doubt that contemporary American election campaigns do fall short of the standards commended in our civics books. But in the laudable desire to improve our campaigns, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the easy, almost reflexive assumption that negative campaigning is bad campaigning: negative speeches and advertising are always morally wrong and damaging to our political system. In part, perhaps, the problem is one of semantics. Negative campaigning certainly sounds bad: it's so, well, you know, negative. But if we move beyond the label, what really is so bad about negative campaigning?

The purpose of this article, as its title indicates, is to challenge the accepted wisdom about negative campaigning. Negative campaigning, in my view, is a necessary and legitimate part of any election; and our politics—and the growing movement to reform our election campaigns—will be a good deal better off when we finally start to acknowledge it.

The Value of Negative Campaigning

What exactly is negative campaigning? Most people who use the term seem to have in mind a definition such as the following: Negative campaigning is campaigning that attacks or is critical of an opposing candidate.[13] Where positive

[11] See, for example, Hume, *Campaign Lessons for '92*; Darrell M. West, *Air Wars: Television Advertising in Election Campaigns, 1952–1992* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1993); and Ken Bode, "Pull the Plug," *Quill* 80 (March 1992): 10–14.

[12] For the exchange in the second debate, see the transcript in *New York Times*, 16 October 1992. In the 1990 Iowa Senate race, incumbent Tom Harkin challenged his opponent to sign a pledge that "each candidate would talk only about his own accomplishments and ideas." See *Newsweek*, 24 September 1990, 30. Several other examples of such proposals are given in Michael Pfau and Henry C. Kenski, *Attack Politics: Strategy and Defense* (New York: Praeger, 1990), chaps. 2 and 3.

[13] Not surprisingly, most journalists and political practitioners do not define the term explicitly, but the above definition clearly fits the way that they use the term in their speeches and writings. See any of the articles listed in note 2. Those sources that do offer an explicit definition, however, almost

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campaigning dwells on the candidate's own strengths and merits, and talks about the beneficial policies he would adopt if elected, negative campaigning focuses on the weaknesses and faults of the opposition: the mistakes they have made, the flaws in their character or performance, the bad policies they would pursue. And the more one focuses on the reality and consequences of such practices, the more clear I think it becomes that negative campaigning is not the plain and unmitigated evil that it is frequently portrayed to be. To the contrary, negative campaigning provides voters with a lot of valuable information that they definitely need to have when deciding how to cast their ballots.

To begin with, any serious, substantive discussion of what a candidate intends to do after the election can only be conducted by talking about the flaws and shortcomings of current policies. If a candidate is arguing for a major change in government policy, his first responsibility is to show that current policies are in some way deficient. If the economy is already growing rapidly with low rates of inflation, if the "environmental crisis" has been greatly exaggerated, if present policies have largely eliminated the possibility that nuclear arms will actually be used, then everything the candidates are proposing in these areas is useless, even dangerous.[14] The need for such proposals becomes clear only when a candidate puts them in the context of present problems—only, that is to say, when a candidate "goes negative."

If you doubt this, go to a bookstore or library and look at any of a dozen or so books that analyze some major current policy issue. Don't select books that are written by public officials, and which might therefore be "tainted" by their ambitions for higher office. Choose the volumes that are written by the top experts in the field, the ones that presumably define the very best we can hope for in the way of intelligent and civilized discourse. What you will find is that almost all of these books organize their argument in the following way: they start by looking at the defects and shortcomings of present policy, and only then do they turn their attention to proposing new policies and solutions. It is no accident that they take this form: this is the way that most of us think about policy issues. Implicitly or explicitly, we adhere to the old adage that if it ain't broke, don't fix it. We only want to institute new policies if the old ones aren't working. Even if we are dealing with a policy area such as welfare, the schools, or the deficit, where there is widespread criticism of current practices and perhaps

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always provide one similar to that proposed above. See, for example, Gina M. Garramone, "Voter Responses to Negative Political Ads," *Journalism Quarterly* 61 (Summer 1984): 250–59; Morton Sipress, "Wisconsin in 1992: The Impact of Negative Campaigns" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1993); Ansolabehere et al., "Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?"; Pfau and Kenski, *Attack Politics*. For a more elaborate attempt to develop a typology of negative ads, which makes the valid point that many so-called positive ads actually include implied references to the opposing candidate, see Karen S. Johnson-Cartee and Gary A. Copeland, *Negative Political Advertising: Coming of Age* (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1991), chap. 2.

[14] All of these, I should point out, are positions that have been defended in recent years by serious policy analysts.

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a consensus that something needs to be done, we would still like to have a better diagnosis than just a vague sense that the present system isn't working. In what specific ways are current policies failing? Why are they failing? What particular aspects of the current policy mix are at fault? It is difficult to imagine anyone producing an intelligent prescription for the future without first answering such questions.

But the information and analysis embodied in negative campaigning are also valuable on their own terms, for they tell us something extremely relevant about the choices we are about to make. We need to find out about the candidates' strengths, it is true, but we also need to learn about their weaknesses: the abilities and virtues they don't have; the mistakes they have made; the problems they haven't dealt with; the issues they would prefer not to talk about; the bad or unrealistic policies they have proposed. If one candidate performed poorly in his last major public office, if another has no clear or viable plan for dealing with the economy, if a third is dishonest, the voters really do need to be informed about such matters. I need hardly add that no candidate is likely to provide a full and frank discussion of his own shortcomings. Such issues will only get a proper hearing if an opponent is allowed to talk about them by engaging in negative campaigning.[15]

Finally, negative campaigning is valuable if for no other reason than its capacity to keep the candidates a bit more honest than they would be otherwise. One doesn't have to have a lot of respect for the truth and intelligence of current campaign practices in order to conclude that things would be a lot worse without negative campaigning. If candidates always knew that their opponents would never say anything critical about them, campaigns would quickly turn into a procession of lies, exaggerations, and unrealistic promises. Candidates could misstate their previous records, present glowing accounts of their abilities, make promises they knew they couldn't keep—all with the smug assurance that no one would challenge their assertions. Every campaign speech could begin with the words, "I think I can say without fear of contradiction. . . ."

The Need for Clarity

In presenting earlier versions of this article, I have frequently encountered two quite contradictory reactions. There are those who think that negative campaigning really is as bad as it is said to be and that a defense of it only gives sanction to some of the worst aspects of modern campaigning. I shall have more to say about this in the final section of this article. For now, I wish to consider a second and (to me) more surprising reaction: that I have actually overstated

[15] See the argument of John Stuart Mill that it is not enough to hear unpopular opinions stated by their adversaries; the public "must be able to hear [such arguments] from persons who actually believe them, who defend them in earnest and do their very utmost for them." See Mill, *On Liberty* [1859] (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1956), 45.

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and mischaracterized the opposition to negative campaigning. As one panel discussant put it, "Nobody criticizes *all* negative campaigning. When people criticize negative campaigning, they're not worried about attacks that are true and deal with significant issues. What they're upset about is that so much of this attack advertising is misleading or nasty or about made-up issues that have no real relevance to governing. *That's* what the furor's all about."

To this argument, I would make two responses. First, I would urge anyone who thinks I am overstating the case to read through a substantial part of the writing that has built up recently around the question of negative campaigning. What you will find is that the vast majority of this work—academic and popular—does, indeed, indict all campaign activities that are aimed at criticizing one's opponents, regardless of the particular issues they deal with, without even investigating whether the attacks are true or not. Very occasionally, one will come across an author who notes, usually in passing, that perhaps not all negative campaigning is bad, that some of it may even serve a useful purpose. But only a very small percentage of the writing on negative campaigning includes this qualification; most writing on the topic criticizes *all* negative campaigning, without any attempt to draw distinctions about its truth, relevance, or civility.

Academic writing is particularly guilty of this oversight. A number of major academic research projects have been conducted over the last ten years or so which have been designed to investigate the effects of negative campaigning. Without exception, these studies have defined negative campaigning to include all advertising that is critical of one's opponent and have operated from the assumption (usually implicit) that such campaigning has no redeeming value. And this, in turn, has had very significant implications for the kinds of normative conclusions these studies reach. Michael Pfau and Henry Kenski, for example, have carried out several field experiments designed to show that the effects of negative campaigning can be neutralized through a strategy known as inoculation, in which a candidate tries to anticipate the attacks his opponent is likely to make and to answer them before they can be raised by the opposition. Pfau and Kenski clearly regard inoculation as a major boon to the political system, a conclusion that makes sense if all negative campaigning is bad. But if some negative campaigning is valid and beneficial, then Pfau and Kenski's inoculation strategy may only be one more tool that candidates can use to mislead and manipulate the electorate.[16]

If the problem really is with campaign ads that are misleading or irrelevant or nasty, why not just say so? Why not abandon the attack on negative campaigning and go after misleading campaigning or trivial campaigning instead? My concern here is not just that of a fussbudgety academic who is unduly preoccupied with hair-splitting and theoretical distinctions. As many studies of the policy develop-

[16] Pfau and Kenski, *Attack Politics*, especially chaps. 5–9.

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ment process have emphasized, the way a problem is defined has a major effect on the kinds of "solutions" that will be proposed to cope with it.[17]

This has clearly been true of the current effort to improve the conduct of American election campaigns. By defining the problem as one of negative campaigning, critics have naturally been led to look for solutions that would make it more difficult for candidates to criticize their opponents. What all of these proposals have in common, not surprisingly, is that they are targeted at negative campaigning as a generic, undifferentiated category. They would apply, in other words, to all advertising that criticizes one's opponents; they do not even attempt to distinguish between truthful and misleading attacks, or between trivial and relevant issues. And thus, to the extent they are successful, they will not only eliminate scurrilous and unfair attacks, but also those that are true, relevant, responsible, and serious.

There is, in short, a need for much greater care and clarity in thinking and writing about negative campaigning.

The Character Issue

Given the likely consequences of an attempt to limit or discourage critical comments of any kind, many commentators might want to modify their definition of negative campaigning. Perhaps what they really mean is something more like this: "Critical comments about your opponents' policy proposals are acceptable. But critical comments about your opponents' character, ability, or personal behavior are wrong. That's what negative campaigning is."[18]

This argument, of course, is simply one variant of another common theme in the recent public debate about election campaigns. Whenever a candidate's personal character or behavior are questioned by his opponents or by the media, a number of voices will be heard insisting that such matters have no legitimate place in our elections and that campaigns should stick "strictly to the issues." But this argument, too, is fundamentally mistaken. Its basic flaw is the failure to appreciate the fact that candidates for public office are not computer programs with lengthy sets of preestablished policy subroutines, but flesh-and-blood human beings.

Campaign promises are at best only a rough guide to the actual decisions that a public official will make when in office. Candidates may lie or avoid facing up to hard choices. New issues will arise that were never discussed during the campaign. Old issues will appear within an entirely different context. Whatever

[17] See, among others, David Dery, *Problem Definition in Policy Analysis* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); and David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, "Problem Definition, Agenda Access, and Policy Choice," *Policy Studies Journal* 21 (Spring 1993): 56–74.

[18] Though no one I am aware of actually defines negative campaigning this way, a number of sources have suggested the need to distinguish between issue-based and personal attacks. See, for example, Donald L. Rheem, "'Negative' to Negative Ads," *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 March 1988; and May, "Analysts Say."

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the cause, it is striking how many of the most important policy initiatives of the last thirty years were never discussed in the previous campaign, or were taken by presidents who had promised or implied that they would do otherwise. The issue positions assumed during a campaign, in other words, are short-lived and changeable; a better guide to what a candidate will do is often provided by his personality and character.

Once a public official does reach a decision, there is surely no guarantee that it will automatically be promulgated and executed with the full force of law, especially in the highly fragmented environment of American government. Congress must usually agree to pass the proper legislation; the bureaucracy must implement it; interest groups and the public must often be persuaded to cooperate. Officeholders, in short, need to do a lot more than closet themselves away with a big stack of policy reports in order to reach the right decisions. They must also be good managers and political strategists, meet frequently with other elected officials, lead public opinion, persuade the recalcitrant, and attract and retain talented staff. And all of these are matters of ability, temperament, and character.

For both of those reasons, candidate character and behavior are entirely relevant issues, more important than many policy questions. Indeed, if you examine the records of the last few presidents, what strikes you is how their most serious failings—at least in the minds of the voters—were not brought on by their policy views, but by their character flaws: Nixon's dishonesty and vindictiveness, Carter's inability to work with other elected officials, Reagan's management style, Bush's general disinterest in domestic policy. Small wonder, then, that public opinion polls continually show that voters are highly concerned about the personal qualities of the people on the ballot.[19]

After acknowledging this, however, the issues become somewhat murkier. Character matters, but what particular character traits would recommend or disqualify a candidate? Does sexual promiscuity make for a bad president? Does avoiding the draft? Many of the most important character traits, moreover, are remarkably difficult to assess. We now know something about how to determine if a candidate is promiscuous, but how do we "prove" that he is vindictive or paranoid or unintelligent? If a candidate loses his temper at a campaign stop, is this an isolated incident or a sign of a deep-seated mean streak? When a candidate cheats on his wife, is this a regrettable but common human failing, or a symptom of a larger personality disorder?

There are no simple answers to such questions; but particularly in elections for executive offices such as president, governor, or mayor, where character flaws can have such important repercussions, I think we are well advised to cast

[19] See Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), esp. 54–59; David P. Glass, "Evaluating Presidential Candidates: Who Focuses on Their Personal Attributes?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49 (Winter 1985): 517–34; and Arthur H. Miller, Martin P. Wattenberg, and Oksana Malanchuk, "Schematic Assessments of Presidential Candidates," *American Political Science Review* 80 (June 1986): 521–40.

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the net widely.[20] Certainly there is no reason to preclude a priori any discussion of a candidate's sexual behavior or intellectual honesty. More to the point, the criterion one uses to decide whether such matters are worth discussing is not negativity, but relevance. Gary Hart's sexual behavior, for example, should not have been excluded from discussion in the 1988 campaign simply because it was a negative issue that cast him in a bad light. There is a reasonable argument, however (though I am inclined to reject it), that Hart's extramarital affairs were irrelevant to the campaign, because they told us nothing about what kind of president he would have made.

Furthermore, when difficult and border-line cases do arise as to whether a particular behavior or character trait is relevant to a candidate's performance in office, the bias should clearly be in favor of reporting and discussing the issue. If many voters believe that such matters are irrelevant, then presumably they can be trusted to ignore the issue when deciding how to cast their own ballots. But the final say should rest with the electorate, not with the reporters, political consultants, or fair campaign practice committees who might wish to screen such matters from public attention.

And if issues of character and behavior should be discussed, then they should be examined in both their positive and negative aspects. If candidates are free to portray themselves as leaders or deep thinkers or good managers or highly moral, then their opponents should be free to contest these claims. If Joseph Biden wanted to project an image as a passionate orator, fine. But the campaign manager for one of his leading opponents should then have been allowed to point out that some of Biden's passion and rhetoric were borrowed.

The Role of the Media

Another possible line of reply to the argument presented here is that I have left one important element out of the equation: the news media. If the purpose of negative campaigning is to expose the candidates' weaknesses and shortcomings, and to prevent lies and misrepresentations, then perhaps we can rely on television, newspapers, and magazines to help perform these functions. Equally significant, even if the critics of attack advertising do not actually intend to place the onus of negative campaigning on the media, it seems likely that this would be one practical effect of their proposals. The more difficult candidates find it is to talk about the deficiencies of their opponents, the more it will be left up to reporters and editors to determine whether and which such matters will come to public attention.

But when it comes to the need for negative campaigning, the news media cannot substitute for the candidates. Yes, the media will often be negative—but

[20] For a more extended discussion of some criteria that might guide media coverage of "character" issues, see Larry J. Sabato, *Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism Has Transformed American Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1991), especially chap. 8.

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about the wrong things and in the wrong ways. Two major characteristics of the American news media, amply verified in a long list of studies, make them ill suited to perform the functions that have traditionally been served by negative campaigning. In the first place, the media have a long-standing aversion to issues of any kind—positive or negative—or to detailed discussions of the candidates' previous performance and governing abilities. As one recent analysis of the media performance literature has noted:

> Countless studies of campaign journalism (both print and broadcast) have shown that the news invariably focuses on the campaign as a contest or race. News reports on the candidates' standing in public opinion polls, their advertising strategies, the size of the crowds at their appearances, their fund-raising efforts, and their electoral prospects far surpass coverage detailing their issue positions, ideology, prior experience, or decision-making style.[21]

This same sort of disproportion can be found in negative articles about the campaign. If a candidate makes a major gaffe, if his poll ratings are slipping, if there is in-fighting among his advisers—all these will be reported promptly and in exhaustive detail. But do not expect such detailed examination of the shortcomings in a candidate's economic policies, his environmental record, or his plans for dealing with the Middle East. The media's past record suggests that they are unlikely to provide it. Studies of campaign advertising, by contrast, usually conclude that political commercials have far more substantive content than is generally appreciated. Moreover, according to a recent study by Darrell West, negative spots usually have more specific and issue-based appeals than positive commercials.[22]

A second obstacle to the media's attempt to "police" an election campaign are the norms of objectivity and nonpartisanship that govern most major American news outlets. What exactly objectivity means, and whether the media always live up to that standard, are complex and difficult questions, but ones that need not concern us here. Within the well defined arena of election campaigns, these norms have an important impact that has also been confirmed in a substantial number of studies: outside of the editorial page, the media are generally averse to saying anything explicit about the issues that could be construed as judgmental, interpretive, or subjective. As Michael Robinson and Margaret Sheehan found in their study of news coverage during the 1980 election:

> As reluctant as the press is about saying anything explicit concerning the leadership qualities of the candidates, the press is markedly more reluctant to assess or evaluate issues. . . . [We found] an almost total refusal by [CBS and UPI] to go beyond straightforward description of the candidate's policy positions. During the last ten

[21] Stephen Ansolabehere, Roy Behr, and Shanto Iyengar, *The Media Game* (New York: Macmillan, 1993), 57–58.

[22] See, among others, Thomas Patterson and Robert McClure, *The Unseeing Eye* (New York: Putnam, 1976); and West, *Air Wars*, chap. 3.

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weeks of Campaign '80, CBS failed to draw a single clear inference or conclusion about a single issue position of a single candidate—UPI as well.[23]

How do the media cover issues, then? The answer is that they report on what the candidates themselves are saying. As Robinson and Sheehan put it, "For all practical purposes, whatever the candidates or their surrogates said about the issues served as issue coverage."[24] As a result, the only kinds of policing of the issues that the media will undertake on their own initiative are questions that can clearly and unambiguously be labeled as matters of fact. If a candidate makes a blatant factual error—by misquoting a report, or claiming that nuclear missiles can be called back after they are launched, or adding items to his resume that never actually occurred—the media will sometimes call him on it. Obvious inconsistencies, where a candidate makes a statement that is clearly in conflict with positions he has taken earlier, may also get reported. Even the recent profusion of ad watches, which represents a more self-consciously aggressive attempt to scrutinize the candidates, generally adheres to these same guidelines.

In most campaigns, however, the most significant issue controversies are not matters of fact, but questions that require a substantial amount of judgment and interpretation. Would George McGovern's proposed defense cuts have left America unprotected? Was Jimmy Carter avoiding the issues in 1976? Was Ronald Reagan a warmonger? Was Walter Mondale too much in hock to special interests? Did George Bush have any vision for America's future? Were Michael Dukakis's social values at odds with those of the mainstream American voter? On these and similar controversies, the media's record is that they will publicize these issues only if a candidate's opponents have talked about them first. During the 1980 campaign, for example, almost the entirety of the mainstream economics profession believed that it was impossible for Reagan to cut taxes, increase defense spending, and still balance the budget. But the media were unwilling to make this charge on their own authority. Negative comments about Reagan's economic proposals, Robinson and Sheehan found, "invariably" came from the other candidates or their supporters, "never" from the journalists themselves.[25] The media's ability to perform their police function, in short, depends on the candidates' ability to engage in negative campaigning.

But even if the news media were to adopt a new set of norms and were willing to police our election campaigns, it is doubtful that we would want to put this burden primarily on their shoulders. The right of any individual or group to criticize, to object, to dissent is one of the signal achievements of American democracy, enshrined in the First Amendment.[26] To say that we should restrict

[23] Michael J. Robinson and Margaret A. Sheehan, *Over the Wire and On TV* (New York: Sage, 1983), 46.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] It is worth noting that the First Amendment not only guarantees "freedom of speech," but also the right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Given the origins of the American Revolution, I think it no accident that this last proviso is phrased in terms of negative grievances,

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or penalize negative campaigning is to say, in effect, that candidates should now largely abdicate that right and rest content with whatever the media decide to broadcast or publish. If candidates did agree to abide by such strictures, they would thus be renouncing many of the most important duties we have traditionally expected from our best leaders and political heroes: such tasks as articulating grievances; speaking on behalf of the ignored and the forgotten; taking an unappreciated problem, bringing it to public attention, and thereby compelling the system to take action.

On a more general level, it has become increasingly clear over the last thirty years to both liberals and conservatives that some of the most difficult challenges facing American democracy in the twenty-first century concern the enormous power vested in the mass media, an entity that is self-selected, demographically and ideologically unrepresentative, increasingly monopolistic, almost entirely unregulated, and not directly accountable to the voters. There are no easy solutions for this complicated set of issues; but the very fact that these questions are so difficult strongly commends the wisdom of one general maxim: we ought to be extremely leery about any proposal that wants to increase the power of the media by asking them to take on one more function that has traditionally been performed by the candidates or the political parties. If candidates abuse their power of negative campaigning, the voters retain the ultimate power of punishing them at the polls. But what real alternative do the voters have if our election campaigns are improperly policed by CBS News or *The New York Times*?

What Restrictions on Negative Campaigning Would Mean for American Politics

Of the proposals discussed earlier for reducing or restricting negative campaigning, it is unclear how many would actually accomplish their intended goal. Take, for example, the bill that would require any candidate who uses radio or television commercials to attack another candidate to deliver the attack in person. The reasoning behind this proposal is that candidates are willing to attack their opponents largely because they can hide behind the relative anonymity of a slickly-produced advertisement; they would be much more reluctant to criticize another candidate if they had to do so in person. Perhaps, but as any number of recent campaigns illustrate, lots of very strident negative campaigning is already being done by the candidates themselves, with little or no apparent backlash from the voters. In 1988, for example, George Bush showed no qualms about repeating in his own speeches most of the charges about the furloughing of Willie Horton and Dukakis's veto of a Pledge of Allegiance bill that were also featured

rather than positive improvements. Anyone who doubts this should try rereading the Declaration of Independence, which is little more than a catalogue of negatively-phrased "injuries and usurpations" committed by the British government, with remarkably little discussion of what remedies a new government might provide.

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in his television ads. So the candidates and their consultants might decide, after some initial hesitation and experimentation, that personally delivered attacks are still quite effective and continue their negative campaigning unabated.

But let us suppose, for a moment, that one or another of these proposals would be effective: it would significantly reduce the volume of negative campaigning and make it considerably more difficult for a candidate to attack or criticize his opponent. What impact would this have on the character of American politics?

The most obvious consequence, of course, is that it would deprive the electorate of a lot of valuable information, and thereby make it that much more difficult for the voters to make intelligent choices about the people they elect to public office. Like our political system generally, our electoral system is based on the belief that good decisions are more likely to result from a full, thorough, and unrestricted discussion of the issues. As the Supreme Court stated in one of the most important free speech cases of the twentieth century, there is

> a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and *that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.*[27]

Deprived of the important information conveyed in negative campaigning, the voters would be in the position of a blackjack player who must decide how to play his hand without getting to look at his hole card. He may, of course, stumble into the right decision, but the odds are surely better if he knows all the cards he has been dealt.

But beyond this general enfeebling of democracy, any limitation on negative campaigning is likely to have important systemic consequences for our politics. In congressional elections, restrictions on negative campaigning would almost certainly work to the advantage of incumbents, making them even more entrenched and difficult to unseat. As a score of recent studies have shown, incumbent members of the House almost always begin the election campaign with a huge advantage over their opponents.[28] They are better known; they have an established record of service to the district; they have made numerous speeches and sent out hundreds of newsletters and press releases, all designed to show how attentive they are to the voters' interests and opinions and how well they represent the district in Congress.

How can the challenger overcome such a lopsided starting point? The challenger's first task, almost all studies agree, is to make the voters familiar with his own name and qualifications, since the evidence clearly indicates that people won't vote for someone they have never heard of. But there appear to be distinct limits to the effectiveness of this kind of positive campaigning. For virtually

[27] New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964) at 270. (Emphasis added.)

[28] See Thomas E. Mann, *Unsafe at Any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), chap. 4; and Gary C. Jacobson, *Money in Congressional Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).

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anything the challenger pledges will seem hopelessly abstract and insubstantial when compared to the tangible, proven record of the incumbent. The challenger may claim, for example, that he will do wonderful things for the district; but his promises will certainly seem less impressive than what the incumbent (even a very bad incumbent) has already accomplished. The challenger can also promise to represent district opinion and help solve the nation's most pressing problems, but the incumbent will no doubt reply that he is already doing these things, once again reinforcing his position by a long litany of specific bills he has introduced or sponsored, resolutions he has voted for, position papers written by his staff, etc. For all the recent talk about an anti-incumbent mood, there is no evidence that very many voters are so ornery as to throw incumbents out of office for no reason except that they are incumbents, or so risk-seeking as to vote out an acceptable incumbent on the hope that the challenger might prove to be even better. To the contrary, the evidence shows that voters place a strong premium on the value of experience.[29]

In the end, a challenger in a congressional election stands almost no chance of winning unless he "goes negative": unless, in other words, he can succeed in raising doubts about the incumbent's character, voting record, and attention to the district. Particularly worth noting here is Gary Jacobson's analysis of congressional election data from the 1980 and 1982 American National Election Studies (ANES). Incumbents who got reelected and incumbents who lost, Jacobson found, were virtually indistinguishable in terms of how voters assessed their positive qualities. In 1980, for example, 58 percent of the voters in districts with winning incumbents could name something specific they liked about the incumbent, as compared to 59 percent in districts with losing incumbents. Nor was there any difference between winning and losing incumbents in whether the voters could remember anything specific the incumbent had done for the district.

What did distinguish winning and losing incumbents was whether the voters could name anything specific that they disliked about the incumbent. In districts with incumbents who got reelected, only 18 percent of the voters could mention a specific dislike; but in districts with losing incumbents, 46 percent were able to voice a specific grounds for dissatisfaction. As Jacobson concludes:

> Challengers certainly hope to convince people of their own virtues—at minimum, that they are qualified for the office—but they are not likely to get far without directly undermining support for the incumbent. . . . The data indicate that successful challengers do two things: They make voters aware of their own virtues, and they make them aware of the incumbent's shortcomings.[30]

[29] The most vivid demonstration of the voters' regard for experience in congressional elections is, of course, the fact that about 95 percent of incumbents get reelected every two years. On the regard for experience in presidential elections, see Campbell et al., *American Voter*, 54–58; and Steven J. Rosenstone, *Forecasting Presidential Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 58–63, 86–87.

[30] The analysis discussed here may be found in Gary C. Jacobson, *The Politics of Congressional Elections*, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 81–83 and 134–36.

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Any move to limit negative campaigning, in short, would just add one more weapon to the already formidable arsenal with which incumbents manage to entrench themselves in office.

What effect a reduction in negative campaigning would have on presidential elections is more difficult to predict, partly because we have fewer cases available to study, partly because it is less easy to generalize about the strategic situation confronting the candidates. Consider, however, two different scenarios:

In three of the last eight presidential elections, a popular incumbent running for reelection began the general election campaign with a huge lead over his opponent. In 1964, Lyndon Johnson led Barry Goldwater in the first Gallup Poll conducted after the conventions by a 65 percent to 29 percent margin; in 1972, Richard Nixon was beating George McGovern by 64 percent to 30 percent as the fall campaign got underway; in 1984, Ronald Reagan's lead over Walter Mondale was 56 percent to 37 percent.

In this kind of situation, it is not clear that either candidate derives a special benefit from a limit on negative campaigning. On the one hand, if the challenger has any hope at all of cutting into the incumbent's lead, he must make some attempt to mount a sustained attack on the incumbent's record in office. Goldwater, McGovern, and Mondale certainly recognized this point, for all three did a substantial amount of negative campaigning during the fall. But the chances are probably very small that these attacks will have much impact on the electorate: If the voters have decided they basically like the incumbent after watching him perform in the Oval Office for three and a half years, they are unlikely to revise this opinion in two and a half months, no matter how skillfully the challenger campaigns. In addition, the challenger will no doubt have his own set of faults and shortcomings, and none of the incumbents listed above was especially shy about bringing these to the attention of the electorate. Perhaps the safest conclusion one can draw about a presidential election of this kind is that when an incumbent is this far ahead by September of the election year, nothing that goes on during the fall campaign is likely to have too much effect on the final outcome.

The situation is very different, however, when the early fall polls show a close, hotly-contested race (as in 1980 and 1988), or when the out-party candidate has opened up a lead over the incumbent (as in 1976 and 1992). In these cases, there is a clear imbalance in the information available to the average voter.Given the tremendous visibility of the presidential office, the failures and shortcomings of the incumbent administration are already a matter of widespread public knowledge. When Gerald Ford faced an uphill battle in 1976, when Jimmy Carter sought reelection in 1980, when George Bush ran as the successor to Ronald Reagan in 1988 and then for a second term of his own in 1992, most Americans knew their records quite well: the poor or uneven performance of the economy, the foreign policy setbacks and trouble spots, the inability to define and implement a program. Incumbent candidates in this position do spend some of their time trying to convince voters that things are better than they seem, but even the most energetic campaign efforts in this direction are not likely to have much payoff.

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As in the case of the popular incumbent, voters are unlikely to change an assessment they have developed over three and a half years, on the basis of several months of obviously partisan propaganda.

So the only chance such an embattled incumbent has is to raise doubts about his opponent. Especially in the modern era of presidential selection, when the out-party candidate is rarely a prominent national figure prior to winning the nomination, his faults and shortcomings are generally not well known. Most voters, it appears, knew remarkably little in 1976 about Jimmy Carter's record as governor of Georgia, or about Ronald Reagan's performance in California in 1980, or about the gubernatorial records of Michael Dukakis and Bill Clinton.

Such matters have not received a great deal of attention from survey researchers, but the data that are available suggest, not at all surprisingly, that most Americans do not devote much effort to monitoring the performance of fifty different state governors. In mid-October of 1980, for example, the CBS News/*New York Times* poll asked a national sample of probable voters, "Do you think Ronald Reagan did a good job or not when he was Governor of California, or don't you know enough about that to have an opinion?" Forty-eight percent of the respondents admitted they didn't know enough about the matter; another 4 percent said they weren't sure. A similar result occurred in September of 1988, when a NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* survey asked likely voters, "From what you know, do you think Michael Dukakis has been a good Governor of Massachusetts, or not?" Though the "don't know enough" option was not specifically offered in this case, and though Dukakis's gubernatorial record had by that time become a major issue in the 1988 campaign, 28 percent of the respondents still said they didn't have an opinion. In September 1992, 40 percent of the registered voters in a CBS News/*New York Times* poll were unable to say if they had a "favorable or unfavorable impression of the job Bill Clinton has done as Governor of Arkansas." By way of comparison, when the Gallup Poll asks its standard job performance question about an incumbent president during the late summer or early fall of a presidential election year, only about 8–14 percent of those surveyed give "don't know" responses.[31]

And the more negative campaigning is discouraged or penalized, the more likely it becomes that all voters will ever learn about how the challenger performed in his previous position is the candidate's own highly colored version of that record. Thus, in a close election of this kind, where the campaign could make

[31] Another way to demonstrate this point is to examine the percentage of the electorate that is able to assign the candidates a position on the seven-point issue scales in the American National Election Study (ANES) surveys. The 1980 survey, for example, had nine such scales; in all nine cases, a larger number of respondents were able to provide a rating for Jimmy Carter, the incumbent president, than for Ronald Reagan, even though the latter had an unusually well-defined ideological profile for a challenger. Similarly, the 1984 ANES sample showed a higher number of "don't know" responses for Walter Mondale's issue positions than for President Reagan's on all eleven of the scales used. In 1988, when George Bush was not the incumbent but was closely associated with the incumbent administration, the vice president's issue positions were known to more Americans in nine of nine cases.

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a difference in the final outcome, limits on negative campaigning would be distinctly to the advantage of the challenger.

It is no accident that when various commentators recommended a moratorium on negative campaigning during the last few weeks of the 1992 presidential race, Bill Clinton readily agreed to the idea and George Bush tried to resist it.[32] Both major-party campaigns understood quite well that Bush's only chance for victory lay in a negative campaign against Clinton. To be sure, there is something a little sad about an incumbent president whose best argument as to why he should be reelected is to say, in effect, "Sure, I may not have been a very good president – but my opponent would be even worse." But the fact that this argument is sad does not mean that it may not be in some cases entirely valid.

The Search for Better Campaigns

To defend negative campaigning, of course, is not to deny that positive campaigning is also important. What our politics really needs is a mixture of the two. A candidate who is challenging an incumbent should be required to show the weaknesses and shortcomings of his opponent, and then to indicate how and why he would do better. An incumbent should defend his own record, and then (since that record is unlikely to be entirely without blemish) should be able to point out the ways in which the challenger would be deficient. The point is that both are valid ways of appealing to and informing the electorate – just as economic affairs and foreign policy are both relevant issues.

The effort to stamp out negative campaigning thus deals a double blow to any attempt to improve the quality of future American election campaigns. It seeks to deny the voters important information that is relevant to their decisions; but it also helps divert attention from the many serious problems that genuinely afflict our campaigns. Most of the practices that are condemned on the grounds of negative campaigning are actually objectionable for very different reasons. Sending a forged letter about one's opponent, as the Nixon people did in 1972, is wrong, not because it is negative campaigning, but because it's a lie. Demanding that your opponent take a drug test isn't objectionable because it's negative, but because the issue it raises is trivial. Calling your opponent "unChristian" is wrong because it is a misuse of religion. Accusing a congressional incumbent of taking too many junkets would be wrong if it takes such incidents out of context. (It may also be a real indication that the incumbent is neglecting his duties and abusing the perquisites of office.)

There is a simple test that can be applied to all of these issues. If you think that a particular campaign practice is wrong because it is an instance of negative campaigning, then it follows that the same behavior would be acceptable just as long as it was done in a positive manner. So, if negative campaigning is the real

[32] See, for example, their comments on the matter in the second debate in *New York Times*, 16 October 1992.

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villain in all of these cases, sending a forged letter that attacks an opponent is wrong, but forging a letter that says positive things about one's own candidate is acceptable. Or: it's wrong to criticize your opponent for failing to take a drug test, but it's okay if you yourself take a drug test and then trumpet the results as proof of your spectacular fitness for office. It's wrong to call your opponent "unChristian," but acceptable to call yourself "the Christian candidate in this election."

Rather than trying to limit or discourage negative campaigning as a generic category, we ought to recognize that some negative campaigning is good and some negative campaigning is bad—and then think more carefully about the kinds of moral criteria that really should make a difference. A full-blown examination of this matter is the subject for another article or book, but the preceding discussion and the examples commonly cited in the negative campaigning literature clearly point in several important directions. Probably the most significant problem with campaign advertising, positive and negative, is that so much of it is misleading, taking votes and actions out of context, or implying connections between events that may be completely unrelated. Many ads also deal with matters of highly questionable relevance that tell us little or nothing about either candidates' ideology or fitness for office. It also seems clear that many voters are troubled by the incivility of many negative ads, the tone of which is frequently harsh and mean-spirited. All of these are real and serious problems, eminently worthy of our best efforts to rectify them. But we will make little progress in this direction by a war against negative campaigning.*

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Dial-In Democracy: Talk Radio and the 1994 Election

LOUIS BOLCE
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Detractors call them right wing nuts, apostles of hate, fomenters of violence. Fans hear them as inspirational, voices of reason, enlighteners of the public. Similarly, their audience is portrayed as maladjusted, intolerant, and dangerous—or as guardians of the republic, socially conscious, and public spirited. Talk radio, its hosts and listeners: Is it a "bedlam of conservative yakkers?" A forum for seditionists? An electronic version of New England town meetings? Is it all of the above, some, or none?[1]

Whether characterized as laboratories of demagogeury or of democracy, talk radio has become a staple of American political discussion, especially since the 1994 election—the political tsunami that uprooted scores of Democratic members of Congress, senators, governors, and state legislators. The election ended forty years of Democratic dominance of the House of Representatives, over sixty years of control of state houses and legislatures, and perhaps laid the groundwork for the sixth realignment of the American party system (or signaled continuing dealignment).[2] Republicans won 230 seats in the House of Representatives, picking off 52 formerly held by Democrats, with 52 percent of the national House vote. The Republicans also gained control of the Senate by capturing eight

[1] Walter Goodman, "4 Minutes A Week: A Liberal on NBC," *New York Times*, 9 March 1994; "Dumb and Dumber – Cyberdemocracy," CNN *Crossfire* Transcript #1229, Air Date: 1 March 1994; Anthony Lewis, "Words Matter," *New York Times*, 5 May 1995; Todd S. Purdum, "Clinton Assails the Preaching of the Militia," *New York Times*, 6 May 1995.

[2] Everett Carll Ladd, "The 1994 Congressional Elections: The Realignment Continues," *Political Science Quarterly* 100 (Spring 1995): 1–23.

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Democratic seats. The GOP increased its majority to 54 to 46 when conservative Democrats Richard Shelby from Alabama and Ben Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado switched allegiances. Republicans, by January 1996, had added to their House majority when five southern representatives crossed over from the Democratic to the Republican side of the aisle.

The transfer of political power at the state level was no less dramatic. The GOP attained control of both legislative chambers of nineteen states (Democrats now control eighteen), capturing eleven legislatures formerly held by Democrats. Republicans maintained or captured thirty state houses—inverting the partisan make-up that existed prior to the election and giving the GOP a majority of governors for the first time since 1970.

The Republican campaign to win the House and Senate, governorships, and state legislative chambers in the 1994 elections was "not just about ideas but technology, not just about crafting ideas but communicating them to the public." Indeed, House Speaker Newt Gingrich's 1994 electoral strategy was to funnel information around "the classic elite media" directly to the voters. Republican leaders have long held that the established mass media have a liberal bias. Gingrich believed that the "new media" gave the Republicans a decisive edge in 1994: "Without C-Span, without talk radio shows, without all the alternative media, I don't think we would have won."[3]

This article analyzes the talk radio phenomenon in the context of the 1994 House, Senate, and gubernatorial elections. While talk radio has piqued the interest of media commentators and some academic researchers, scant attention has been focused on the electoral behavior and political orientations of talk radio listeners and their potential as an emergent voting bloc and as a category for election analysis (analogous, for example, to evangelical Christians). We profile the political and policy views of "talk voters" and detail the association of these variables to their voting behavior in 1994. The causal relationships between listening to talk radio and specific attitudes and activities—and whether the medium's principal impact is amplification, mobilization, or conversion—is beyond the scope of this study. No panel study data are available to date to permit these types of analyses.

"Dial-In Democracy" examines whether talk radio is the "conservative precinct" portrayed by conservative commentator William Rusher, the "grievance network" heard by Democratic consultant Bob Shrum, or, worse still, an outlet of "testosterone-fueled meanness [and] name-calling."[4] Finally, it seeks to place talk radio, with its populistic impulses, in the renewed debate over the nature of American democracy.

[3] Steven Roberts, "Open Arms for Online Democracy," *U.S. News and World Report*, 16 January 1995, 10.

[4] William Rusher, "The Importance of Talk Radio," Newspaper Enterprise Association, 3 September 1994; Jon Weiner, "Looking for the Left's Limbaugh," *Dissent* 42 (Spring 1995): 161.

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The Growth and Reach of Talk Radio

Talk radio has grown enormously over the past thirty-five years. In 1960, only two radio stations, KABC in Los Angeles and KMOX in St. Louis, had talk formats. By the spring of 1995, 1,130 (one of nine) radio stations devoted the bulk of their programming to news/talk. In the winter of 1994, news/talk was capturing 16.2 percent of the 12 years of age or older audience and 19.5 percent of men over 18. On the eve of the midterm elections, 20 million Americans a week were tuning in to conservative talk host, Rush Limbaugh, on 659 radio stations.[5]

In the late 1960s, AM radio began to turn more and more to talk shows because of FM's technical advantage in broadcasting music. But the real boom erupted in the 1980s, spurred by the advent of cheap satellite transmission technology. The number of all-talk or news/talk radio stations climbed from 200 to more than 800 in a decade.[6]

Several events in the late 1980s and early 1990s spurred the emerging political prominence of talk radio/TV—the founding of the National Association of Talk Show hosts in 1988, Congress's recission in 1989 of a pay raise for itself after a public clamor fomented by talk shows, Gennifer Flowers's intrusion into Bill Clinton's quest for the Democratic nomination in 1992, Ross Perot's quirky on again-off again campaign for the White House, the flap over gays in the military in early 1993, Zoe Baird's aborted nomination to be attorney general in 1993, Rush Limbaugh's rapid rise to national prominence, the Whitewater affair, the 1994 health care debate, and the Oklahoma City bombing.[7]

Previous Findings on Talk Radio Listeners

The few studies of talk radio listeners offer inconclusive and conflicting findings. Some analyses have suggested that listeners are more politically alienated and inefficacious, inattentive to public affairs, socially isolated, and cynical than nonlisteners. Talk listeners were found to have been more likely to take extreme sides on policy issues and to be more suspicious of elites than nonlisteners.[8] The

[5] Phyllis Stark, "Country Radio Levels Off; News/Talk Keeps Growing," *Billboard*, 18 June 1995, 89.

[6] "Everybody's Talkin' At Us," *Business Week*, 22 May 1995, 105; Kenneth Jost, "Talk Show Democracy," *The CQ Researcher*, 19 April 1995, 372, 375.

[7] Howard Fineman, "The Power of Talk," *Newsweek*, 8 February 1993, 24–28; Jost, "Talk Show Democracy," 368, 375, 376, 378; John Fund, "The Power of Talk," *Forbes Media Critic* 2 (Spring 1995): 54ff; Benjamin I. Page and Jason Tannenbaum, "Populistic Deliberation and Talk Radio," *Journal of Communication* 46 (Spring 1996): 33–54.

[8] John Crittenden, "Democratic Functions of the Open Mike Radio Forum," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 35 (Spring 1971): 200–210; Robert K. Avery and Donald G. Ellis, "Talk Radio as an Interpersonal Phenomenon" in Gary Gumpert and Robert Catheart, eds., *Inter/Media: Interpersonal Communications in a Media World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 108–115; Murray B. Levin, *Talk Radio and the American Dream* (Lexington, MA; Lexington Books, 1987); Jeffrey L. Katz, "The Power of Talk," *Governing* 4 (March 1991): 38–42.

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talk radio listeners in these studies appear quite similar to the voters described in the early election studies—passive, inert followers with little knowledge of public affairs and, still worse, as the American Founders feared, apolitical clay "easily misled by the artful misrepresentations" of interested men of "perverted ambition."[9]

Richard Hofstetter and his colleagues' 1991 survey of San Diego talk radio listeners presented a different portrait. Listeners paid more attention to politics and participated more in political activities (including voting, campaign work, community action, and contacting public officials) than nonlisteners. Seeking information was the major reason given by San Diegans for listening to talk radio.[10]

The most extensive analysis of talk radio and TV listeners and viewers (and hosts) to date is *The Vocal Minority in American Politics* conducted by the Times Mirror Center for The People & The Press in May 1993.[11] This nationwide study examined listeners' motivations for tuning into talk radio and analyzed the political perceptions, attitudes, opinions, and behaviors of the talk radio audience. The *Vocal Minority* found that "surveillance" reasons such as "keeping up on the issues of the day" (cited by 84 percent) and "learning about how different people feel about different issues" (named by 85 percent) were by far the most cited reasons for listening to talk radio. Nearly half of talk listeners reported that they were more interested when they were listening to people with an opposite point of view, more than double those who said they preferred to hear someone expressing a point of view similar to their own. Entertainment was also an important reason, mentioned by fully half.[12]

The Times Mirror found talk show audiences to be more conservative, more Republican, more anti-Congress, and more critical of President Bill Clinton than nonlisteners. *The Vocal Minority*, like the Hofstetter et al. study, showed the talk radio constituency to be attentive to politics—and more likely to participate in public meetings, to write letters to their officials, and to vote.

The Data

On 8 November 1994, the Voter News Service (VNS)—the consortium of ABC, the Associated Press (AP), CBS, CNN, and NBC—surveyed 10,210 voters na-

[9] Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), chap. 14; Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960); Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 60 (June 1966): 285–295. *The Federalist Papers*, intro. by Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), 384, 34.

[10] C. Richard Hofstetter et al., "Political Talk Radio: A Stereotype Reconsidered," *Political Research Quarterly* 47 (June 1994): 473.

[11] Andrew Kohut, Cliff Zukin, and Carol Bowman, *The Vocal Minority in American Politics* (Washington, DC: Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, 1993).

[12] Ibid., 10–11.

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tionwide as they exited the polls. Among the questions asked in the national exit poll and in twenty individual state polls was whether they "frequently listen[ed] to political call-in shows on radio."

Exit polls have several desirable qualities. Their large sample sizes permit more extensive subgroup analyses than most academic surveys, particularly in statewide races. Also, the immediacy of the survey to actual voting eliminates the "recall problem," in which respondents at some remove from election day inaccurately report their electoral behavior. Moreover, exit poll interviews are conducted immediately after the act of voting, when the salience of elements of the voter's decisional calculus such as candidate qualities and policy concerns are highest.[13]

The VNS poll results are supplemented by the 1992 American National Election Study (NES) conducted by the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies, the 1993 Times Mirror survey, and data from Luntz Research Companies. Unless otherwise noted, the data presented in this essay are from VNS.

Talk Radio and the 1994 Elections

Talk radio is thought to have wielded considerable political clout in the 1994 election, its influence pervading national, state, and local politics. Indeed, the 1994 election has been called the "first talk-radio election."[14] Talk radio listeners made up 21 percent of House voters nationally; similar percentages held for all the individual states and in all regions surveyed by VNS. In 1994, talk voters cast 64 percent of their votes for Republicans in House races and six in ten voted for Republican Senate candidates. These talk voters differed significantly from nonlistening voters, who cast 51 percent of their ballots for Democratic House and Senate candidates. (See Appendix at end of article.)

Differences in the voting behavior of talk radio listeners and nonlisteners also turned up in every individual state surveyed by VNS. Listeners were more likely, often substantially so, to support the Republican candidate. Nonlisteners, on the other hand, cast a majority or sizable plurality of their votes for Democratic candidates. Only the Senate race in Ohio and the gubernatorial contests in California, New York, and Ohio were exceptions.

The voting behavior of talk radio listeners in the key states of Texas, Pennsylvania, and New York suggests that talk listeners can be viewed as an emerging, potentially potent voting bloc and as a politically meaningful analytical category. For example, had talk radio listeners in the Lone Star state split their votes among the two major party candidates the same way nonlisteners had, Democrat Ann Richards, who lost to George Bush, Jr. 46 to 53 percent, would have remained in the governor's mansion. Nonlisteners (78 percent of the electorate) voted for

[13] Herbert Asher, *Polling and the Public*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992), 101–102.

[14] Howard Kurtz quoted in Fund, "The Power of Talk," 54.

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her by a 50 to 48 percent margin. If talk listeners in Texas had voted in like manner, Richards would have won by two percentage points. But talk voters overwhelmingly supported Bush, 69 to 31 percent—a margin sufficient to overcome Bush's deficit among the rest of Texas voters (See Table 1).

Similarly, Democrat Harris Wofford, who lost to challenger Rick Santorum 47 to 49 percent, would have been returned to the U.S. Senate from Pennsylvania by nonlisteners, who voted for him by a four point margin. The ballots cast by the one-fifth of the electorate who listened to talk radio, however, went decisively to Santorum.

The roller coaster governor's contest in the Empire State is particularly notable, since the outcome could have gone in either direction had talk listeners voted as nonlisteners had. According to VNS, the 81 percent of the New York electorate who did not listen to talk radio had divided their votes evenly between incumbent Democrat Mario Cuomo and Republican challenger George Pataki. But Cuomo lost overall, 45 to 49 percent as three-fifths of talk radio listeners voted for Pataki.[15]

The distinctiveness of talk voters was evident in other key races in large states. In New Jersey, talk radio listeners cast 57 percent of their votes for Republican Garabed "Chuck" Haytaian—19 percentage points more than for two-term Democratic Senator Frank Lautenberg. Lautenberg carried the nonlistener vote by 53 to 44 percent and won the race overall, 50 to 47 percent. And in the Senate race in Virginia, talk listeners also behaved differently from nonlisteners. Republican Oliver North was the clear favorite over incumbent Democrat Charles Robb among talk listeners—55 to 36 percent in a three-candidate race. But nonlisteners favored Robb over North by a nine point margin—large enough to keep Robb in the Senate.

Leaders or spokespersons of any group that strongly supports a winning candidate or party often claim (as many talk show hosts have done) that it was *their* followers' votes that were responsible for putting the candidate or party in office. If their group had voted differently, they argue, the election would have turned out differently. It is in the political interest of such persons to do so. Rewards ought to come, they say at least implicitly, from such loyalty.

This article does not claim that talk radio, and by extension, the talk vote determined the outcome of the 1994 elections generally or in any particular race. Rather, it maintains that talk voters appear to be an emerging political category worthy of empirical analyses comparable to the treatment political scientists have accorded other categories of citizens in the electorate—African Americans, Christian fundamentalists, union members, farmers, southerners, the poor, senior citizens, and so forth—who have historically evidenced distinct voting patterns.

[15] The aggregate statewide election returns for these "what if" scenarios were drawn from Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa with Richard E. Cohen, *The Almanac of American Politics 1996* (Washington, DC: The National Journal, 1995). The statewide percentages of talk voters and non-talk voters are drawn from the VNS state exit polls.

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TABLE 1

How Talk Radio Listeners and Nonlisteners Voted in Selected 1994 State Races

% of Talk listeners in state electorate		*Talk listeners*				*Nonlisteners*				*Total Sample*			
		Dem %	*Rep %*	*Other %*	*N*	*Dem %*	*Rep %*	*Other %*	*N*	*Dem %*	*Rep %*	*Other %*	*N*
22	Texas Governor	31	69	–	280	50	48	–	973	46	53	1	1253
22	PA Senate	32	60	8	343	50	46	4	1267	47	49	4	1610
19	NY Governor	37	59	4	263	47	47	6	1133	45	49	6	1396
23	NJ Senate	38	57	3	292	53	44	3	1042	50	47	3	1334
21	VA Senate	36	55	9	354	48	39	13	1311	45	43	12	1665

Source: 1994 Voter News Service statewide exit polls.

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding, votes for minor party candidates, and "omits."

Talk voters do not fit conceptually into traditional analytical categories used to define other groups or collectivities that have been of long-standing interest to social scientists—race/ethnicity, occupation, region, class, religion, generation, gender, type of community, or associational memberships. The most salient and theoretically meaningful characteristic of talk voters appears to be the medium and the type of programming they listen to. What binds these folks together is that they are "talk networked."

The 1994 Talk Voter

Who was the 1994 talk voter? Demographically, he was predominantly male and white. In 1994, there was a clear difference in the listening habits and voting behavior between men and women. Men were more likely to listen to talk radio. Twenty-three percent of men in the total sample checked off the talk radio box in the 1994 VNS exit poll compared to 18 percent of all women, thus making talk voters decidedly male—56 to 44 percent.

Men were also significantly more likely than women to vote Republican in House races—58 vs. 42 percent. Male talk listeners overall were 12 percentage points more likely to vote for GOP House candidates than female talk listeners, though substantial majorities of both supported Republicans. White men listeners were similarly more likely to vote Republican than white women listeners but both had even higher levels of support for Republican congressional candidates than nonlisteners. (See Appendix at end of article.)

The gender differences among talk listeners (and, to a lesser extent, among nonlisteners) are in accord with the literature on the gender gap—the partisan division of the voting behavior of men and women—which emerged during the 1980 presidential election as women appeared to be moving to the Democratic party. The emphasis of commentators on women and their Democratic leanings obscured, however, a politically more profound movement—a reverse gender gap of white men voting increasingly Republican.[16] These gender gaps held in the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections and the 1990 midterm elections. In 1994, the partisan rift between men and women was the widest ever since the Reagan-Carter election when the "gender gap" entered the political vocabulary.[17]

The 1994 Republican electoral successes have been credited to the "angry white male."[18] Indeed, over three-fifths of white males surveyed by VNS voted

[16] Louis Bolce, "The Role of Gender in Recent Presidential Elections: Reagan and the Reverse Gender Gap," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 15 (Spring 1985): 372–385; Daniel Wirls, "The Gender Gap in American Elections: Lingering Illusions and Political Realities" in Benjamin Ginsberg and Alan Stone, eds., *Do Elections Matter?* 2nd ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 117–133.

[17] Karlyn H. Bowman, "The Gender Factor" in Everett Carll Ladd, ed., *America at the Polls: 1994* (Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1995), 52–57.

[18] Susan Estrich, "The Last Victim," *New York Times Magazine* 18 December 1994, 54–55; Richard Berke, "Defections Among Men to G.O.P. Helped Insure Rout of Democrats," *New York Times*, 11 November 1995.

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for Republican House candidates in 1994, up from the 52 percent in the 1992 National Election Survey. Nearly three-fifths supported Republicans for the Senate. White women in general less widely supported the GOP in both House and Senate races in 1994. (See Appendix.)

Male white talk voters were indeed anti-Democratic. Extraordinary majorities voted Republican for House and Senate candidates. Yet, white female talk voters were by no means pro-Democratic: nearly two-thirds of them also voted for GOP House and Senate candidates. White male and female support for Republicans among nonlisteners was substantially lower. GOP House candidates won 59 percent of the vote from nonlistening white males; GOP Senate candidates garnered 54 percent. Female nonlisteners distributed their votes equally between Democrats and Republicans for the House and the Senate.

While there was a gap in voting behavior between men and women, there was a chasm separating whites from blacks. Although the proportion of whites and blacks who listened to talk radio was quite similar—20 and 19 percent, respectively—their voting behaviors were quite different. As seen in the Appendix, whites cast 58 percent of their votes for Republican House candidates and 55 percent for GOP Senate candidates. And white talk radio listeners were even more Republican-voting than nonlisteners.

But listening to talk radio appears to have been unrelated to the voting behavior of African Americans. Blacks, whether they listened to talk radio or not, voted Democratic by at least 8-to-1 margins. This should not be surprising given the monolithic black support for Democrats since 1964, despite the growing economic diversity among blacks, their conservatism on some sociocultural issues, and appeals of prominent leaders of the GOP to be more inclusionary.[19] Since talk radio was not associated with the partisan voting behavior of African Americans, the remainder of this article reports data on *white* talk radio listeners and nonlisteners unless otherwise specified.

Differences in talk radio listening patterns and voting behavior were not as pronounced among other demographic or socioeconomic groupings such as marital status, religious affiliation, education (except for a moderate curvilinear pattern peaking among those completing four years of college), and income (except for a moderate disparity between the poorest and wealthiest categories) than they were with gender. None of these factors were nearly as important in differentiating the voting behavior of talk listeners from non-talk listeners as race in conjunction with gender.

[19] Michael Combs and Susan Welch, "Blacks, Whites and Attitudes Toward Abortion," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 46 (Winter 1982): 510–520; Richard Seltzer and Robert C. Smith, "Race and Ideology: A Research Note Measuring Liberalism and Conservatism in Black America," *Phylon* 46 (Summer 1985): 98–105; Louis Bolce, Gerald De Maio, and Douglas Muzzio, "Blacks and the Republican Party: The 20 Percent Solution," *Political Science Quarterly* 107 (Spring 1992): 63–79; Louis Bolce, Gerald De Maio, and Douglas Muzzio, "The 1992 Republican 'Tent': No Blacks Walked In," *Political Science Quarterly* 108 (Summer 1993): 255–270.

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TABLE 2

Political Characteristics of the 1994 White Electorate, Talk Radio Listeners and Nonlisteners

	% of Total Electorate	% with Attribute Who Listen to Talk Radio	% of Talk Listeners	% of Nonlisteners	% of Electorate with Attribute Listening To Talk Radio
Ideology					
Conservative	39	29	54	35	11
Liberal	16	16	12	17	2
Moderate	39	16	35	47	7
(N)	(4550)	a	(943)	(3607)	(4550)
Party ID					
Republican	39	26	50	37	10
Democrat	31	12	19	34	4
Independent	27	12	29	26	6
Other	3	14	2	3	–
(N)	(4645)	a	(946)	(3619)	(4645)
1992 Vote					
Bush	41	26	52	39	11
Clinton	40	14	27	43	6
Perot	15	23	17	14	4
(N)	(4640)	a	(950)	(3690)	(4640)

a. The base Ns for column 2 are: conservatives, 1775; liberals, 728; independents, 2028; Republicans, 815; Democrats, 1440; other, 139; Bush voters, 1902; Clinton voters, 1856; Perot voters, 646.

Note: 1. Percentages for columns 1, 3 and 4 may not add to 100% due to rounding, votes for minor party candidates, and "omits." Columns 2 and 5 do not add to 100% since they are subsets of the response category from which they are computed.

2. Column 2 should be read, for example, that 29% of conservatives listened to talk radio (and, thus, 71% did not); 26% of Republicans listened to talk radio (and, thus, 74% did not); 26% of Bush voters listened to talk radio (and, thus, 74% did not).

3. Column 5 is a product of columns 1 and 2. Thus, the 11% of the electorate who were conservative talk radio listeners is the product of the 39% of the electorate who called themselves conservatives multiplied by the 29% of conservatives who listened to talk radio. Likewise, the 10% of the electorate who were Republican talk radio listeners is the product of the 39% of the electorate who called themselves Republican multiplied by the 26% who listened to talk radio.

Source: Voter News Service 1994 national House exit poll.

Politics and Talk Radio

What most distinguished talk listeners from nonlisteners was their ideology, partisanship, and the way those in the "political middle" voted in 1992 and 1994. (See Tables 2 and 3.)

Conservative commentator William Rusher's observation that talk radio had become a "conservative precinct" was correct.[20] The data in Table 2 demonstrate this in several ways. First, self-described conservatives in the 1994 electorate were much more likely to have listened to talk radio than liberals—29 vs. 16 percent (column 2). This far greater tendency of conservatives to tune into talk radio, when combined with the fact that there were many more conservatives

[20] Rusher, "The Importance of Talk Radio."

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TABLE 3

Talk Radio and the "Political Middle": The 1992 and 1994 House Vote Among White Talk Listeners (in percent)

	1992					
	Talk Listeners			*Nonlisteners*		
	Dem %	*Rep %*	*(N)*	*Dem %*	*Rep %*	*(N)*
Independents	56	44	(218)	59	41	(183)
Moderates	58	42	(154)	57	43	(122)
Perot Voters	49	51	(118)	58	42	(101)
	1994					
	Talk Listeners			*Nonlisteners*		
	Dem %	*Rep %*	*(N)*	*Dem %*	*Rep %*	*(N)*
Independents	34	66	(225)	39	56	(835)
Moderates	43	54	(303)	52	46	(1518)
Perot Voters	28	73	(141)	28	67	(461)

Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding, votes for minor party candidates, and "omits."

Source: The 1992 figures are drawn from the Center for Political Studies' National Election Study; the 1994 figures are from the 1994 Voter News Service national election exit poll.

in the total electorate than liberals—39 vs. 16 percent (column 1)—produced an electorate in which conservative talk radio listeners made up 11 percent of all 1994 House voters while talk radio-listening liberals made up only 2 percent (column 5). Simply, the profile of the 1994 national House electorate shows conservatives outnumbering liberals, and substantially more likely to have tuned into talk radio.

The conservative dominance of the talk radio medium is further illustrated by the ideological profile of the 1994 talk voter: 54 percent of 1994 white voters who tuned into talk radio were self-described conservatives, while only 12 percent characterized themselves as liberals—a better than 4 to 1 margin (column 3).

This decidedly conservative bent of the white talk radio audience in 1994 appears to offer little cheer for those who wish to present an effective counterbalance to conservative talk radio. The five to one edge of conservative to liberal talk listeners in the entire 1994 national electorate (column 5) suggests that liberal talk hosts such as Mario Cuomo, Jerry Brown, Gary Hart, and Jim Hightower face an uphill struggle to provide ideological balance to the medium.

More air time for talk radio programs hosted by liberals, it could be argued, might nonetheless lead more nonliberals as well as liberals to listen to liberal talk radio—"broadcast it and they will come." This appears problematic for a number of reasons. The available pool of white liberals in the 1994 white electorate was too small to provide an effective counterweight to conservative talk. Even if more progressive radio hosts could have *quadrupled* listenership among white liberals from 16 percent in 1994 to 64 percent, the liberal talk audience that would have been generated would still have not equalled the percentage of conser-

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vative talk listeners who voted in the 1994 elections (The figures are derived from columns 1 and 2 in Table 2).

Why would conservatives and moderates tune into liberal talk radio? Because as the Times-Mirror *Vocal Minority* survey found, most listeners tune in for information, for "surveillance," for listening to different viewpoints, for "reconnaissance." Why might they, along with liberals, not stay tuned? The *Vocal Minority* also found that entertainment was a major reason for listening to talk radio. While hardly a scientifically tested proposition, liberal hosts appear to have been unsuccessful in challenging the dominance of conservative talk, at least in part, because, according to commentators such as Hightower, they have been "dull and stuck up."[21]

Indeed, conservative talk radio may have increased its edge over its liberal counterpart in the year after the midterm elections. Hightower, the most widely listened to liberal talk show host, seems to have fallen victim to insufficient ratings. His show was dropped by ABC in October 1995. In January 1995, San Francisco's leading talk station replaced liberal talk show hosts with conservatives.[22]

Talk radio was also a Republican precinct for white talk radio listeners in 1994. A majority checked off Republican in VNS's party identification question; a fifth selected Democrat, while independents accounted for nearly three-in-ten talk voters. A majority of 1994 white talk voters reported having cast a ballot for George Bush in 1992; nonlisteners gave a plurality of their votes to Clinton.

A postelection nationwide survey by Luntz Research provides additional evidence of the political relevance of talk radio. It shows a strong monotonic relationship between the amount of talk radio listening and the tendency to vote Republican. Voters who had no exposure to talk radio evenly split their votes between Democratic and GOP candidates. Those who listened for at least eleven hours weekly supported Republican candidates by 3-to-1. Citizens who listened between one and ten hours a week tended to have voted more Republican, the more they listened to talk radio.[23]

The utility of the talk/nontalk dichotomy as an analytical category is illustrated by how differently white voters, particularly white talk voters, in the "middle"—self-described moderates, independents, and those who had voted for Perot in 1992—cast their ballots in 1994 compared to two years earlier. Generally, talk radio listeners evidenced the most pronounced shift toward Republicans. (See Table 3.)

White moderate talk listeners in 1994 lopsidedly supported Republican House candidates, whereas nonlistening moderates preferred Democratic candidates.

[21] Quoted in Fund, "The Power of Talk," 58; see also, Fund, 56 and Weiner, "Looking to the Left's Limbaugh" for other examples of calls for liberal alternatives; see Kohut et al., *The Vocal Minority*, 11, on the entertainment value of talk radio.

[22] Edmund Andres, "ABC Pulls Plug on a Populist's Radio Show," *New York Times*, 9 October 1995; "Chopping at the Competition," *MEDIAWATCH*, November 1995, 6.

[23] Luntz Research, personal communication, 25 May 1995.

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In 1992, things were different. Then, there was no variation between talk voters and nonlisteners; both supported Democratic House candidates with three-fifths of their votes.

Even more striking was the surge in votes for Republicans among white independents, especially among those who listened to talk radio. Support for GOP House candidates from independent talk radio listeners swelled by 22 percentage points from 1992 to 1994. Nonlisteners also shifted from the Democratic to the Republican column between 1992 and 1994; they gave Republican House candidates 56 percent of their votes in 1994, up 15 points from two years earlier. The voting behavior of listening vs. nonlistening political independents grew more distinct over the two elections; only three percentage points separated their support for GOP House candidates in 1992; by 1994 the gap had widened to ten points. Similarly, the gap that divided talk radio listening from nonlistening moderates also widened. It was one percentage point in 1992; it was eight points in 1994.

Perot voters, a closely scrutinized group whose support had been courted by both parties in 1992 and 1994 (and wooed by virtually all presidential aspirants for 1996) departed from their 1992 voting pattern and strongly supported Republican congressional candidates in 1994. The larger increase in Republican voting came from Perot voters who did not listen to talk radio—25 points vs. 22 points for listeners. But talk listeners who voted for Perot in 1992 supported 1994 Republican House candidates in greater numbers than their nonlistening counterparts—73 vs. 67 percent.

In contrast to self-classified moderates and independents, Perot voters, both listeners and nonlisteners, were more alike in their voting behavior in 1994 than they were two years earlier. One explanation is that the labels "moderate" and "independent" are vague, meaning different things to different people. Both categories include individuals with disparate and often contradictory views. Perot voters are, by definition, more concretely defined as a group, having voted for a candidate who articulated a specific policy agenda, many items of which were coopted in 1994 by the GOP in their "Contract With America" (for example, term limits, a balanced budget amendment, and reform of House rules).

The Democratic rout in 1994 can be attributed, in part, to their failure to retain moderates, independents, and Perot voters—three skeptical and pivotal (especially in this era of dealignment) overlapping segments of the electorate.[24]

Talk Voter Issues

VNS's 1994 exit poll asked respondents, "which one or two of these [issues] mattered most in your vote for Congress?" The nine issues were: foreign policy, health care, the federal budget deficit, Clinton's performance as president, crime,

[24] Drummond Ayers, Jr., "Republication Progress Fails to Impress Perot's Faithful," *New York Times*, 9 April 1995.

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TABLE 4

Voting Issues for U.S. House: White Talk Radio Listeners and Nonlisteners (in percent)

	Talk Listeners			*Nonlisteners*		
	All %	*Rep %*	*Dem %*	*All %*	*Rep %*	*Dem %*
Taxes	28	34	15	5	7	4
Crime	25	25	27	12	13	9
Clinton's performance	22	29	9	11	16	7
Health	21	14	35	28	20	38
Economy/Jobs	20	16	26	3	2	4
Federal budget deficit	19	20	19	13	16	11
Time for a change	16	21	6	8	9	5
Candidate's experience	10	7	19	7	6	9
Foreign policy	5	4	8	4	4	5
No issue selected	6	4	9	9	7	8
	N = 959	622	267	3775	1837	1493

Note: Percentages add to more than 100% because multiple responses were accepted. The question asked: "Which 1 or 2 of these mattered most in your vote for Congress?"

Source: Voter News Service 1994 national House exit poll.

time for a change, candidate's experience, taxes, and the economy/jobs. Talk voters and nonlisteners differed substantially on the incidence of issue voting, the frequency and types of issues mentioned, and the salience of President Clinton's job performance in their vote decisions.

White talk listeners were one-third less likely to cast an issueless vote than nonlisteners and substantially more likely to mention issues as reason for their vote (1.7 issues cited compared to .91). They were also twice as likely to say that Clinton's job performance factored into their vote decision. While there was no significant difference in the mean frequencies of issues mentioned by white talk voters who voted for either Republican or Democratic congressional candidates, those who voted for Democrats were more than twice as likely not to have found any of the issues included in VNS's exit poll as a factor in the vote.

Health care was by far the most important issue cited by nonlisteners. (See Table 4.) Talk listeners were also concerned about health care; but taxes, crime, the state of the economy/jobs, as well as the Clinton presidency were important too.

There were significant differences in the salience of the types of the issues that "mattered most" to white talk voters depending on whether they supported Republicans or Democrats for the House (with the exception of crime and the deficit). Voters who went Democratic were two-and-a half times more concerned with health care and the experience of their congressional candidate, 10 points more inclined to cite the economy and jobs, and twice as likely to cast an issueless vote. To white talk voters who cast ballots for Republican House candidates, taxes, Clinton's job performance, and the need for change loomed large. These matters barely concerned their Democratic counterparts.

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TABLE 5

Evaluations of Clinton, Congress, and Direction of Country: White Talk Radio Listeners and Nonlisteners (in percent)

	Total Sample %	*Talk Listeners* %	*Nonlisteners* %
Clinton Approval			
Approve	41	24	45
Disapprove	54	73	49
(N)	(4734)	(959)	(3775)
Congress Approval			
Approve	15	9	16
Disapprove	85	88	78
(N)	(4734)	(949)	(3775)
Vote Reason			
Support Clinton	14	10	16
Oppose Clinton	29	46	24
Clinton not factor	53	41	56
(N)	(4734)	(959)	(3775)
Direction of Country			
Right direction	37	27	40
Wrong track	57	69	54
(N)	(4734)	(959)	(3735)

Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding and "omits."
Source: Voter News Services 1994 national House exit poll.

The Clinton Factor

Bill Clinton's race for the presidency in 1992 to some commentators was the quintessential candidate-centered campaign, characterized by heavy emphasis on and mastery of modern communications technology. This "new style" of campaigning, akin to Franklin Roosevelt's use of the new radio medium of his era, aims to reach the multitude of potential voters on a personal level that is difficult to reach by traditional media and conventional means.[25] In 1992, white talk radio listeners favored Clinton over George Bush 42 to 37 percent (and Democratic House candidates over Republicans 55 to 45 percent), according to the National Election Study. Nonlisteners also supported Clinton over Bush, 43 to 38 percent (and Democratic House candidates 48 to 41 percent).

Two years later, the white electorate (both talk listeners and nonlisteners) disapproved of Clinton's job performance 54 to 41 percent. White talk listeners disapproved Clinton's presidential performance by a three to one margin, while nonlisteners were marginally negative in their assessment of Clinton's handling of the presidency. (See Table 5.)

[25] Robert Agranoff, "The New Style of Campaigning: The Decline of Party and the Rise of Candidate-Centered Technology" in Jeff Fishel, ed., *Parties and Elections in an Anti-Party Age* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 230–240; Stanley Milkis, "The New Deal, Party Politics, and the Administrative State" in Peter W. Scramm and Bradford P. Wilson, eds., *American Political Parties and Constitutional Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), 160.

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TABLE 6

House Vote by Evaluations of Clinton, Congress, and Direction of Country: White Talk Radio Listeners and Nonlisteners (in percent)

	Total Sample %			*Talk Listeners* %			*Nonlisteners* %		
	Dem	*Rep*		*Dem*	*Rep*		*Dem*	*Rep*	
Clinton Approval									
Approve	76	22	(1758)	85	15	(228)	74	23	(1530)
Disapprove	15	83	(2364)	10	88	(654)	17	81	(1710)
Congress Approval									
Approve	67	31	(696)	62	38	(92)	68	30	(604)
Disapprove	36	62	(3423)	24	74	(790)	39	59	(2633)
Vote Reason									
Support Clinton	92	8	(630)	93	6	(91)	93	7	(604)
Oppose Clinton	5	95	(1300)	5	95	(419)	5	95	(872)
Clinton not factor	49	51	(2205)	43	57	(357)	50	50	(1830)
Direction of Country									
Right direction	61	37	(1651)	58	42	(250)	62	36	(1401)
Wrong track	27	71	(2428)	16	82	(622)	30	68	(1866)

Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding and "omits."
Source: Voter News Services 1994 national House exit poll.

A negative assessment of Clinton's handling of the presidency was related to voting for GOP House candidates. This was especially the case among white talk voters. Half of all whites who voted for Republican House candidates said that their vote was cast to express opposition to the president. (VNS question read: "Was one of the reasons for your vote for U.S. House today: 1. to express support for Bill Clinton; 2. to express opposition to Bill Clinton; 3. Bill Clinton wasn't a factor in your vote.") Voters' use of their ballots to send an anti-Clinton message increased to 64 percent among white talk listeners who voted Republican, while 45 percent of their nonlistening counterparts cast oppositional ballots. Looked at another way, white talk voters who disapproved of Clinton supported Republican House candidates with nearly nine of ten of their votes. (See Table 6.)

The Clinton factor is further seen in voters' responses to VNS's item, "which one or two issues mattered most" in their vote. Those white voters (talk listeners and nonlisteners) who cited localistic factors, such as the "experience" of the congressional candidate, chose Democrats, 56 to 44 percent. But whites who cited "Clinton's job performance" as among the top one or two reasons for their vote decision went for Republicans, 75 to 25 percent. Among white voters who listened to talk radio who cited the president's job performance as a key element in their vote, nearly nine of ten (88 to 12 percent) went for Republican House candidates. (The data above are derived from the indicators presented in Table 4.) These data lend support to a view that has lost favor in recent years—that national factors, including the popularity of the incumbent president, the administration's performance, and the state of the economy can be at least as important

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as local factors (such as the qualities of the congressional candidates, incumbency, and so forth) in deciding off-year elections.[26]

Overall, the emergence of Clinton as an issue in the 1994 elections appears to have hurt Democratic House candidates. Listening to talk radio was related to heightened concern with Clinton and this, in turn, was coupled with significantly higher levels of support for Republican House candidates.

A Grievance Network?

Talk radio has been criticized as "catering to and built up by people who used to sit on bar stools and complain to each other"—a higher tech, albeit more impersonal grievance forum.[27] While this characterization is unfair, the frustrations voiced over the airwaves did turn up in talk voters' evaluations of governmental institutions, political leaders, the direction of the nation, and in the reasons these citizens cited why they voted the way they did.

White talk voters, irrespective of partisanship and ideology, were more negative/oppositional than nonlistening voters as seen in Table 5. Talk voters did not particularly like how Congress was handling its job, they were not happy with Clinton's job performance, nor did they like the direction that the president and Congress were taking the country. Overwhelming majorities of both talk voters and nontalk voters disapproved of Congress. Approval of Congress among white talk radio listeners was in single digits. Also, nearly five times as many white talk listeners—46 to 10 percent—voted in House elections to oppose President Clinton than to support him. Moreover, large majorities of both talk and nontalk voters felt that the country was "seriously off on the wrong track" rather than "generally moving in the right direction," with talk listeners more likely than those who didn't tune in to express this view (69 vs. 54 percent). Finally, talk listeners were twice as likely as nonlisteners to have cited "time for a change" as an issue that had figured prominently in their voting calculus. (See Table 4.)

Other VNS data (not presented here) demonstrate conservatives were far more pessimistic than moderates and liberals; conservative talk radio listeners were the most pessimistic of all political groupings. Republican and independent talk voters were more likely to believe that the country was headed down the wrong track than their nonlistening counterparts. Talk voters who identified themselves as Democrats more widely believed than Republicans and independents that the country was going in the right direction, but still one-third were pessimistic about the future of the country.

[26] Compare Edward R. Tufte, "Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review* 69 (September 1975): 812–826; with Morris Fiorina, "An Era of Divided Government," *Political Science Quarterly* 107 (Fall 1992): 395; and Norman Luttbeg and Michael M. Gant, *American Electoral Behavior, 1952–1992*, 2nd ed. (Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock, 1995), chap. 5.

[27] Timothy Egan quoted in Fund, "The Power of Talk," 55ff.

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Overall, on the four "grievance" indicators, talk voters accounted for about twice as large a proportion of the electorate who took opposition/critical positions than those who expressed supportive views.

Talk Radio and Retrospective Voting

How did these citizens, disgruntled about their government's performance, manifest their dissatisfaction on 8 November 1994? They voted against the governing party and for the opposition. Voters, particularly talk voters, appear to have voted retrospectively in 1994. Retrospective, or backward looking voting, occurs when citizens base their vote decision on the past performance (competence) of the party in power, that is, rewarding the incumbent administration when it is viewed as managing the nation's affairs satisfactorily and punishing those in power when conditions are perceived as deteriorating. It is probably the most common form of issue voting.[28]

Each of VNS's items concerning the direction the country was heading, attitudes on Congress, and the Clinton factor tap into various aspects of retrospective judgments. Voter responses to each of these items demonstrate that the 1994 election can be viewed largely as a white repudiation of the national Democratic party's competence in handling the affairs of the nation, with dissatisfaction most pronounced, again, among talk voters.

Citizens who thought the country was on the right track presumably would be more likely to vote for Democrats; those who saw the country headed down the wrong track would, if they voted retrospectively, presumably vote Republican. Both white talk and nontalk voters can be seen to have voted retrospectively in 1994 but there were again differences. (See Table 6.) Talk listeners who evaluated the state of the nation positively gave House Democratic candidates 58 percent of their votes; nonlisteners holding this view were somewhat more supportive of Democrats. The relationship between believing that the country was heading down the wrong track and voting Republican was in the expected direction, but again it was much more pronounced among talk radio listeners. Two-thirds of such nonlisteners supported Republican House candidates; over four-fifths of talk listeners who thought the country was heading in the wrong direction voted Republican. Virtually the identical pattern turned up in the voting behavior of talk and nontalk listeners in Senate races.

That citizens dissatisfied with a Congress dominated by one party for roughly half a century would be inclined to vote against candidates of that party is not difficult to understand. Talk voters who disapproved of Congress supported Republicans 74 to 24 percent; they were 15 points more likely to support GOP candidates than nonlisteners dissatisfied with Congress. The opposite tendency among those who evaluated Congress positively is also easy to apprehend. Citi-

[28] Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

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zens who approved of Congress voted overwhelmingly for Democratic candidates, 67 to 31 percent. Yet four of ten white talk voters who *approved* of Congress voted Republican.

Talk listeners' use of the vote as a mechanism to register discontent with governmental leaders and institutions, their greater issue focus, and the shift in congressional voting from Democrats in 1992 to Republicans in 1994 among Perot voters, independents, and moderates suggests that they voted rationally. Their voting behavior was in accord with their beliefs about governmental institutions and leaders, and the correctives they thought were needed to remedy their grievances (suggested by their citing "time for a change" as the reason for their vote). The relationship between the perceptions and electoral behavior of these VNS respondents is consistent with V.O. Key's argument that "voters are not fools. . . .[T]he electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the information available to it."[29] Talk voters can be said to have voted responsibly when they employed their votes to signal opposition and dissatisfaction and bring a change in control of Congress—not as "uncontrolled two year olds throwing a temper tantrum," as ABC's Peter Jennings charged.[30]

Talk Radio Listeners: Involved or Indifferent?

The early studies of talk radio listeners as well as commentary by some journalists have portrayed talk radio listeners as socially isolated and politically alienated. The 1994 talk voter appears different from this portrayal: they were more opinionated, less apt to cast an issueless vote, and more concerned with public policy matters than with personal qualities of candidates.

These Voter News Service data are in accord with the 1992 NES data and the 1993 Times Mirror poll, which present a positive picture of talk voters—with their greater interest in politics and higher political participation rates. The 1992 National Election Study, for example, found talk voters to be substantially more likely to watch news every day, to be "very much" interested in and to pay a "great deal" of attention to news about campaigns, and to engage in political discussion. (See Table 7.)

Nonlisteners were significantly more likely to express no interest in campaigns, never to watch news programs, to pay no attention to the presidential campaign, and not to discuss politics with others. The greater political involvement of talk radio listeners is further suggested by a December 1995 survey conducted by the *Washington Post*, the Kennedy School of Government, and the Kaiser Family Foundation. The study found that regular listeners to Rush Limbaugh's radio talk show had much higher participation rates and information

[29] V.O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Voting, 1936–1960* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968 [1966]), 7.

[30] Quoted in Terry Eastland, "The New Congress & the Old Media," *Forbes Media Critic* 2 (Spring 1995): 42.

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TABLE 7

Political Involvement: White Talk Radio Listeners and Nonlisteners, 1992 (in percent)

	% of Talk Listeners	% of Nonlisteners
Interest in political campaigns		
Very much interested	59	42
Not much interested	7	15
N	(942)	(827)
Watched TV news programs		
Every day	57	36
Never	7	17
N	(1032)	(917)
Number of programs watched about politics on TV		
A good many	43	28
Just a few/none	16	25
N	(876)	(704)
Attentive to news about presidential campaign		
A great deal	27	13
Not at all	10	18
N	(954)	(757)
Talked to others about campaign		
Yes	45	33
No	55	67
N	(948)	(826)

Note: Percentages for the first of our variables do not add to 100% because only the polar responses are shown. The Ns include all response categories for the variable.

Source: 1992 Center for Political Studies National Election Survey.

levels than "most politically engaged voters." Summarizing the research, the *Post* noted: "with voter registration topping 80 percent, more than half of dittoheads [Limbaugh's listeners] say they are very interested in politics, compared to only a quarter of non-dittoheads."[31]

If normative theorists are correct in maintaining that democratic systems presuppose political involvement, "vigilance," and the "practice of discussion" among its citizens, then talk radio voters arguably meet this requirement.[32]

Implications of Talk Radio for American Democracy

It has been widely assumed by talk radio listeners, callers, and hosts, by journalists and commentators, by the Speaker of the House and the president of the United States that talk radio had an effect on the 1994 election and that this new use of an old medium and the development of new interactive media will have important political consequences in the future.

The 1994 Voter News Service national election exit poll data permit the analysis of the political orientations and voting behavior of talk radio listeners in the 1994 midterm elections. What emerges from the 1994 national House,

[31] Mario S. Brossard, "Audience Participation in Radio Land," *Washington Post*, 29 January 1996.

[32] See Bernard Berelson et al., *Voting*, chap. 14; and Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter*.

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Senate, and gubernatorial exit poll data from VNS (as well as the 1993 Times Mirror and the 1992 National Election Study data) is that talk radio listeners are more conservative and Republican, more negative toward government, and more participatory than nonlisteners. The data paint a portrait of an opinionated, reasonably well educated, and socially integrated segment of the electorate.

The VNS data do not permit a causal analysis of the impact of talk radio; that is, the data cannot make the case that talk radio's effect on its listeners had a causal impact on their electoral behavior and led, at least in part, to the 1994 Republican congressional victories. Surely, many talk radio listeners would have both turned out on election day and cast their ballots the same way had they not tuned in to talk radio. But there were others who voted in 1994 the way they did because talk radio so amplified their interests and concerns that they turned out to vote where they would not have otherwise. And there were undoubtedly still other voters who were converted or persuaded in some way to change their vote because of their talk radio listening.

Journalistic observers and academic analysts offer widely divergent views of the effects of talk radio on American politics and its party system. Some believe that talk radio and other alternative media may exacerbate citizen disaffection toward government, political leaders, and the two major parties, aggravating electoral instability and societal strain. Thus, talk radio hosts and listeners pose a danger to American constitutional government—to the point of advocating insurrection. An *Economist* headline: "1-800-MOB-RULE" epitomizes this view.[33] Other commentators see talk radio and new communications technologies as a plus for democracy by expanding the country's political conversation and discussion, and the citizen's sense of empowerment, considered by some theories the essence of democratic practice.[34]

The press talks of "cyberdemocracy," "electronic town halls," and computer-TV interactive voting. One fear is that these new media formats are ushering in an era of "hyperdemocracy"—an inherently unstable form of direct democracy. Talk radio thus presents a "specter of government by feverish plebiscite," a process that erodes the essence of "representative democracy" by making it "harder and harder for Congress to exercise considered judgment."[35] James Madison's warning of a phalanx of unbridled popular passions is raised in *Time* cover stories and on the editorial and op-ed pages of major American newspapers and in journals of opinion.

The classic American statement on the need for representative government has been Madison's "filtering" imagery in the *Federalist Papers*: "to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens" whose wisdom, prudence, and temperance would mitigate the popular

[33] "1-800-MOB-RULE," *Economist*, 18 August 1993, 22.

[34] Berelson et al., *Voting*, chap. 14; Bernard Hennessy, *Public Opinion*, 5th ed. (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1985), chap. 2.

[35] Robert Wright, "Hyper-Democracy," *Time*, 23 January 1995, 15–21; Fineman, "The Power of Talk," 25; Roberts, "Open Arms," 10.

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excesses of democracy. The Framers of the Constitution, fearing impassioned majorities and their tendency to destroy and tyrannize, rejected plebiscitary or "pure" or "direct" democracy. "Representative democracy" was a defense against the "temporary errors and delusions" of the people.[36]

Madison's chief bulwark for the mischief of faction—the extended republic—is now easily breached in an age of global, instantaneous communication in its many emerging forms. The advantage of a large country in 1787, as Madison argued in *The Federalist*, No. 10 was the check it placed on faction. When people are geographically dispersed, even if a majority has a "common motive," the distance among them will make it hard for them "to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other."[37] In Madison's view, the majority having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression.

Talk radio can create instantaneous communities of coexistent interest and passion over continental distances. And the filters—the chosen body of representatives—can be clogged with the telephone calls, faxes, and e-mail messages of an increasingly active citizenry and can be all too willing to act impulsively on behalf of these impassioned, fractious segments of the populace.

The growing prominence of talk radio and the emergence of new communications media over the last twenty years may have exacerbated the extended period of dealignment that has come to characterize American electoral politics. Talk radio allows voters to bypass both political parties and the established news media for political information and voting cues, thus further weakening the two-party system and destabilizing the political process.

Those who consider talk radio to have a salutary effect on American politics and government see the medium as a "forum for discussion and dissent"—the modern equivalent of the soapbox, committees of correspondence, the bully pulpit, the village square, and the town hall.[38] Talk radio, for other defenders, is a mediating institution that gives people a sense of connection in politics, "fulfilling some of the functions that traditional political institutions—parties, unions, or civic groups used to perform."[39] This and the other "new media" provide novel ways for officials and constituents to engage in two-way conversations; they are a modern means by which citizens can petition and instruct their elected representatives. Talk radio and TV shows "inasmuch as they improve both substance and relevance of information can contribute to democracy via a clearer picture of electoral alternatives," for the level of information helps determine how well the public can control government.[40]

Among other cited benefits of talk radio is that the medium diminishes political and social alienation and increases self-efficacy and participation by creating a

[36] *The Federalist Papers*, 82, 384.

[37] Ibid., 83.

[38] CNN, "Late Edition," 16 April 1995, transcript #81.

[39] Robin Toner, "Election Jitters in Limbaughland," *New York Times*, 3 November 1994; John Fund, "The Power of Talk," 52–59.

[40] Christine F. Ridout, "News Coverage and Talk Shows in the 1992 Presidential Campaign," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 26 (December 1993): 712–715; Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, *The*

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sense of connectedness with like-minded citizens and by tapping "new wells of opinion and reviv[ing] confidence in the political process."[41] Democratic party activist Ann Lewis notes the more participatory mode promoted by the new media: "The old media acted as gatekeepers, deciding what the people should know. The new media involves the 'democratization' of political knowledge. Ordinary people are taking over some of that power, and often in a more honest way."[42] As Madison put it in his *National Gazette* essays in 1791, when he was an opposition leader in the House, access to multiple information outlets mitigates the influence of the dominant opinion molders by enabling "every good citizen to be a centinel" of the republic.[43]

The new/alternative media with their democratization of knowledge force a rethinking of our conceptions of direct and representative democracy. The former may no longer be adequately captured by Thomas Jefferson's ward republics, Alexis de Tocqueville's description of the town meeting, or Norman Rockwell's classic "Freedom of Speech" painting. Nor can representative democracy in the United States today be equated with Madison's "chosen body of citizens whose wisdom may discern the true interest of their country" or Joseph Schumpeter's depiction of the democratic method as an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions" in which political leaders "acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."[44] The new interactive modes of communication and participation, including talk radio, foster the continued evolution and blending of what Martin Diamond called the two "species"—direct and representative democracy—of the "genus" popular government, perhaps drawing inspiration from the anti-Federalist tradition of American politics, which has looked favorably upon processes and institutions that approximate an assembly of the people directly governing themselves.[45] Tocqueville's celebration of the town meeting is an example of this sentiment as are the initiative, referendum, and recall of the Populists and progressives at the turn of the twentieth century and calls for "participatory democracy" by the New Left in the 1960s.[46]

Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

[41] Hofstetter et al., "Political Talk Radio," 469; Steven Roberts, "Open Arms for Online Democracy."

[42] Quoted in Fund, "The Power of Talk," 55; see also Page and Tannenbaum, "Populistic Deliberation", 49–52.

[43] Lance Banning, *Jefferson and Madison: Three Conversations from the Founding* (Madison, WI: Madison House, 1995), 203; Richard K, Matthews, *If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 158, 214–215.

[44] *Federalist Papers*, 82; Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1950), 269.

[45] Martin Diamond, "Democracy and *The Federalist*: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent," *American Political Science Review* 53 (March 1959): 54; Herbert J. Storing, *What the Anti-Federalists Were For* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 17–18.

[46] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, George Lawrence, trans., J. P. Mayer, ed., (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1969), 68–70; Donald Lutz, *Popular Consent and Popular Control* (Baton Rogue: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), chap. 8; John F. Manley and Kenneth Dolbeare, eds., *The Case Against the Constitution: From the Antifederalists to the Present* (Armonk, NY: M.E.

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While talk radio is not direct democracy in the classic sense, or even the teledemocracy of participatory visionaries, it is an expression of a *vox populi*—a street-level public opinion—which must be factored into the American representative system. Today, representative institutions have entered an era in which their responsiveness to the popular will can be monitored not only by professional government watchers (journalists, social scientists) but also a growing attentive and suspicious public who need only a radio, telephone, and perhaps access to a computer or fax machine to become informed and communicate their views.

If democratic ideology is about "opposition as it is about governance," then the new communications technologies and new uses for older technologies such as talk radio can "provide citizens with alternative perspectives and force the critical exposure and scrutiny of elites." The effect can be to render elite control more tenuous and "undermine existing constellations of power."[47]

Talk radio is one of many forms of interactive telecommunications that have begun to comprise what Lawrence Grossman has dubbed the "electronic republic." These media appear to be transforming American democracy into a more participatory regime.

> Interactive telecommunications technology makes it possible to revive, in a sophisticated modern form, some of the essential characteristics of the ancient world's first democratic polities. Instead of a show of hands, we have electronic polls. Instead of a single meeting place, we have far-flung, interactive telecommunications networks that extend for thousands of miles. In place of personal discussion and deliberation, we have call-ins, talk shows. . . .[48]

The new styles of political participation characterized here are evolving. Many observers see these interactive media eventually becoming the "nation's dominant means of communication."[49] Supporters of the participatory potential of the electronic republic, many of whom echo fears concerning the excesses of democracy, advocate civic education to produce a more enlightened and temperate citizenry. Yet the "electronic public sphere," incarnated in Grossman's Federal Elections Commission on Citizenship, or Ross Perot's electronic town halls, or James Fishkin's National Issues Convention, appears utopian.[50]

The recent study and commentary on participatory democracy combined with the research reported here suggest a more plausible scenario: the American political system will need to accommodate an active and opinionated citizenry who can be mobilized by interactive communications and who can instantaneously transmit their views directly (and often in concert) to decision makers. The

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Sharpe, 1987); Benjamin R. Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 274.

[47] Eric Schickler, "Democraticizing Technology: Hierarchy and Innovation in Public Life," *Polity* 27 (Winter 1994): 175–199.

[48] Lawrence K. Grossman, *The Electronic Republic: Reshaping Democracy in the Information Age* (New York: Viking, 1995), 48.

[49] Jost, "Talk Democracy," 364.

[50] James S. Fishkin, *Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).

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electorate in the electronic republic might come to resemble talk radio listeners as they have thus appeared—informed, although perhaps too partially; opinionated, but perhaps too passionately; and politically active, but perhaps too impetuously. But whether the talk radio phenomenon factionalizes or unifies, skews politics to the left, right, or center, whether its audiences are engaged citizens or divisive malcontents—talk radio listeners may signal the emergence of a new political type.*

Appendix

Talk Radio Listeners and Nonlisteners Among Voters in the 1994 Elections

% of voters for House & Senate candidates who listen to talk radio		*Total Sample*			*Talk Listeners*			*Nonlisteners*		
		Dem%	*Rep%*	*N*	*Dem%*	*Rep%*	*N*	*Dem%*	*Rep%*	*N*
	All Voters									
21	House	48	52	(4923)	36	64	(1023)	51	49	(3900)
21	Senate	48	49	(3602)	38	59	(774)	51	46	(2828)
	Men									
23	House	42	58	(2399)	29	71	(558)	45	55	(1828)
24	Senate	42	55	(2058)	32	66	(493)	46	51	(1565)
	Women									
18	House	54	46	(2524)	41	59	(465)	56	44	(2051)
18	Senate	51	47	(2196)	43	56	(390)	53	45	(1806)
	Whites									
21	House	42	58	(4221)	29	71	(887)	45	55	(3334)
22	Senate	43	55	(2826)	30	68	(612)	46	52	(2214)
	White Men									
23	House	37	63	(2075)	23	77	(473)	41	59	(1602)
24	Senate	39	59	(1363)	25	73	(331)	43	54	(1032)
	White Women									
19	House	47	53	(2121)	35	65	(410)	50	50	(1711)
19	Senate	46	52	(1442)	35	63	(277)	49	49	(1165)

Note: Senate percentages may not add to 100% due to votes for minor party candidates, "omits," or rounding.

Source: Voter News Service 1994 national exit poll.

* The authors would like to thank Jeffrey Alderman, the director of polling at ABC News, and Gary Langer, senior polling analyst at ABC, for access to the VNS data and for their insights on the 1994 election, and Luntz Research Companies for providing data from their postelection survey on talk radio. They also thank Thomas Halper for his comments and suggestions.

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The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996



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Parliamentary Government with a Strong President: The Post-1989 Turkish Experience

METİN HEPER
MENDERES ÇINAR

In his defense of the virtues of parliamentarianism versus those of presidentialism vis-à-vis political stability, Juan J. Linz has made the assumption that there is a close relationship between the consolidation of democracy, which Linz defines as democracy becoming "the only game in town," and the possibility for an equitable distribution of resources, at least in the intermediate run. According to Linz, democracy as a regime would not come under threat if the losers do not lose too much and if they maintain the hope that in the foreseeable future they may retrieve what they have lost. Linz has argued that parliamentarianism rather than presidentialism makes this more probable, because in contrast to the situation in a presidential system of government, in a parliamentary system, those in power usually have less authority at their disposal and can be more easily removed from power.[1]

This view has come under criticism,[2] but Linz's detractors have not questioned his basic assumption concerning the significance of a balance between the interests

[1] Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Winter 1990): 51–69; Linz, "The Virtues of Parliamentarism," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Fall 1990): 84–91.

[2] Donald L. Horowitz, "Comparing Democratic Systems," *Journal of Democracy*, 1 (Winter 1990): 73–79; Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Centrality of Political Culture," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Winter 1990): 80–83.

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of civil societal groups for the consolidation of democracy. This view overlooks Giovanni Sartori's admonition that democracy has both a horizontal and a vertical dimension; there is a need for political participation and prudent government.[3] There should be a balance not only between the interests of different societal groups but also a balance between different groups' interests and the long-term interests of community.[4]

Linz and his detractors take it for granted that political actors in the non-Anglo-American contexts, too, double as state elites, who are concerned with the long-term interests of community. They pay little attention to what Samuel P. Huntington argued close to three decades ago—for the consolidation of democracy there is a need for political institutionalization, that is, the emergence of an autonomous political center with its own values and norms, which when necessary would moderate and redirect the relative power of civil societal groups.[5]

The political institutionalization in this sense has faced obstacles not only in the Third World countries but, at least for some time, even in such continental European countries as France and Germany. Consequently, in France and Germany there has been a resort to mixed constitutions, leading to semi-presidentialism or semiparliamentarianism. Linz has assumed that these latter are "hybrid" regimes, evincing characteristics from both presidentialism and parliamentarianism.[6] The regimes in such countries as France and Germany have not been varieties of presidentialism or parliamentarism, nor hybrid regimes. They have been qualitatively different from both presidentialism and parliamentarianism, because in these regimes sovereignty was divided between the state elites and political elites. The first set of elites, too, exercised sovereignty in its own name; their authority was not derived from those of the political elites.[7] The state elites in question had been essentially responsible for the guardianship of the long-term

[3] Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary Debate* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1987), 131–132.

[4] This point has been overlooked not only by Juan J. Linz and his detractors vis-à-vis the question of the presidentialism versus parliamentarianism but also by the proponents of the "Transitions" project, who have placed emphasis on the skillfulness of political actors to bring about a gradual and controlled regime change. See Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 4 vols. For an elaboration, see Metin Heper, "Transitions to Democracy Reconsidered: A Historical Perspective," in Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson, eds., *Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991).

[5] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

[6] Linz, "The Virtues of Parliamentarism," 85.

[7] The idea of "mixed" constitutions goes back to Aristotle. Closer to our time, Montesquieu denounced despotism and preferred a constitutional monarchy, that is, a mixture of the republican and monarchial forms. See Robert Anchor, *The Enlightenment Tradition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 43–50. An historical example is the "constitutional dualism" of the Bismarckian Reich of the late nineteenth century that combined a concession to the democratic norm with a commitment to the monarchical principle. See Gordon Smith, *Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Politics in the Federal Republic* (London: Heineman, 1979), 10.

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interests of community and accountable to the people as a collectivity, whereas the political elites have been basically responsible for representing particular interests and accountable to their disparate constituencies. For instance, Charles de Gaulle in France spoke of himself as being "above political struggles, a national arbiter," and called himself ". . . guide of France," entrusted with the destiny of France and that of the republic; he wanted to become "the source of all power."[8] Germans came up with a "chancellor democracy." The chancellor alone was responsible for the general lines of government policy. Ministers tended to be valued for their technical competence and were responsible to the chancellor, not to the parliament. The chancellor could be removed from office only by a constructive vote of no confidence and was expected to stay in office for a full term.[9]

In both France and Germany, at least from World War II onward, democracy has been "the only game in town," yet for some time their political regimes continued to have both "democratic" and "undemocratic" dimensions. The political regimes in these countries had undemocratic dimensions in the sense that those saddled with the responsibility of looking after the long-term interests of community had not considered themselves politically accountable at least in the accomplishment of this particular task of theirs. One example was de Gaulle who wanted to see himself as the source of all power in the French polity. The problem in these regimes had not been the reconciliation of particular interests in an equitable manner but that of bringing about an harmonious relationship between the state and political elites.

In both France and Germany, however, gradually the state and political elites developed essentially an harmonious relationship between themselves even during the period of cohabitation,[10] basically because in both countries the need to graft an "undemocratic" dimension to their political regimes was recognized by all.[11] Particularly in the post-de Gaulle France and post-Konrad Adenauer Germany, the state elites came to virtually double as political elites.

The makers of the Basic Law of 1949 in Germany had two dominant concerns: to safeguard the country against "the totalitarian inclinations of power-hungry political leaders" and to facilitate the stability of national government.[12] Thus the Basic Law incorporated, alongside the liberal democratic principles, the view of the state as supreme arbiter of conflicting interests and guardian of the needs

[8] Lowell G. Nooman, *France: The Politics of Continuity and Change* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 98.

[9] Renate Mayntz, "Executive Leadership in Germany: Dispersion of Power or 'Kanzlerdemokratie'? in Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman, eds., *Presidents and Prime Ministers* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 1981), 147.

[10] Jean V. Poulard, "The French Double Executive and the Experience of Cohabitation," *Political Science Quarterly* 105 (Summer 1990): 243–267.

[11] John A. Rohr, "Executive Power and Republican Principles at the Founding of the Fifth Republic," *Governance* 7 (April 1994): 113.

[12] Mayntz, "Executive Leadership in Germany," 140.

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of collectivity.[13] This led to the emergence of the chancellor democracy in Germany. The chancellor represented the state, yet at the same time his power depended on the support he obtained from his party and the parliamentary party group (and often also from his coalition partner), as well as on his popularity with the electorate.[14] German political leaders may have insisted that the citizens' first duty was toward the state, but they also acted as representatives of partisan interests.[15]

A similar development took place in France. The Fifth Republic, which began in 1958, was essentially based upon Michel Debre's argument that in France an institutional framework was needed as a substitute for disciplined public behavior.[16] De Gaulle in turn thought that no party program could ever reflect the interests of more than a particular fraction of the French people; only a president who is genuinely above party politics can care for the common interests of all.[17] The 1958 French constitution created a strong president, yet the constitution has not rendered the president unaccountable to the electorate. The French presidents have been considered chief of state and leader of France, and as such they have tried to stay above the day-to-day politics; at the same time, they have had to keep in mind their reelection. As a consequence, they could not afford to continually quarrel with their prime ministers and keep changing them—a right granted to them by the constitution. It is true that as president, de Gaulle stood rather aloof vis-à-vis the politicians and the electorate. However, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's speeches, which were calculated to project the image of a president who looks after the French people and the French state and who at the same time is perfectly capable of engaging in partisan conflicts, reflected the behavior of post-de Gaulle presidents in France.[18]

Unbalanced Political Development in Turkey

Since the installation of the multiparty regime in 1945, democracy has been the only game in town in Turkey, and two mixed constitutions have been put into effect. Yet in Turkey an accommodation between the state elites and the political

[13] Nevil Johnson, *Government in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Executive at Work* (Oxford, England: Pergamon Press, 1973), 27.

[14] Mayntz, "Executive Leadership in Germany," 147.

[15] Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *The Government of Germany* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1971), 156.

[16] Anne Stevens, *The Government and Politics of France* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 39.

[17] Ibid., 61.

[18] Ezra N. Suleiman, "Presidential Government in France" in Rose and Suleiman, eds., *Presidents and Prime Ministers*, 106. Also see Jack Hayward, "From Republican Sovereign to Partisan Statesman" in Jack Hayward, ed., *De Gaulle to Mitterand: Presidential Power in France* (New York: New York University Press, 1993); and Harvey B. Feigenbaum, "Recent Evolution of the French Executive," *Governance* 3 (July 1990): 264–278.

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elites has not taken place. In fact, the mixed constitutions themselves have become a serious matter of contention. This is basically because in Turkey historically and during the recent decades the state elites have attempted to render the political elites into a nonentity. As a consequence, the political elites have not looked with favor on the mixed constitutions "imposed" upon them following the 1960-1961 and 1980–1983 military interventions.

During the nineteenth century, the representative assemblies set up in Istanbul and localities were not the upshot of demands by socioeconomic groups but the handiwork of the center itself. The motives behind their establishment were those of appeasing the Great Powers that were pressuring the Ottoman government to grant additional rights and liberties to the non-Muslims in the empire, to facilitate the collection of taxes and the recruitment to the military, and to bring limits to the sultan's prerogatives so as to make the bureaucratic elites more influential in the state affairs.[19] In the Union and Progress Party period of 1909–1918, the bureaucratic and military elite members of the Committee manipulated governments from behind the scenes.[20]

Not much changed during the earlier decades of the Republic, proclaimed in 1923. During the single-party years of 1923–1945, the Republican People's party (RPP) was essentially an instrument of the state elites led by Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, whose primary purpose was to modernize Turkey. These state elites thought that "Islam that stood in the way of change" was the major factor in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and attempted to educate a new generation of Turks who would think logically and who would make decisions based on reason and not religion. The republican state elites thus opted for rational democracy; for them, democracy meant enlightened debate to find out what was best for the country.[21]

The intellectual-bureaucratic elites schooled in the Atatürk-İnönü tradition and located in the universities, the upper reaches of the civil service, and in the ranks of the RPP attempted to keep alive the idea of rational democracy during the post-1945 multiparty politics period, too. For instance, Bahri Savcı, a professor of political science at the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University (which for a long time served as a training ground for the bulk of the statist intellectual-bureaucratic elites) made a distinction between politics in its widest sense and active dynamic politics. "Politics in its widest sense" meant determination of

[19] Stanford J. Shaw, "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reformers," in William P. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968); Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[20] Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1969), chaps. 6 and 7.

[21] Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington, U.K.: The Eothen Press, 1985), chap. 4; on "rational democracy," we draw upon Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part Two: Classical Issues*, 51–55.

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public policy based on rational analysis, though to the extent possible, coming closest to the preferences of the voters. The statist intellectual-bureaucratic elites were considered responsible for politics in its widest sense. "Active dynamic politics" referred to those activities aimed at securing and preserving political office. According to Savcı, "politics in its widest sense" had to constitute the basic framework within which "active dynamic politics" ought to have been carried on.[22]

The statist intellectual-bureaucratic elites' efforts to dictate to the politicians general guidelines for making policies did not go unchallenged. The new breed of politicians who claimed that they were going to represent the "national will" (*milli irade*) and not the state's will quickly clashed with the statist intellectual-bureaucratic elites. In the 1950s, the leaders of the opposition RPP who represented the statist will heavily criticized the leaders of the Demokrat party government, who represented the "national will," for turning the rational democracy into a populistic democracy and accused them of acting against the best interests of the country. The Democrats attacked the Republicans by claiming that the Republicans were not respectful to the "national will"[23] and were in fact hatching a plot to overthrow the Democrats through a popular uprising.[24] The upshot of this irreconcilable conflict was that the statist and political elites became completely distrustful of each other and of the values the other set of elites stood for.[25]

In 1960–1961, the military intervened. The statist intellectual-bureaucratic elites took this opportunity to make the "mixed" 1961 constitution that divided sovereignty between the two sets of elites in question. This constitution created the National Security Council (NSC) and the Constitutional Court, strengthened the Council of State (the Turkish version of France's Council d'Etat), and granted autonomy to the universities and the Turkish Radio and Television, in the hope they would enlighten public opinion. The rationale behind these arrangements was to bring the parliament under the virtual tutelage of the bureaucratically staffed institutions so as to establish the supremacy of the statist will over the national will.

Given the hostility of the two sets of elites toward each other, it was naive to expect the political elites to go along with this constitutional arrangement that aimed to render them into a secondary position vis-à-vis the state elites. Having always viewed the statist elites as not trying to promote the long-term interests of the community but as attempting for purely selfish reasons to prevent the political elites from having the upper hand, the political elites in Turkey have always perceived any limitation to their prerogatives as an authoritarian arrangement pure and simple and, therefore, as undemocratic. Consequently, Süleyman

[22] Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, 78.

[23] Ibid., chaps. 4 and 5.

[24] Füruzan Tekil, *İnönü Menderes Kavgası* (Istanbul: Tekin Neşriyat, 1989).

[25] Metin Heper, "The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared," *Comparative Political Studies* 25 (July 1992): 186.

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Demirel, the leader of the Justice party, a successor party to the Demokrat party, repeatedly complained as prime minister that the country could not be governed under the 1961 Constitution.[26] As the basic rationale behind the notion of mixed constitution—that of obtaining prudent government alongside political participation through constitutional means when political elites are perceived not to pay adequate attention to the need for prudent government—had been alien to the political elites,[27] both the Justice party and the RPP (which after 1967, under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit had lost its characteristic of being a statist party) did not hesitate to form coalition governments with such antisystem parties as the religiously oriented National Salvation party and the ultranationalist Nationalist Action party.

In the political turmoil that followed, the military intervened two more times—in 1971–1973 and 1980–1983. Following the intervention-by-memorandum of 1971–1973 (in which the military did not take power directly into its own hands but attempted to rule through an above-party government), the scope of some rights and liberties was restricted and such state institutions as the NSC were given additional authority to advise the government. During the remaining years of the 1970s, however, the political elites continued to challenge the state institutions in question and played an important role in their increasing politicization and polarization.[28] Under the circumstances, the state institutions could not provide the ballast the political system needed, and the military intervened for the third time in 1980–1983.

As in the earlier instances, the military again wished to restructure the political system to make it viable through changing the constitution. The end result was the 1982 constitution in which the military junta played a far greater role than the juntas had played in the making of the 1961 constitution and in amending that constitution following the 1971–1973 intervention. Having observed "the increasing politicization and polarization of the state institutions during the previous two decades, with the exception of the [military members of the] NSC," the 1980 military intervenors perceived the salvation of democracy in Turkey in further strengthening the hand of the NSC.[29] At the same time, they created a more than symbolic presidency, while maintaining parliamentarianism.

[26] Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, 89.

[27] Metin Heper, "Turkish Democracy Reconsidered; Illusion Breeding Disillusion" in Heiko Körner and Rasual Shams, eds., *Institutional Aspects of Economic Integration of Turkey into the European Community* (Hamburg: Verlag Weltarchiv G.MBH, 1990).

[28] C. H. Dodd, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy*, enlarged second edition (Huntingdon, U.K.: The Eothen Press, 1990), 45–48. First published in 1983.

[29] Metin Heper, "The State, the Military and Democracy in Turkey," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 9 (September 1987): 52–64. According to the 1982 Constitution, the Council of Ministers is obliged to "give priority consideration to the decisions of the NSC concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independent of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society" (Article 118).

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PRESIDENCY UNDER THE 1982 CONSTITUTION

Despite the fact that Turkey faced a severe political instability for several decades, the political elites and the bulk of the intelligentsia continued to perceive any governmental system other than parliamentarianism as authoritarian. Under the circumstances, the only governmental system the military could come up with was parliamentarianism though with "an active and powerful president" who had "greater than normal powers" than comes across in a parliamentary system of government.[30] Whereas the post-1949 Germany had opted for a symbolic and ceremonial presidency (because the German chancellor was granted powers "greater than normal") and the post-1958 France adopted a statist and executive presidency, Turkey chose to have a statist president with limited executive powers.

Under the 1982 constitution, the governmental system in Turkey is parliamentary because the executive branch evinces a dual structure with a president who is not politically responsible. Only the Council of Ministers is responsible to the legislature. The president appoints as prime minister whomever has the majority in the parliament, and who, unlike his French counterpart, has limited influence on the composition of the Council of Ministers. The Turkish president is elected by the Turkish Grand National Assembly from among its own members.

It is a cardinal principle of the parliamentary system of government that the president is not authorized to act alone in executive matters. At first sight, the Turkish case seems to have departed from this general rule. In Turkey all presidential decrees are countersigned by the prime minister and the ministers concerned, except in those cases where he is authorized to act alone by the constitution and other laws (Article 105 of the constitution). Furthermore, the same article stipulates that "no appeal will be made to any legal authority, including the Constitutional Court with regard to the decisions and decrees signed by the president at his discretion." However, as Ergun Özbudun has shown, in no instance does the constitution explicitly specify cases where the president can act without a countersignature; either it is quite clear that the countersignature is needed or it is required because of constitutional custom. As a general rule, whenever the matter falls within the sphere of the political executive the countersignature is required.[31] Özbudun has concluded that the instances in which the Turkish president can act alone normally pertain not to his capacity as "chief executive" but to his capacity as "head of state."[32]

Yet, under the 1982 constitution, the Turkish president's powers that he can use alone are quite numerous, which brings us to his being a statist president,

[30] Ergun Özbudun, "The Status of the President of the Republic under the Constitution of 1982: Presidentialism or Parliamentarism?" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 37.

[31] C. H. Dodd, "Political Modernization, the State, and Democracy: Approaches to the Study of Politics in Turkey" in ibid., 20.

[32] Özbudun, "The Status of the President of the Republic under the Constitution of 1982," 42–43.

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though with limited executive powers. His legislative powers include addressing the parliament each year; returning bills to the parliament for reconsideration; submitting constitutional amendments to referendum; appealing to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of laws, law-amending ordinances, and the Standing Orders of the Assembly on grounds of constitutionality; and dissolving the parliament in cases specified by the constitution. Among his executive powers are those of convening and chairing the Council of Ministers whenever he deems it necessary and presiding over that Council when martial law or the state of emergency is to be declared; preparing the agenda of and chairing the meetings of the NSC; and appointing the head and the members of the State Supervisory Board (affiliated to the presidency) and instructing the Board to conduct inquiries, investigations, and inspections.[33]

Particularly critical among these powers is the president's preparation of the agenda and chairing the meetings of the NSC. The Council of Ministers has to give priority to the measures the NSC deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society. These are matters for which, according to the oath that he takes upon assuming office, the president is responsible. Thus, the Turkish president can use the NSC to put pressure on the Council of Ministers to take specific measures concerning those matters for which he is responsible. Also the 1982 constitution defines the duties of the president as not unlike those of the French president as stipulated by the 1958 French constitution. The Turkish constitution reads: "The president . . . shall insure the implementation of the Constitution, and the regular and harmonious functioning of the organs of State" [Article 104]. According to the French constitution, too, the president makes sure that the constitution is respected, and he insures the regular functioning of the public authorities. Both constitutions gave powers to their presidents that can be interpreted very broadly. As already mentioned, de Gaulle in France did interpret his powers very broadly; he was encouraged to do so because his duties were defined in such lofty terms.[34]

What differentiates the presidency in Turkey from that in France is that Turkey's office does not have the crucial legitimacy accorded by popular election. In Turkey, however, this situation is partly compensated for by the fact that in his election by the parliament, during the first two ballots the president has to obtain two-thirds of the votes; if there is a need for a third ballot, he has to have the support of the majority of the full membership. In Germany a simple majority is adequate.

This requirement of qualified majority for the election of the president by the parliament in Turkey is a means to insure the impartiality of the president which, of course, one does not come across in post-de Gaulle France. In Turkey,

[33] Ibid., 43.

[34] Douglas E. Ashford, *Policy and Politics in France: Living with Uncertainty* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982), 19ff.

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the principle of impartiality in particular provides to the presidency a weight because, as Kemal H. Karpat has explained, the dominant philosophy in both the Ottoman and the Republican periods has been that governmental authority should be exercised strictly in conformity with the political requirement of rulership, eschewing social, economic, or ideological considerations. Power and authority could be reposed in a supreme and wise authority, which might be even a single person, so long as that person acted in the long-term interests of community.[35]

The impartiality of the president in Turkey is insured by other provisions, too. He is elected for a term of seven years as compared to the maximum five years of the parliamentarians. If the president-elect has been a member of a political party, he has to resign from his party. Upon his election, his membership in the parliament comes to an end. And, in contrast to the situation in both France and Germany, the president in Turkey cannot be reelected.

The impartiality of the Turkish president in Turkey gives him a special aura. His status in the polity is further reinforced by the requirements that he has to be at least 40-years old and he must have received a university-level education. Both respect for age[36] and education as a means to attain elite status[37] have always been significant in Turkey. As if to underline the significance of the president in the Turkish polity, the 1982 constitution also made the impeachment of the president more difficult than the situation in both France and Germany. In France an absolute majority and in Germany a two-third majority are required; in Turkey a three-fourth majority is needed for the initiation of the impeachment process.

All in all, under the 1982 constitution, the president in Turkey has considerable clout as the guardian of the state. He is not the chief political executive, yet his responsibilities are extensive, and the fulfillment of these responsibilities may at times oblige him to transgress the political sphere. He can do this by drawing upon his morally elevated position in the polity and, in the last resort, by operating through the NSC and the State Supervisory Board. But the system of government is essentially parliamentarian, and the president has to respect the cardinal principles of that system of government, including the most important principle that the Council of Ministers has primary responsibility for determining and conducting the policy of the nation.

The Dynamics of the Presidency in Post-1989 Turkey

The first president who served under the 1982 constitution was Kenan Evren, who had been the head of the junta that had carried out the 1980–1983 military

[35] Kemal H. Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980" in Heper and Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, 152.

[36] Çiğdem Kağitçibaşi, "Social Norms and Authoritarianism: A Comparison of Turkish and American Adolescents," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 16 (1970): 444–451.

[37] Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1965).

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intervention. According to a provisional article in the constitution, Evren was elected president upon the ratification of the constitution by a referendum. Particularly early in his term of presidency, he was very jealous of his prerogatives as the statist president; he displayed quite an activism with regard to such matters as terrorism, the politicization of key ministries, and the revival of Islam. At times he tended to concern himself with such matters as the Cyprus question and Turkey's relations with NATO – matters that properly belonged to the sphere of the political executive. In time, Turgut Özal, prime minister during Evren's presidency, gradually began to play a more influential role. Both Özal's circumspection while pushing Evren to his proper sphere and Evren's increasing realism about the limitations of his office led to the emergence of a division of labor and a good deal of harmony between the two of them. Özal accepted with grace Evren's suggestions and recommendations, which in turn were increasingly less frequent and harsh; for his part, Evren became more careful not to meddle in matters for which the political executive was responsible.[38]

The Evren presidency constituted a transitional period. His military background, his being the head of the junta that conducted the 1980–1983 military intervention, his election as president as part and parcel of the ratification of the 1982 constitution, and the never-ending barrage of criticisms directed against him by the bulk of the intelligentsia because of the above factors, could not be repeated in the following two presidencies of Özal and Demirel. It follows that the Özal and Demirel presidencies were going to constitute the real test cases for the operation of the new governmental system in Turkey – parliamentarianism with a more than symbolic presidency.

Turgut Özal Presidency (1989–1993)

Both during his prime ministry (1983–1991) and his presidency, Özal had a grandiose mission to make Turkey "one of the ten or fifteen most developed countries in the World."[39] According to Özal, Turkey had "to swim with the tide and reach the contemporary civilization." Özal thought that this mission could be achieved by pursuing "right," that is, "realistic" policies.

He argued that if one strives to come up with right policies, one cannot be criticized for acting in a partisan manner. Özal elaborated this point: he came from the bureaucracy in the late 1970s, when he was undersecretary of the State Planning Organization; bureaucratic norms reflect the state impartiality; when one has the ultimate purpose of promoting the well-being of the country, one

[38] For Evren presidency, see Metin Heper, "The Executive in the Third Turkish Republic, 1982–1989," *Governance* 3 (July 1990): 299–314; C. H. Dodd, "Kenan Evren as President: From Conflict to Compromise" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

[39] He, for instance, mentioned this mission of his at the presidential oath-taking ceremony on 19 November 1989.

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would act in an impartial manner;[40] in any case, just because he was president, he could not take a middle-of-the-road approach; he would go on expressing his long-held views.[41]

Özal, of course, had not been content with only formulating right policies; he also wanted them to be implemented by the government. He claimed that the 1982 Turkish constitution was "similar to the French one, except in a few matters like the declaration of a state of emergency." He argued that if only one sentence were added to the 1982 constitution—"The president is the chair of the Council of Ministers"—there would remain no difference between the two constitutions in respect to the powers of the president.[42] For a while, Özal could dictate policies to the government, because he managed to twist the arms of his former (Motherland) party's delegates, and he had a rather subservient stalwart of his, Yildirim Akbulut, elected as the leader of the party. He then appointed him as prime minister, 9 November 1989.

From the very beginning, Akbulut made it known that he would work in harmony with the president and a conflict between them would be out of the question.[43] Indeed, Akbulut formed his cabinet from names suggested by Özal.[44] Özal continued to receive regular briefings, particularly on the economy. He gave specific instructions to the government, and sometimes directly to bureaucrats.

Özal's attempt to double as prime minister attracted criticisms both from academia[45] and the media. The latter began to refer to him as "Presido-Prime Minister,"[46] "Elected Sultan,"[47] and the like. Özal was undeterred. He even publicly criticized the government if it made a critical decision without consulting him and if Özal thought the decision was not a right one. This often happened on matters concerning the economy.[48] Özal also frequently meddled in the internal affairs of the Motherland party; his interest in the party was related to his activist approach vis-à-vis the economy. He said: "I myself founded the Motherland

[40] *Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal'ın Türkiye'miz, Dünya ve Gelecek Konulu Konuşmaları*, Ankara, 1990, booklet compiled by the President's Office, 22.

[41] Heper, "Turgut Özal's Presidency: Crisis and the Glimmerings of Consensus" in Heper and Evin, eds., *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, 194.

[42] *Milliyet*, (Istanbul daily), 30 November 1990. In France, the president himself can proclaim a state of emergency; in Turkey a state of emergency can only be declared by the Council of Ministers chaired by the president.

[43] *Milliyet*, 21 March 1990.

[44] Akbulut himself disclosed that his government was formed in this manner. *Hürriyet* (Istanbul daily), 30 May 1991.

[45] For instance, Lütfi Duran, "Türk Anayasası ve Fransa Örneği," *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul daily), 13 December 1990.

[46] Columnist Derya Sazak in *Milliyet*, 3 March 1990.

[47] Editorial in *Hürriyet*, 30 November 1990.

[48] For examples of such criticisms directed to the government by Özal, see *Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal'in Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri Merkez Birliği Genel Kurulındaki Konuşmaları*, Ankara, 1990, 18; *Dünya'daki Dengeler ve Türkiye*, Ankara, 1991, 23–23; *Geleceğe Bakış*, Ankara, 1992, 27–30, all booklets compiled by the President's Office.

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Party. . . . We made certain promises to the people. . . . As today's government has no independent program of its own, it is my duty to warn the government if it acts contrary to the program it adopted intact."[49] On foreign policy issues, Özal took the initiative and acted alone. He disclosed his views on sensitive foreign policy issues and negotiated on critical problems with other countries without even consulting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[50] He justified such conduct by noting that as president and head of the NSC he was responsible for the external security of the country.[51]

When in June 1991 the term of Akbulut's party leadership came to an end, Özal again tried to influence the outcome of the election of the next leader of the party at the party convention. This time, however, he was not successful, and his former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesut Yılmaz, with whom he did not look eye to eye and who was not prepared to be Özal's loyal servant, was elected. When Yılmaz became prime minister, he wanted to have cordial relations with Özal, but not to conduct his ministry under his shadow. Yılmaz pointed out that Özal was the spiritual leader of the Motherland party, but added that he and his colleagues in the party would carry out their relations with Özal "within the parameters set by the Constitution."[52]

To Özal such a relationship with the prime minister was, of course, not satisfactory. Furthermore, by this time Özal had come to the conclusion that "his" party had begun to shed its earlier reformist approach. Consequently he wished to give direction not only to the government but to the party. And he continued to invite some ministers and key bureaucrats to the Presidential Palace to be briefed by them. This led to Yılmaz's asking ministers and bureaucrats not to see the president without first obtaining his permission.

But Özal did not give in easily. He argued that he was interested neither in the day-to-day operation of the government nor in party business but in policy issues. He did not want policies that had "contributed to the Motherland success in the past" to be abandoned. However, Yılmaz was adamant in maintaining the autonomy of both the government and the party from Özal. Yılmaz even implicitly threatened Özal by saying that if Özal would not intervene in the party affairs his presidency would become less debatable.[53] Here Yılmaz was drawing attention to the fact that because Özal's election to the presidency had led to debates concerning the legitimacy of his presidency, Özal needed the support of the Motherland party, of which Yılmaz was the leader. Upon these developments, Özal discontinued his weekly meetings with Yılmaz. For the rest of Yılmaz's ministry, the relations between him and Özal remained rather cool.

On 20 October 1991, Turkey had new general elections. The Motherland party came second behind Süleyman Demirel's True Path party. The new govern-

[49] Reported in *Türkiye'miz, Dünya ve Gelecek*, 40–41.
[50] Among others, see *Cumhuriyet*, 1 January 1990; *Milliyet* 28 March 1990.
[51] *Turkish Daily News* (Ankara daily), 15 March 1990.
[52] *Hürriyet*, 4 July 1991.
[53] *Milliyet*, 15 August 1992.

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ment was formed by the True Path party and the Social Democratic Populist party, and Demirel became prime minister.

In the past, Özal and Demirel had had rather tense relations. Demirel always thought that Özal had acted in an opportunistic manner following the reinstallation of democracy in 1982, because "Özal had formed the Motherland party" and stole the votes of Demirel's old Justice party in the 1983 general elections. At the time, Demirel was banned from politics. Furthermore, when the issue of the return of Demirel's and other such pre-1980 politicians' political rights through a referendum came to the agenda, Özal campaigned against such a move. In return, when Özal was elected president on 26 September 1989 by the votes of the Motherland party, which at the time was thought not to have behind it the support of the electorate, Demirel along with others argued that Özal's presidency was not legitimate and promised to bring him down by amending the constitution as soon as he could control the necessary number of votes in the parliament.

Initially it seemed as if the president and the new prime minister would get along well. In a surprise move, Özal stated that his era had come to an end: during the 1987 election campaign, as prime minister, he had made certain promises to the people; he had a moral responsibility to make good on those promises; but there had been new elections; now those who have just obtained a mandate from the people would rule. Özal added that he would go on expressing his views, but it was up to future governments whether to take them into account or not.[54] In his turn, Demirel indicated that he would let bygones be bygones, because the "smooth functioning of the state" was important.[55] Yet Demirel, not unlike Yılmaz before him, felt the urge to remind Özal that "the president is head of the State but not of the political executive. The president's powers have been clearly indicated in the Constitution . . . . The duty of the president is only that of coordination.[56]

Despite this reminder from Demirel and despite what he had said earlier about his era having come to an end, Özal wished that his weekly meetings with Demirel should be with an agenda,[57] so that he could participate in the governmental decision making. When Demirel did not comply, Özal declined to sign governmental decrees about appointments to some bureaucratic posts. He said that reshuffling of top bureaucrats had been informed by partisan considerations. He argued that governments might change but there were some things that should remain the same.[58] Özal again invited bureaucrats to the Presidential Palace and wanted to be briefed on the economy. He also created his own staff of experts, which he used to come up with alternative policies. He earnestly

[54] Heper, "Turgut Özal's Presidency: Crisis and the Glimmerings of Consensus" in Heper and Evin, eds., *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, 197.

[55] *Cumhuriyet*, 4 January 1992.

[56] Ibid., 31 January 1991.

[57] Ibid., 1 January 1992.

[58] *Milliyet*, 7 January 1992.

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hoped that the Demirel government would make use of his expertise. When this was not done, Özal began to openly criticize the government and to appeal directly to the people. He also urged the Motherland party to conduct a more active opposition and even suggested to the party specific tactics for this purpose.

All of these efforts on his part were of no avail. Demirel's position was that there was no need for him to meet with the president on a weekly basis. He would meet with Özal when there was a need. When asked, the government would not refuse to give information to the president, but again there was no need to do this regularly. Demirel even refrained from providing Özal with background information about the appointments he wanted to make in the bureaucracy, because he was unwilling to "negotiate" such matters with the president.[59] Demirel did not want to create a "coalition partner in the Presidential Palace."[60]

Özal received a cold shoulder for the Yılmaz's Motherland party, too. As earlier, Yılmaz again did not want Özal to exercise control over the party. In fact, Özal and Yılmaz had diametrically opposite views on this issue. Özal thought that because Yılmaz did not pay attention to his views, the Motherland party had constantly lost ground in Turkish politics.[61] Yılmaz in turn had been of the opinion that if he acted along the lines Özal suggested he could not have been an effective leader.[62]

All this made Özal quite a dejected man. He even started toying with the idea of resigning from the presidency, forming a new political party, and realizing his Second Transformation program.[63] At this juncture he suddenly died of a heart attack on 17 April 1993.

Süleyman Demirel Presidency (1993–1996)

Demirel followed Özal in the presidency on 16 May 1993. Initially, Demirel did not know how to conduct his presidency. He indicated that he was endeavoring to interpret the constitution and set his own style as president,[64] just as Özal had done.

Just as Özal, Demirel had a vision of a stable democracy, a stable economy, and a strong army.[65] Unlike Özal, however, Demirel placed emphasis on political stability rather than change. Political stability was dependent, according to Demirel, first and foremost on "democratic authority" and "rule of law." Democratic authority meant the autonomy of political institutions from politically nonaccountable institutions. Here, he particularly had in mind the military. In the past he had twice been ousted from power by the military, in 1971 and 1980.

[59] Ibid., 4 January 1992.
[60] *Hürriyet*, 2 February 1992.
[61] Ibid., 5 June 1992.
[62] *Sabah* (Istanbul daily), 21 September 1992.
[63] Mehmet Barlas, *Turgut Özal'ın Anıları (Istanbul: Gençlik Yayınları, 1994), 166.*
[64] *Milliyet*, 26 June 1993.
[65] *Tercüman* (Istanbul daily*), 18 May 1994.*

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Demirel placed emphasis on rule of law also because he did not want his presidency to be debatable like that of Özal.[66] He said: "The President of the Turkish Republic will be a Constitutional President. He will not use powers that the Constitution has not granted him. . . . If all institutions remain within their constitutionally defined powers then democratic authority will be set up and there will be democratic stability."[67] Whenever he indicated which political institution was responsible for what function, he always added, "There are rules in this country; everybody should conform to those rules.[68] For Demirel, political stability was dependent upon each institution satisfactorily performing its functions. He thought that when necessary he should contribute to the satisfactory performance of functions by institutions, without, however, dictating policies to those institutions.

Thus Demirel was of the opinion that his primary function as president was that of insuring "the smooth functioning of the state."[69] Therefore, he concluded that, among other things, he should sign decrees about appointments made by the government without making any fuss about them and should not in principle resort to his constitutionally granted delaying powers in respect to legislation, even if "the latter had some debatable points."[70] When at some point he was asked to take initiative and urge the Council of Ministers to declare a state of emergency on account of serious economic crisis, Demirel said that the economy was not his direct responsibility.[71] Similarly, when his assistance was sought to remove the government from power he indicated that it was a responsibility that belonged to the parliament.[72] In this spirit, Demirel even pointed out that the National Security Council was a constitutional institution and had been fulfilling its responsibilities in accordance with the constitution.[73] Demirel made this statement when some pundits had made a distinction between the military and the civilian solution to the Kurdish issue in Turkey and denounced the military solution—crushing the terror and then bringing further socioeconomic development to the area versus the civilian solution of extending political and cultural rights while the separatist terror continued unabated.

On the other hand, Demirel has been enthusiastic about using some of his powers as head of state in a guarded manner. For instance, he insisted that he had discretion on whether to approve or disapprove the candidate for chief of the general staff nominated by the government. He had his way.[74] Similarly, he

[66] *Milliyet*, 17 May 1993.

[67] *Cumhuriyet*, 15 May 1993. Since Demirel had fiercely criticized Özal of having transgressed his powers, he was now being too careful regarding this matter.

[68] For one such statement, see *Sabah*, 5 December 1993.

[69] Abdullah Uraz, *Millet Devlet Kucaklaşması* (Ankara: Eka, 1994), 74–116.

[70] *Türkiye* (Istanbul daily), 22 May 1994 and his press conference on 16 May 1994.

[71] *Sabah*, 5 April 1994; *Hürriyet*, 2 February 1994.

[72] *Meydan* (Istanbul daily), 9 May 1994.

[73] *Sabah*, 13 November 1994.

[74] *Hürriyet*, 6 May 1994.

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pointed out that the separatist terror in southeastern Turkey was not a matter of the government but for the state. Yet he did not become directly involved in this issue. He met with the leaders of the opposition parties, conveyed their views on the issue to the prime minister, and thought he accomplished "his duty of coordination."[75]

Demirel's willingness to contribute to the success of the institutions without interfering in the way they conducted their business came out quite clearly in his relations with his former political party, the True Path party, which has been the senior partner of the present coalition government both during his prime ministry (1991-1993) and his presidency, and in his relations with the government led by Tansu Çiller. Before he became president, Demirel had promised that he would not meddle in party affairs.[76] There is no hard evidence that he did not keep his word. He also seems not to have actively interfered in the election by the party of Tansu Çiller as the new leader of the party.

Demirel, however, allowed members of the opposition to visit him and complain that Çiller and the politicians in her close entourage were acting contrary to the traditional goals and policies of the party. It has been reported that on such occasions Demirel advised members of the party to work for the success of the party.[77] Demirel explained his behavior as follows: his basic concern is the stability of the political system. Stability within political parties, including his former party, contributes to the stability of the political system as a whole. Also, the success of the party in government would increase the trust of the citizen toward the regime. Impartiality means that one does not meddle in the affairs of a political party continuously; if one involves oneself in the affairs of a political party once in a while and if one does that for a larger purpose, one cannot be considered as acting in a partisan manner.[78]

Demirel had in general a guarded approach concerning his relations with the government, too. For instance, despite some persistent questions from journalists, on the whole, he avoided disclosing what he thought about the performance of the government. Only on rare occasions did he somewhat show his hand when he said things like, "it is not my business to attribute fault to anybody"[79] or "the president should not act like the leader of the opposition."[80] Still, even on those occasions Demirel considered the presidency as a "place of arbitration." When the president becomes involved in political issues, Demirel thought, he should act in an objective manner and for the benefit of the whole country.[81] Demirel pointed out that here "political" means "Turkey's problems,"[82] that is, vital prob-

[75] *Milliyet*, 21 October 1993.
[76] *Cumhuriyet*, 16 May 1993.
[77] *Hürriyet*, 25 September 1993 and 21 February 1994.
[78] *Sabah*, 20 December 1993; *Milliyet*, 27 June 1993; *Hürriyet*, 22 December 1993.
[79] *Sabah*, 5 May 1994.
[80] *Milliyet*, 16 May 1994.
[81] Ibid., 27 June 1993; also see Uraz, *Millet Devlet Kucaklaşması*, 199, 276.
[82] *Hürriyet*, 11 August 1993.

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lems of the country. He has been of the opinion that he should always be consulted on "Turkey's problems." Demirel has pointed out that the Turkish political system is not like the German political system; it is more like the French political system: "The Turkish presidency is not a post where, concerning Turkey's problems, one can say 'I do not care.'"[83] He added: "I do not give directives, but what I say is more than advice. If what I think is not right then they should tell me why I am not right;"[84] "I am not trying to substitute for them; I am telling them that there is a critical problem which should be attended to in a particular manner."[85]

On rare occasions, however, Demirel went out of his way and openly criticized the government. He pointed out that he acted in the said manner when Turkey faced an important problem and the government was not paying attention to his views. If a matter were of vital importance, such as a religiously oriented party capturing government and trying to turn the clock back in Turkey, Demirel felt the need to draw the line once and for all: "The government is one of the organs of the state which is not just a sum of different institutions. One does not become a king just because one is elected. There is the Constitutional Court and the Presidential Palace. In this country, one cannot do whatever one fancies."[86] Thus, in some isolated cases, Demirel did transgress the government's prerogatives, though rather timidly.

Conclusion

As Giovanni Sartori has argued, a viable democracy is dependent upon a judicious blend of political participation and prudent government. In some contexts, politically accountable elites play a key role in achieving both. In other contexts, the responsibility of providing a prudent government is undertaken by politically unaccountable elites. In such countries as France and Germany, the situation of a polity functioning under a mixed constitution does not prove problematic, because in those countries the need for such a political arrangement is recognized by the major political actors, who do not challenge that arrangement. There is a near consensus on what is needed, the making of the relevant political arrangement is not half-hearted, and the outcome to a great extent fulfills the need. Political institutionalization a la Samuel Huntington is achieved through a mixed constitution; the politically nonaccountable elites provided the ballast that the system needed from time to time.

In Turkey, historically and in some periods during the recent decades, the politically less-than-accountable elites dominated the political scene. Following the installation of multiparty politics in the 1940s, the new category of political elites, Democrats, placed emphasis on political participation with strong doses

[83] Ibid.
[84] *Milliyet*, 24 May 1994.
[85] Ibid., 12 July 1993.
[86] *Meydan*, 15 June 1994.

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of populism and, on the whole, gave short shrift to prudent government. They did this basically out of hostility toward the statist elites' earlier domination of the political scene. This led the statist elites to think that political elites ignored the long-term interests of community. As a consequence, the statist elites tried to achieve Huntingtonian political institutionalization by forging the mixed constitution of 1961. In essence, parliamentarianism was retained, but parliament was brought under the surveillance of a number of bureaucratic agencies. Democrats dubbed that political arrangement as undemocratic. Political crises that followed ultimately led to the 1980 military intervention and to Turkey's second mixed constitution of 1982.

The 1982 constitution retained the parliamentary nature of the regime but gave more than normal powers to the president. Such provisions as his being elected by a qualified majority, his nonelection, the difficulty of his being impeached, and the like accorded the president a certain amount of weight in the polity. Yet he lacked the crucial legitimacy that derives from being elected popularly. In the absence of such legitimacy, his relations with the political executive were defined in a rather ambiguous manner, which made it difficult for the president to provide the guidance the system might have needed from time to time and to accomplish this in such a way that the constitutionality of his actions would not become debatable.

It could have been a miracle if under the Özal and the Demirel presidencies the political system had functioned in a manner close to the constitutional system, hesitantly and half-heartedly put together because of the continuing lack of appreciation by the political actors for Huntingtonian political institutionalization. Özal wanted to dominate the political system and resorted to a one-man show. As the nominal head of the political executive, he attempted to dictate policies to governments. Except for a brief period during which a politician completely subservient to him occupied the prime ministry, Özal's actions as head of state attracted heavy criticisms from all quarters, and gradually he became relatively timid as head of state. Özal first tried to attribute to himself powers greater than those he actually had as head of state; when this did not work, he became hesitant to use the powers he actually had. Özal essentially wanted to function as a political executive rather than as head of state; he was interested in contributing to public policy making rather than adopting a longer view. His activist stance drew reaction; consequently, he could not even contribute to public policy making. His activist approach created tensions in the polity.

Demirel has displayed a different presidential style. From the very beginning, he has been very cautious as head of state; he thought his responsibility consisted only of achieving coordination among different state organs as well as political parties. He was somewhat less timid in his relations with the political executive; on occasions he insisted that the latter pay close attention to his views. When the political executive did not pay attention to him, he publicly criticized him, giving rise to some tension in the polity.

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Given the past political developments, the parliamentary system of government with a more than symbolic president proved to be rather problematic in Turkey. Turkish political actors could not appreciate the need for this type of political structuring. First, they continued to have their old agendas and to try to settle their old scores. Second, in the absence of the institutionalization of the new political regime in Huntingtonian lines, their mode of operation was shaped by their own preferences and prejudices. Özal tried to accomplish his grandiose mission of transforming Turkey; Demirel wanted to operate within the strict limits of rules and regulations, because in the past the military had transgressed civilian governments' powers. In the process, the idea of a mixed constitution remained alien to Turkish political actors, and politics continued to experience tensions that made prudent government difficult.

It is patent that the Anglo-American pattern of achieving a balance between political participation and prudent government is more democratic than any other arrangement and leads to a more harmonious polity. A polity functioning under a mixed constitution is a second best arrangement. When the political elites are not able to contribute to achieving prudent government in a satisfactory manner, the latter type of political structure contributes to prudent government. Given the fact that the transition to democracy in Turkey was characterized by an intense conflict between the political and the statist elites and in the process political elites tended toward a populistic understanding of politics, there was a need for a polity functioning under a mixed constitution. Although the conflict in Turkey between the two sets of elites made a harmonious operation of the polity under a mixed constitution extremely difficult, because of a basic commitment to democracy on the part of nearly all actors in the polity, the failure of the arrangement in question has not resulted in the establishment of a long-lasting authoritarian system of government. But it was unfortunate for Turkey that the two attempts at adopting mixed constitutions ended in failure, and the Turkish political system was deprived of the contribution that capable presidents could make to prudent government.

In the absence of such a contribution by presidents, would officers be tempted for another military intervention if they think that Turkey faces a grave threat of some sort? Since their last intervention in 1980, the military seems to have arrived at the conclusion that a coup is not a feasible way of consolidating democracy and that each intervention leads to the military's loss of prestige, particularly among the intelligentsia.[87] In any case, the military can make its views known to the government constitutionally through the National Security Council. The military gradually came to have a civilian ethic and accepted the supremacy of the political government.[88] Still, some pundits in Turkey speculate that the military may still step in if the regime is threatened by militant Islam or the ethnic right.

[87] Ahmet Evin, "Demilitarization and Civilization of the Regime" in Heper and Evin, eds., *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, 23–40.

[88] Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*.

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At this point there is no politically efficacious ethnic right movement in Turkey that may develop into a parliamentary majority. There is, however, an Islamic movement that registered considerable success in recent municipal elections and that has a political party, Prosperity party (*Refah Partisi*), which in June 1996 became the senior member of a governing bloc in parliament. Refahis are not equivocal whether they aim at an Islamic state or would be content with the incorporation of some religious demands into public policy making. If they do not try to bring about an Islamic state, the military in all likelihood will not intervene.

The Refahis developing into a greater political force to be reckoned with largely depends, it is thought by many in Turkey, upon the secular political parties. Adoption of a run-off election system, for instance, would successfully bar the Prosperitarians from power, because presently the votes of the secular bloc are badly divided. So far, secular political parties on the left or the right (which are bigger) could not cooperate among themselves in order to ward off a religious threat to the regime.

The parties on the right, which have been garnering most of the votes in the recent past, always thought that in the future elections, they will come out on top with the Prosperity party far behind. The president remains silent on the issue. The military command is careful not to make any overt political statements. It follows that the 1982 mixed constitution does not function. Warnings for an imminent Islamic threat to the regime come from journalists and other members of the intelligentsia. So far these warnings have failed to elicit any positive response from the political parties in the essentially secular bloc. This complacency may be due to the fact that the military continues to be staunchly secular and that it constitutes a safety valve against development of an Islamic state. If our prognosis has validity, we face a peculiar situation: many members of the secular bloc who think of themselves as true democrats bypass the presidency and perhaps unconsciously rely upon the military to deal with a possible threat against the regime, when the military itself is most unwilling to get entangled once more in the quagmire of the day-to-day politics in Turkey.

Turkish parliamentarianism continues to suffer from its past political legacies. Nevertheless, at least for the members of the secular bloc, democracy continues to be the only game in town. But it needs to be complemented by prudent government. Turkish politicians should either double as statist elites or acknowledge the need for a polity operating under a mixed constitution. The first option is more desirable.

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

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The Eisenhower Administration's Fear of Empowering the Chinese

ROSEMARY FOOT

The mid-1950s represented a high point for Maoist China in diplomatic, economic, and military terms. The Korean War armistice agreement signed in 1953 demonstrated that China had fought U.S. forces to a stalemate on the Korean peninsula. In 1954, China joined other major powers at the conference on Indochina and Korea. It also began to enjoy increased status within the communist bloc, in part as a result of the Korean outcome and in part because of the new Soviet leadership's willingness to put its relationship with Beijing on a more equal basis. These events, together with the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May, helped to convince the Eisenhower administration that Asian communism had entered a more vigorous phase. Washington concluded that its strategy had to be to maintain a high level of pressure on that most dynamic and confident example, the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The Eisenhower administration's harsh policy toward the PRC has tended to be explained in the scholarly literature in two main ways: first, students of the period have argued that, while the Eisenhower administration (and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in particular) privately realized there was a need to be more flexible toward the PRC and to deal with two Chinas, it would not risk its relationship with the right wing in Congress in order openly to pursue that reality. Second, it has been said that a coercive policy toward China made it easier domestically for Dwight D. Eisenhower and Dulles to pursue a partial improvement in relations with the Soviet Union; or, alternatively, that the strategy of driving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing required a policy of isolating

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the PRC in order that Beijing would learn more quickly the drawbacks of its alliance with and dependence on its northern neighbor.[1]

In accepting that a multicausal analysis is likely to prove most satisfactory in any explanation of this period of relations between the United States and China, this article will focus on an aspect that needs to be given far greater attention: the perceived fear within the Eisenhower administration, expressed most starkly by Dulles, that conciliatory gestures from Washington would empower the Chinese with fatal consequences for U.S. interests in Asia. The first phase of the Sino-American ambassadorial negotiations, August 1955 to December 1957, will be used as an entry point for explicating these consequences, since it provides a useful means of illustrating the struggle to prevent any modification in policies. The article will then demonstrate the centrality of this concern with empowerment, together with the belief that an increase in Chinese power would result in a corresponding loss of U.S. prestige and of its ability to control foreign policy outcomes. In other words, a flexible China policy, Dulles feared, would result in a loss of U.S. structural power.[2]

The Geneva Negotiations, 1955–1957: U.S. Delaying Tactics

The formal negotiations began at Geneva as a result of previous contacts established between Chinese and American officials outside the main body of the 1954 conference on Indochina and Korea, and of Zhou Enlai's dramatic offer at the first conference of Afro-Asian countries in 1955 at Bandung to sit down with the Americans in order to defuse the tensions that had arisen over Chinese attempts to recapture the offshore islands of Quemoy (Jinmen) and Matsu (Mazu). The talks were led on the U.S. side by Ambassador to Czechoslovakia U. Alexis Johnson and on the Chinese side by Ambassador to Poland Wang Bingnan, both trusted and experienced diplomats who nevertheless kept in very close contact with their superiors. Soon after the start of the discussions on 1 August, a two-point agenda was rapidly agreed: item one, the return of U.S. and Chinese citizens detained in each other's countries; and, item 2, the settlement of other practical matters at issue between the two parties.

On the eve of the talks, the Chinese released eleven U.S. Air Force personnel shot down over PRC territory during the Korean War. In their view, such a gesture invited an American response, possibly to include a relaxation of the strict

[1] See, for example, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "Cold War Contacts: America and China, 1952–1956" in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., *Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955 A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc, 1989); and Tucker, "John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the "'Two Chinas' Policy" in Richard H. Immerman, ed., *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); John Lewis Gaddis, "The American Wedge Strategy" in Harding and Yuan, eds., *Sino-American Relations*.

[2] An elucidation of the concept of structural power may be found in Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," *International Organization* 41 (Autumn 1987).

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trade embargo that had been in force against the PRC since 1951,[3] a suggestion that did not correspond with Dulles's intentions. In discussing China policy with the president, the secretary of state reminded Eisenhower of the primary purpose of these negotiations as far as the United States was concerned: "we were not anxious to push [these talks] to a conclusion except as to getting out our civilians who are being subjected to inhuman treatment. Otherwise," he said, "we needed time by which to stabilize the situation" in the Taiwan Straits as a result of the severe crisis that had occurred over the offshore islands in late 1954, early 1955. The president confirmed that he was in full agreement with this plan.[4]

Devising tactics to ensure that no more than this single agreement could emerge from the negotiations, together with the diminution in tensions in the Taiwan area, was to prove a complex task that required all of the diplomatic and legal skills of the secretary of state.[5] Inadvertently, the Chinese helped him achieve his goal as a result of their suggestion for the wording of the agreement upon the return of civilians. At the end of August 1955, and after some consideration of phrases such as "immediately to return" or "as soon as possible to return," the Chinese offered to insert the word "expeditiously." Walter S. Robertson, the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, and one who was always dubious about the sagacity of holding these talks, was delighted. The wording could not be better from the U.S. standpoint, he wrote, because "if the Communists did not release all the Americans 'expeditiously' in the literal sense of the term, they would be in an absolutely indefensible position."[6] More to the point from Dulles's perspective, a failure to implement the agreement speedily would allow the talks to continue while ensuring that nothing of substance beyond this one agreement would be concluded.

It soon became clear that Washington did indeed intend to use the phrasing of the agreement, finally signed on 10 September, as a weapon against Beijing and as a way of stringing out the talks. This was the intention even though Wang Bingnan had made it plain, as the UK ambassador in Washington reported, that the agreement to repatriate civilians would still mean that an "unspecified number of what the Chinese call 'unfinished cases' would be left in Chinese hands."[7]

The specific U.S. objective in accusing China of not acting "expeditiously" (which the administration interpreted publicly as meaning almost immediately),

[3] U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957* [hereafter *FRUS*] vol. iii, *China*, (Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), August 2 1955, 3.

[4] *FRUS, 1955–1957*, vol. iii, August 5, 1955, 16–17.

[5] U. Alexis Johnson has confirmed that at first, Dulles himself sent instructions directly. As meetings became less frequent, Herman Phleger, the State Department's legal adviser, became more prominent. Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall, 1984), 247.

[6] *FRUS, 1955–1957*, vol. iii, September 2, 1955, 75.

[7] Foreign Office File (FO) 371/115010 September 5, 1955, Public Record Office, (PRO) London; See also Robert B. Ekvall, *Faithful Echo* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960), 90–91. Ekvall was employed as an interpreter at the talks for the U.S. side. The word "expeditiously" had, he explained in his memoirs, "connotations of efficacy and efficient action," whereas the Chinese text proposed the compound "chin-su" which only meant "utmost speed."

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was two-fold: first, to castigate the Chinese for failing to live up to their international obligations; and second, to provide Washington with an excuse for refusing to leave item one behind, thus delaying consideration of item two, an awkward issue because of its ill defined nature. However, the pressure to continue the discussions proved difficult to resist partly because, as Ambassador Johnson stated, the original agreement over the agenda did not imply that the United States would be unwilling to discuss other issues until all the Americans were released.[8] Thus, negotiations on item two did proceed, revolving most centrally around the matters of the renunciation of force in the Taiwan area, the raising of the level of the negotiations to that of foreign ministers, and, more intermittently, the questions of the embargo on trade in operation against the PRC and an accounting of those Americans listed as missing in Korea.

The most important and time-consuming question was that of Taiwan. The Chinese argued that the fate of the island was an internal matter and that, because of this, any reference to the use of force should refer only to the bilateral relationship between the PRC and the United States. Nevertheless, by various means Beijing tried to indicate flexibility in response to the U.S. demand for a renunciation of force in the Taiwan area. On 8 October, for example, Zhou Enlai confirmed to the governor of Hong Kong and to Con O'Neill, the British chargé in the PRC, that the Chinese hoped to solve the Taiwan problem by peaceful means. In Wang's statement on the matter in Geneva on 1 December, he softened China's negotiating terms when he dropped all reference to the requirement for meetings between foreign ministers, agreed to settle disputes between Washington and Beijing "through peaceful negotiations without resorting to the threat or use of force," and in a further elaboration of these points stated that, although Taiwan was an internal matter beyond the scope of the talks, Beijing was "willing to settle that question by peaceful means."[9]

A few days later, in a telegram to U. Alexis Johnson, Dulles admitted that the new PRC position represented a retreat in respect to the rescinding of the proposal to continue meetings at foreign minister level; but in his view, and with respect to Taiwan, it still evaded the "clear-cut renunciation of force" that the United States required. Thus, with the secretary of state's close involvement, State Department officials submitted revisions to the communist draft, which included reference not only to a renunciation of force in general, but also to its nonuse "with particular reference to the Taiwan area, except in individual or collective self-defense."[10]

The U.S. requirement that the phrasing be absolutely explicit on this point set back the negotiations and led Wang to insist once again that any specific

[8] *FRUS, 1955–1957*, iii, September 7, 1955, 73–80.

[9] Ibid., December 1, 1955, 194; Record Group (RG) 59, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Subject Files, 1956, Box 1, Lot 58D3, "Basic Documents on Renunciation of Force Issue at Geneva Talks," (Washington DC: National Archive's [NA] ND).

[10] *FRUS, 1955–1957*, iii, December 6, 1955, n. 3; RG 59, "Basic Documents," NA.

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reference to Taiwan must be coupled with an agreement to meet at foreign minister level. The Eisenhower administration would not countenance meetings between Zhou and Dulles, however; neither would it abandon reference to the right of individual and collective self-defense, a phrase that had become, according to Johnson, "a red flag to the Chinese."[11]

Chinese moves to sidestep the thorny issue of Taiwan and to begin negotiations over the trade embargo were also blocked on the grounds that such an item could not be negotiated in the absence of this agreement over Taiwan. Even if such an accord did eventuate, Washington argued that trade could still not be discussed until the agreed announcement on the return of the detained civilians had been fully complied with.[12] The PRC's attempts to circumvent isolation and to engage in people-to-people diplomacy through its offer to allow U.S. news representatives to visit China was similarly thwarted when the U.S. administration threatened to revoke the passports of those Americans who attempted to visit the PRC. Although pressure from the U.S. media forced a reconsideration of this policy, Dulles publicly stated that allowing a limited number of correspondents to visit China did not mean that Washington would "accord reciprocal visas to Chinese bearing passports issued by the Chinese Communist regime," a statement that in the media's view invited Beijing's subsequent refusal to receive Americans on this nonreciprocal basis.[13]

The difficulties of holding the line on issues such as trading with and visits to the PRC were seen by those members of the State Department who were always most solicitous of Chiang Kai-shek as inevitable and as unfortunate consequences of the decision to keep talking to representatives from the Beijing government. Walter P. McConaughy, director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, had written to Robertson expressing his unease at continuing discussions with a regime that was "brazenly violating the only commitment they have made to us in the course of the talks." The discussions, he claimed, damaged U.S. "prestige" and its "national dignity," alarmed Taiwan, and created doubts throughout Asia "concerning the steadfastness of American opposition to Communist China."[14] Robertson clearly shared that unease, and by the end of 1957 he had decided on a tactic that was to result in the suspension of the negotiations. In November, he wrote to Dulles claiming that "it [had] just occurred to him" that the talks could be downgraded from the level of ambassador to that of first secretary. In his view, it would be a way of highlighting the Chinese failure to live up to the agreement of 10 September 1955, together with their unwillingness to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.[15]

[11] *FRUS, 1955–1957*, iii, March 1, 1956, 317 and April 19, 1956, 353, n. 2. Interestingly, according to a U.S. public opinion poll recorded in British documents, a majority of U.S. citizens (54 percent) supported the idea of meetings at the foreign minister level. FO371/127289, February 28, 1957, PRO.

[12] *FRUS, 1955–1957*, Microfiche Supplement, fiche 22, letter to U. Alexis Johnson, July 20, 1956.

[13] Ibid., iii, August 22, 1957, 584–585, editorial note, and September 11, 1957, 600–601.

[14] Ibid., October 1, 1956, 432–433.

[15] Ibid., November 20, 1957, 639 and November 29, 1957, 643–44. Note that Robertson even toyed with the idea of sending the ex-ambassador to the Republic of China to Geneva, (Karl Lott Rankin), a man who was known as strongly sympathetic toward Chiang Kai-shek.

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Dulles, though seemingly not over-enthusiastic about this suggestion, allowed himself to be persuaded, provided such a downgrading did not imply that Washington wanted to break off the talks entirely. The secretary of state may have seen in this suggestion a new way of reinforcing his strategy of diffusing tension in the Taiwan Straits while at the same time not conceding anything of substance to the Chinese. As the designated First Secretary Edwin Martin and Ambassador Johnson informed him, at these lower levels progress was even less likely.[16] Whereas Wang had the confidence of Zhou, a first secretary in Chinese terms would be little more than a messenger.

As a result of this decision, the talks were suspended, later to be transferred to Warsaw in 1958 after the second major crisis over the offshore islands. For some time, the Chinese with some justification had been accusing the Americans of stalling at these negotiations. The U.S. secretary of state also privately acknowledged that there might be something in this Chinese accusation. In a draft speech to the U.S. chiefs of mission in Asia in 1956—in a section that was in fact deleted from the text that was actually delivered—Dulles wrote that he would not want to admit that the Chinese statement had any truth in it, but added somewhat elliptically "I do admit that there is some evidence that the Chinese could deduce a substantiation of that point of view."[17]

Explaining the Inflexibility

As noted earlier, domestic political pressures, especially from friends of Chiang Kai-shek in Congress, do much to explain U.S. caution and inflexibility at these negotiations. On more than one occasion, President Eisenhower, for example, when expressing sympathy for a policy of trading with the PRC at least to the level of commerce permitted with the Soviet Union, stated that it was the U.S. "domestic political situation which compelled us to adopt an absolutely rigid policy."[18] In 1956, Congress had passed a resolution by 391 to 0 in the House and by 86 to 0 in the Senate opposing recognition of the PRC and its admission into the United Nations. Given such emphatic views on this question, it is not surprising that Eisenhower told the British and the Canadians that he understood the strong feeling of the American public against seating Beijing in the UN and that he believed that if Chiang's government were thrown out, Congress would pass a resolution calling for a U.S. withdrawal from the UN.[19]

[16] Ibid., December 12, 1957, 657–59, esp. n. 3; RG 59, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Subject Files, 1957, Box 4, Lot 60D648, December 1957, NA.

[17] RG 59, Records of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, 1955, Lot 60D514, Box 1, Opening Statement by Secretary of State, Chiefs of Mission Conference, Tokyo, 19 March 1956, NA.

[18] For a detailed discussion of Eisenhower's attitude toward trading with the PRC, see Qing Simei, "The Eisenhower Administration and Changes in Western Embargo Policy Against China" in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., *The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

[19] *FRUS, 1955–1959*, iii, December 22, 1955, 228; ibid. xxvii, March 20, 1957, 707–08.

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The secretary of state was also alert to the domestic ramifications of any move toward the PRC. As Nancy Tucker has argued persuasively, Dulles was determined not to suffer former Secretary of State Dean Acheson's fate and became "attuned to issues and actions that would send his more rightwing allies into a frenzy." He deliberately placed people, such as McConaughy and Robertson, whom he knew would be acceptable to the Republican right in offices concerned with Chinese affairs.[20] On the very day that the Sino-American ambassadorial talks began, the House Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific issued a public statement emphasizing that nothing had been accomplished with the communists at the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina in 1954 that would warrant any change of stance towards Beijing. It also reiterated the point that Taiwan was of strategic significance to Western countries and that talks with officials from the PRC did not imply any diplomatic recognition of Beijing. In what could be construed as an attempt to hem Dulles in right from the beginning of these negotiations, Congressman Dick Richards, then chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, told the secretary of state that the House was unanimous in supporting what its members saw as his cautious policy towards the PRC. When the negotiators began to discuss item two of the agenda, before all the Americans in China had been released, Senator William K. Knowland was immediately on the telephone to criticize that move. Robertson tried to parry his criticism by reassuring him that this new phase of the talks meant little, since the only substantive discussion that had taken place on item two concerned the renunciation of force, "to which the Communists incidentally take violent exception." Statements and reactions such as these reminded Dulles of the narrow parameters within which his China policy had to operate.[21]

Furthermore, a strategy of containment through isolation had been seen in the past as a way of forcing Moscow and Beijing closer together, in order to stimulate differences between the supposed socialist allies. It had been seen then as a means of driving a wedge between two states that would, it was believed, find it difficult to work together for long. Even at the time of China's entry into the Korean War, Dulles had argued that the best defense for the United States lay in "exploiting potential jealousies, rivalries, and disaffections within the present area of Soviet communist control." At Bermuda in December 1953, with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, Dulles recommended "intensifying the strain and difficulties between Communist China and Russia" by keeping the "Chinese under maximum pressure."[22]

[20] Tucker, "Taiwan Roots of the 'Two Chinas' Policy" in Immerman, ed., *Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, 236; and Tucker, "A House Divided: the United States, the Department of State, and China" in Cohen and Iriye, eds., *Great Powers*, 36.

[21] RG 59, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Box 1, Lot 58D3, August 1, 1955, NA; *FRUS, 1955–1957*, iii, August 2, 1955, 10–11; October 19, 1955, 131–132.

[22] John Lewis Gaddis, "Dividing Adversaries: The United States and International Communism, 1945–1958" in his *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 148; see also his, "American 'Wedge' Strategy," 167–68.

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Nevertheless, although it is necessary to take account of this perception that the communist world would eventually fragment perhaps even faster as a result of American pressure and although we should take note of the expected reaction from Congress to any potential improvement in ties between Beijing and Washington, the fact remains that there was also a crucial international dimension to the argument for maintaining an inflexible policy toward the PRC, a feature which received growing attention within the administration in the mid- to late-1950s. Certainly, Dulles was indeed tireless in his efforts to consult with Congress, while the president himself remained committed throughout his time in office to developing bipartisanship and to maintaining personal contacts between his administration officials and congressional members. Eisenhower had begun his administration with the intention of holding weekly meetings with legislative leaders and was the first president to have a congressional liaison staff in the White House. Yet, these actions did not reflect weakness but could in fact imply strength, for, as Anna K. Nelson has argued, the "continuing dialogue" did pay dividends in that it "served to increase the influence of the administration, not the Congress."[23] While it is reasonable, therefore, to take account of the restraining effects on China policy that Congress could exert, Dulles and Eisenhower obviously obtained greater leeway as trust was built up between the two branches of government. However, they chose not to test those limits.

With respect to the wedge strategy and the related argument of evolution through pressure, although they too were noteworthy features of the discussions in this era, Dulles in particular realized their weaknesses. It was recognized that not much could come from them in the near future. In talks with the British in early 1956, for example, Dulles stated that "if you took a look down the long vistas of time, eventual difficulties between Moscow and Peiping could be anticipated. . . . But these natural rivalries might take 100 years to assert themselves."[24] On an earlier occasion, Dulles had placed the split twenty-five years in the future, whereas Vice President Richard M. Nixon had spoken of twenty-five to fifty years before it would materialize.[25]

Even more pessimistic views were expressed in an unofficial paper produced in the State Department and circulated to a number of U.S. allies in August 1957. The paper, though unofficial, was said to have been "carefully prepared" and to represent the "considered view of the State Department." It described as "improbable" that the "free world pressure on the Chinese Communists would increase the strain on the Sino-Soviet alliance to the breaking point." Indeed, "[s]ome types of pressure, while increasing the opportunities for tension and friction within the alliance, may also have the effect of making the alliance seem even more essential to the Chinese Communists." Though the paper acknowledged

[23] Anna K. Nelson, "John Foster Dulles and the Bipartisan Congress," *Political Science Quarterly* 102 (Spring 1987): esp. 43-44, 48-49, 64.

[24] *FRUS, 1955–1957*, iii, January 31, 1956, 292.

[25] Gaddis, "American 'Wedge' Strategy," 173.

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that "pressure over a long period of time, if accompanied by other developments which would demonstrate unmistakably to the Chinese Communists that they were not achieving their objectives," might lead them to "reconsider the value of the alliance," it concluded pessimistically that the "free world [did] not have at its disposal either the pressures or the inducements which would be required to weaken substantially the mortar of ideological affinity, shared objectives (and sufficient success to date in achieving those objectives), and Chinese Communist military and economic dependence on the USSR which cements the Sino-Soviet alliance." Furthermore, it added, any strains that did develop would "arise primarily from internal factors and only secondarily from outside action."[26]

Statements such as these imply that the wedge strategy would be unlikely to bear fruit quickly enough to satisfy the objectives of the Eisenhower administration. Thus, containment through isolation was more likely to have been adopted, not only because in the long term it held out the promise of dividing Moscow and Beijing, but also because there seemed little point in using up capital with Republicans in Congress when conciliation would in the intermediate period empower the PRC to the detriment of U.S. interests. The assumption was that in the post-Korean War period the emergence of a strong and hostile China had altered the power structure in East Asia.[27] A policy of flexibility toward the PRC would, it was believed, further enhance the power of the Chinese domestically, regionally, and internationally, thus thwarting U.S. aims in Asia and undermining its relations with its major allies. Many discussions of China policy in these years implied that the Chinese and the Americans were locked into a battle for the loyalty of peoples and states in areas of Asia seen as vulnerable and unstable. Holding back on recognition, trade, or even on cultural contacts with the Beijing government was a way of increasing the chances for victory for the "free world" as it correspondingly diminished those chances for the Chinese.

These kinds of arguments were to appear in National Security Council deliberations, in intelligence estimates, and were to be expressed by the U.S. secretary of state privately and publicly in these years. He told the National Security Council (NSC) in December 1954 that in his view trade with or recognition of the Chinese would "cause a whirlpool in the free world." In the circumstances of Sino-American hostility, the United States "certainly did not want to enhance [China's] prestige." In deliberations with British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd in January 1956, he argued that "in the absence of a break between Moscow and Peiping . . . the only course that [would] protect U.S. vital interests (and perhaps British vital interests, too) [was] to refrain from taking any action which would strengthen

[26] FO 371/127290, August 13, 1957, PRO. For an interesting argument to the effect that in the late 1950s, the Eisenhower administration had come to argue that Sino-Soviet divisions were more likely to arise out of Soviet-American cooperation than pressure on China, see Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: the United States, China, and the Soviet Union 1948–1972* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), esp. chap. 6.

[27] See, for example *FRUS 1952–1954*, xiv, November 6, 1953, 279 and November 23, 1954, 933.

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the Chinese Communist regime." Again with the British in 1957, he warned them that any weakening of the West's attitude towards China would "sow discouragement" among the smaller countries and seriously erode the U.S. defensive position in the Pacific region. With U.S. media correspondents in February that year, he argued that any indication of softening on America's part would discourage anticommunists in Asia as it encouraged those ready to make an accommodation with the Chinese. Communism in Asia was now thought to be the "wave of the future" and, in his view, there was no "feeling of resistance" to it in Asia comparable to the attitude that existed in Western Europe.[28] Although Eisenhower did not personally endorse all aspects of this thinking—he believed, for example, that a relaxation of the West's embargo policy would do little for Beijing's prestige, but quite a lot to strengthen the allies' economies—he did not impose his ideas in this area on a Cabinet that disagreed with him. And in all other respects, he supported Dulles's arguments on the matter.[29]

That these points represented the genuine beliefs of Dulles and not simply statements that served to protect his flank from the Republican right is supported by their close fit with his world view. The secretary of state was preoccupied with ideas of power, change, stagnancy, and vitality. In a major policy statement in May 1952, Dulles had described Truman's containment policies as "negative"; they were policies that would "never end the peril nor bring relief from the exertions which devour our economic, political and moral vitals." At best, they were "treadmill policies which . . . might perhaps keep us in the same place until we drop exhausted." In a book that he published on the eve of the Korean War, he had written that peace was "not a static and stagnant condition of the world, but it can be, and should be, a condition of selective change." As others have noted, Dulles saw "change as the law of life," and he believed that the dynamic would always triumph over the static. His description of Chinese communism as the "wave of the future" encapsulated these fears and bolstered his belief that Beijing's position had to be challenged by the coalition of states led by the United States.[30]

These ideas concerning dynamism and stagnancy were reflected in the policy documents of the Eisenhower era and also affected those around Dulles in the State Department. In May 1959, for example, Jeff Parsons, who was to take over Walter Robertson's role as assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs from 1 July, confirmed that the United States recognized, "as Secretary Dulles

[28] Ibid., xiv, 1952-54, December 1, 1954, 973; ibid., III, January 31, 1956. 291-292; FO 371/127239, 22 March 1957, PRO; *FRUS, 1955-1957*, III, February 18, 1957, 482.

[29] Qing, "Eisenhower Administration," 125.

[30] Dulles had written an article in *Life Magazine* entitled "A Policy of Boldness," 19 May 1952. Excerpt from Dulles's *War or Peace* quoted in the *Washington Post*, 5 March 1957, as part of its attempts to get the administration to reconsider its China policy. See, too, Immerman, "Introduction" to Immerman, ed., *Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, 5. Dulles's world view is also elucidated in Ronald W. Pruessen, *John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power* (New York: the Free Press, 1982); and his chapter in Immerman, ed., "John Foster Dulles and the Predicaments of Power."

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has often stated, that every nation should be a developing nation, that any society which is stagnant is backward and that all peoples need to feel that they are part of a dynamic society moving forward creatively." Perhaps, too, these attitudes were even more deeply embedded and touched a chord in others because they closely approximated traits that have been identified as forming part of the American national character: namely that "fear of winding down," which rests on the traditional belief that Americans are people of energy and reach who nevertheless fear the loss of their vigour and competence.[31]

The fear of winding down in the 1950s was made that much worse because its corollary was that one's enemies were thereby empowered. The administration was concerned that, if the Chinese were to be enabled, this would strike at Washington's ability to maintain regional order in Asia. In the U.S. view, China undoubtedly represented the most significant challenge to that order. Flexibility toward the PRC would aid that challenge, primarily because it would increase the legitimacy and prestige of the Beijing government.

The consequences of enhancing China's power were catalogued in relation to individual countries as well as to the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. With respect to Taiwan, for example, policy documents stated that conciliatory gestures towards the PRC would damage the morale and the viability of Chiang's government and weaken the loyalty of his armed forces. As a result, the overseas Chinese communities would "swing over to Communist China and become loyal to the Chinese communist regime," an eventuality that would, in Dulles's view, multiply U.S. difficulties in "trying to hold the area" in which these communities resided.[32] Rather worrying from the U.S. perspective was the evidence that the overseas Chinese were in fact already "choosing" the mainland. Figures tabulated for those returning from Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Philippines showed that 6,240 Chinese went to the PRC in 1956, closely approximating the numbers returning to the mainland each year for the past five years, compared with 1,468 going to Taiwan in 1956, with an average of only about 1,000 persons per year returning over the same period.[33]

Beyond the immediate impact on Taiwan and the loyalties of the overseas Chinese, there were also the wider regional consequences to consider. The perception was that the Asian noncommunist countries were "dangerously vulnerable" to any increase in communist power "because of their military weaknesses and consequent fear of antagonizing Communist China, their political immaturity and instability, the social and economic problems they face, and the prevalence of anti-Western nationalism." Any indication that the United States, "the only

[31] See, for example, the language of the unofficial State Department paper of August 1957: the PRC was a "dynamic regime" with expansionist aims. It exerted "constant pressure" against the surrounding areas. FO 371/128290, August 13, 1957, PRO; FO 371/141216, May 21, 1959, PRO. Rupert Wilkinson, *The Pursuit of American Character* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), esp. 77.

[32] *FRUS*, 1955–1957, iii, January 31, 1956, 291.

[33] RG 59, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, 1957, Lot 60D648, Box 9, March 1957, NA.

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nation with the power to check Chinese Communist expansion," was reaching an accommodation with the PRC would mean that these nations "would have to choose between coming to terms themselves or acceptance of defeat at Communist hands." Governments in, for example, Thailand, Malaya and Vietnam, would in this case make "drastic adjustments in their policies lest they be left high and dry." Australia and New Zealand would also feel the fires of this shift in policy because of the impact of the change in Singapore and Malaya, where over half the population were Chinese and where Australian troops were stationed. Japan, too, would suffer from any enhancement in the power of the PRC, especially in the increased competition that would result in the markets of "free Asia." Neutralist nations, seen as the weakest link in the chain, would be "encouraged to make further concessions" to the government in Beijing. And even beyond that, in terms of the United States itself, its prestige would be reduced as its commitments came to be viewed as "mere scraps of paper." Moreover, Chinese communist influence would be increased "in proportion to this loss."[34]

In addition to the potentially disastrous results that could obtain as a result of a change in policy toward the PRC, other fears that were expressed also encouraged caution. Beijing, it was believed, had already had the kinds of international and domestic successes that contributed to an enhancement of its status. Its attendance at the Geneva Conference in 1954 was quickly followed by further advances in 1955 at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, where Zhou, largely through his "diplomatic virtuosity," had left a favorable impression, especially in his several private meetings with Asian leaders.[35] National Intelligence Estimates argued that China's domestic capabilities were advancing, too, and its control throughout the mainland appeared to be "firmly established." Sino-Soviet relations were estimated to be strong in 1956 and Beijing's stature in the socialist bloc was high. In other aspects of its foreign relations, the PRC was also regarded as having something of a head start in its battle with the West, since there was a disposition in Asia and the Middle East to feel sympathy for Beijing as a "former victim of imperialist and capitalist oppression."[36] The Pakistani public's reaction to Zhou's trip there in January 1957 demonstrated this kind of sentiment, the argument being that in paying "instinctive tribute" to the Chinese victory over Western dominance, the Pakistanis were at the same time contributing to "their own self-esteem."[37]

The breach in the trade embargo policy by Japan and Britain also raised doubts about America's own steadfastness in this area. Moreover, the negotiations

[34] *FRUS, 1952–1954*, xiv, *China and Japan*, 1984, "National Intelligence Estimates," November 23, 1954, 938; RG 59, Office of Chinese Affairs, Box 4, Lot 60D648, Chiefs of Mission Info. Series, no. 111, March 1957, NA; RG 59, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, 1954-56, Box 18, Lot 60D171, letter to Senator L.B. Johnson, 22 May 1956, NA.

[35] RG 59, R and A Reports, Country File, IR 6909, 20 May 1955, NA.

[36] *FRUS, 1955–1957*, iii, 231-255. As Dulles once put it, the West's position was "not one of depth" in the area. FO 371/127239, 22 March 1957, PRO.

[37] RG 59, Office of Chinese Affairs, Lot 60D648, Box 2, January 1957, NA.

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in Geneva further encouraged the notion that the Eisenhower administration was operating a de facto Two Chinas policy, a belief that Zhou Enlai himself encouraged through statements to diplomats in Beijing and in messages to the authorities on Taiwan.[38] The Eisenhower administration's response was, therefore, to try to undermine or at least not to contribute further to these gains. Official rhetoric emphasized that there was to be no change in U.S. policy and that China itself had not so altered its nature as to become a "peaceloving state." U.S. diplomats were to remind those willing to listen that the PRC had been branded an aggressor by the United Nations in 1951, was violating the Geneva accords in its provision of war material to the North Vietnamese, was still refusing to renounce force in the Taiwan Straits, and was breaking international agreements in its failure to release "expeditiously" those Americans detained in China. Reference was also made to evidence of supposedly widespread internal dissatisfaction as shown by the refusal of some 14,000 Chinese prisoners of war taken during the Korean conflict to return to Communist China and by the large numbers of refugees who were continuing to enter Hong Kong.[39]

Dulles and Robertson, though probably for different reasons—the latter because he relied on a high level of Sino-American hostility to help maintain Washington's support for Chiang, and the former because he believed the wider needs of the anticommunist struggle in Asia required it—played central roles in attempting to undermine China's growing prestige. At a press conference in February 1957, in response to a question concerning possible changes in America's China policy, the secretary stated that the United States should not forget too quickly the hurt that China had done to it. The Chinese, he said, had caused America 150,000 casualties during the Korean War, had prevented a political settlement on the peninsula, had seized Tibet, had been fomenting war in Indochina, had continued to hold ten Americans in its custody, and had been threatening force against Taiwan. In January and February 1957, Robertson gave, respectively, an interview to *U.S. News and World Report* and a speech to the 56th Annual meeting of the Bloomington, Indiana Association of Commerce. At the latter event, he reminded his audience that "Red China" was still "hostile, aggressive, and building up its military capabilities. . . . By every standard of national and international conduct [it was] under its present regime . . . an outlaw nation." It was a regime "imposed by force, without the mandate of the Chinese people, and, having liquidated some 18 million on mainland China in imposing its power, it can hardly be said to be representative of the Chinese people."[40]

The secretary of state's speech in San Francisco in June 1957 quite closely approximated Robertson's own and should be evaluated against this background

[38] See, for example, Zhou's statement to the "heads of mission" in Beijing, 11 November 1957 in FO371/127290, PRO.

[39] RG 59, Office of Chinese Affairs, Lot 60D648, Box 4, March 1957, NA.

[40] FO 371/127289, February 19, 1957, FO 371/127239, January 18, 1957 and February 6, 1957, PRO.

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fear that the Chinese as a result of their own and others' actions were becoming more powerful. The speech was a further public counter to the Chinese projection of themselves as responsible members of the international community who had interests that were legitimate and deserving of recognition. Domestically, Dulles stated, the Chinese Communist party "came to power by violence" and had "lived by violence" subjecting the people to "massive forcible repression." Unlike the Soviet Union at the time that the United States recognized it, the PRC's record was "one of armed aggression." He introduced the experience of the Sino-American negotiations and used it negatively to castigate Beijing's leaders for their disregard of international law, as shown by their refusal to rule out force in their dealings with Taiwan and their failure to live up to the terms of the September 1955 agreement. Dulles also made it clear that in his view the U.S. role in the international system bestowed upon the country certain obligations that did not apply to other states to the same extent, perhaps explaining in part why the U.S. administration was willing to relent over Britain's and Japan's breaches of the trade embargo, while the U.S. kept its controls in force. U.S. diplomatic recognition, he argued, "gives the recipient much added prestige and influence at home and abroad." If the United States compromised on this or on other issues such as trade or cultural relations, the "spirit and resolution" which the United States provided would "weaken free Asia" in its resistance to Chinese Communism.

Though Dulles began his speech by reminding his audience that U.S. policies should never be set in concrete, he closed it by warning those who sought change in China policy that Americans would "never serve as rallying points for free peoples if the impression is created that our policies are subject to change to meet Communist wishes for no reason other than that Communism does not want to change." In a 1950s equivalent of a 1990s sound bite, he told his listeners: "If Communism is stubborn for the wrong, let us be steadfast for the right."[41]

The secretary of state's speech satisfied a number of constituencies, including, of course, those in Congress distrustful of the administration's policy of talking with the Chinese communists in Geneva. But it also represented an important contribution to the strategy designed to undermine China's status and to prevent its further empowerment. In addition, it demonstrated the Eisenhower administration's belief that it represented the one state that had it within its capacity to enhance or undermine Beijing's global position through certain of its actions. Dulles recognized that he lived in a world of change, but as far as the PRC was concerned, he wanted to keep that world, at this stage, as unchanging as possible through a policy of containment through isolation. And although Eisenhower raised "one or two" questions about the draft of the San Francisco speech that Dulles had passed on to him—he suggested that the argument against recognition should be based less on moral and legal considerations and more on "reservations growing out of contemporary practice"—he raised no objections to the decision

[41] *FRUS, 1955–1957*, iii, June 28, 1957, 558–566.

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to give a speech that clarified America's China policy. Overall, the president thought the speech to be "excellent" as a major statement of that policy.[42]

Conclusion

The U.S. debate over Sino-American contacts in the mid-1950s shows that the domestic political environment and the arguments at the basis of the wedge strategy reinforce but do not fully explain the inflexibility of U.S. policies toward the PRC. The Eisenhower administration feared that modification of its policy would increase the power and prestige of China to an unacceptable level. If the Eisenhower administration altered its hostile stance, all that it had sought to achieve in the Asian region, such as containment through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) or through bolstering the strength of the South Vietnamese and the Chinese Nationalists, would be destroyed. Dulles in particular appeared concerned that a dynamic regime such as the PRC would soon be seen by others in Asia as the wave of the future, a model to be emulated, or as a presence to be accommodated at almost any cost.

This emphasis on the need for policies designed to retard or reduce the growth in power and prestige of the PRC continued to be an important conditioning feature of U.S. policy for the remaining years of the Eisenhower administration. In November 1960, the National Security Council rehearsed familiar arguments, emphasizing the continuity of a negative policy with respect to trading, recognition, travel of Americans to the PRC, and Beijing's assumption of the U.N. seat, on the usual grounds that China's position still needed to be undermined and not to be enhanced. In a message to the Far East-American Council of Commerce and Industry in October 1959, the president stated that he wanted to "reaffirm the constancy of our policies" toward China. He believed that developments were "increasingly demonstrating the correctness of our position." The new Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Jeff Parsons made a speech on 19 February 1960 that also strongly supported the administration's China policies. As one British Foreign Office official noted, it "might well have been written by Walter Robertson himself."[43]

Increasingly, however, these essentially stagnant policies came in for greater criticism or came to be questioned within the United States. The British Embassy's summary of the position in June 1959 was that U.S. Senator Clair Engle's speech calling for a cautious change in policy had not yet generated an "effective reply"; on the West Coast there was little support for the trade ban; and there was a "mounting tendency" to question the familiar arguments the administration was continuing to advance.[44] A private institution, Conlon Associates, produced a

[42] Ibid., June 28, 1957, 558, n. 2.

[43] Declassified Documents Reference System, Research Publications, Woodbridge, CT: no. 1286 (1983), "U.S. Policy in the Far East," 10 November 1960, reaffirming policy conclusions in NSC 5913/1, 25 September 1959; FO 371/141216, October 10, 1959 and February 26, 1960, PRO.

[44] FO 371/141263, June 22, 1959, PRO.

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more sustained criticism in the autumn of 1959 for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Its report took issue with some of the central arguments that the administration had put forward over the years. Membership in the United Nations did not automatically increase the prestige of the state in question, it stated, and it used the Republic of China as an example to demonstrate this point. Though acknowledging that Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam would object to any change in U.S. policy towards the PRC, it also predicted that these governments would adjust to that change as they had adjusted to U.S. policies they disapproved of in the past. Elsewhere in Asia, it was argued, the attractions of communism depended less on the United States holding its line on China policy and more on internal developments within the countries themselves.[45]

Underlying Washington's arguments was a belief that a power vacuum existed in the region, primarily as a result of the dissolution of European empires, a vacuum which the Chinese were only too ready to flow into. Policy documents of this era and high administration officials stressed the vulnerabilities of the states in the area and their presumed fear of the "new" China. There was little in this depiction to indicate any realization that many of these Asian states had political agendas that were different from China's own. A willingness to coexist with China need not be equated with appeasement but more with a desire to socialize China into the international order. This lack of a longer-term perspective contributed not only to the obvious policy failures in Vietnam but may also have helped to develop a more general disillusionment with U.S. actions which undermined the international consensus that America sought in order to legitimate its leading role in the international system.

That considerations of power had always been a prominent and frequently vocalized part of U.S.–China relations was confirmed from another policy maker during these years. This time Mao Zedong, according to a U.S. intelligence source, stated in 1957 that the best time to consider establishing diplomatic relations with the United States would be during China's Third Five Year Plan (1962–1967), when the "disparity between the two countries in economic power would be considerably reduced."[46] That disparity has not diminished of course; nevertheless, other internal and external developments affecting both the United States and China have served to transform their bilateral relationship, leading to the rapprochement in 1971–1972 and diplomatic relations in 1979. In this later era, the United States cast aside any fear of empowering the Chinese; instead, President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger were more interested in determining how an opening to China could enhance the

[45] The British acquired a copy of this report and were pleased to discover that it mirrored many of the views they had expressed. FO 371/141216, 10 November 1959, PRO. For example, the British commissioner general in South East Asia had argued in 1957 that change would only truly affect Nationalist China. The Indians and Japanese would be relieved, he stated, and the most the Indonesians would do would be to gloat a little. FO 371/127290, 11 November 1957, PRO.

[46] *FRUS, 1955–1957*, August 8, 1957, 579, n. 3.

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capabilities of their own administration, both internationally and domestically.[47] Perceptions of the PRC had, of course, undergone considerable change by the early 1970s, allowing for the admission that a stable peace in Asia required the inclusion of China. No longer was the PRC seen as the wave of the future, the model for other Asian nations and the subversive revolutionary state able and willing to exert pressure on its neutralist neighbors. Its underlying economic weaknesses and obvious interest in the 1950s in diplomatic recognition, entry into the United Nations, and trade relations with the West suggest that such fears were overstated. By the early 1970s, the legitimacy of these interests was recognized, and the granting of them was no longer seen as being likely to have a negative affect either on U.S. objectives or on its allies, with the notable exception of the Taiwanese. As a result of Beijing's willingness to reciprocate U.S. gestures, the Chinese themselves could in these years be seen to have reversed the Sino-American relationship in some senses and to have empowered the Nixon administration in terms of its domestic popularity and the increase in its diplomatic maneuverability. However, this need not imply a decline in U.S. hegemony relative to the 1950s. Rather, it should be seen as confirmation that the Chinese wanted to make another attempt at participating in the international order that the United States had been instrumental in creating. The "wave of the future" had broken on the shore, but carrying little before it after all.

[47] I am thinking here of how the Nixon administration watched the polls for evidence of increased popularity after the Nixon trip (the president's rating rose to 56 percent in March 1972, the highest popularity rating in fourteen months) and of the belief of that administration that an opening to China would increase its leverage with the Soviet Union and with the North Vietnamese, and facilitate its withdrawal from the conflict in Indochina.

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
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Growing Income Inequalities in America? A Review Essay

HUGH HECLO

Americans have generally loved talking about economic inequality and hated doing anything about it. As the thirteen colonies were becoming a new nation, there was much talk of "sumptuary laws" to protect republican virtue against "luxury" and extravagant consumption. Although that mood soon passed, economic inequality has been a beloved, recurring theme in public debate.

Since roughly the mid-1980s, the issue of economic inequality has again been inching its way onto the public agenda. It has been an inching process because those pushing "fairness" angst have felt vulnerable to countercharges that they were reviving 1960s radicalism and fomenting class warfare (a charge that gives 1960s reformers far more credit as egalitarians than they deserve). Nevertheless, economic data do have a way of accumulating and getting reported. In 1990, Kevin Phillips (*The Politics of Rich and Poor*) did much to legitimate inequality talk, and by mid-decade, as the three books under review indicate, the subject had gathered noticeable momentum.

Since the Great Society's alleged War on Poverty, Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk have been prominent contributors to the study of income inequality and poverty policy. Thanks to such scholars, the United States now has the best data and economic analyses of income poverty in the world (though it also has just about the worst statistics of all industrialized nations in terms of reducing poverty). Both their technical proficiency with the economic data and heart-felt concern for an antipoverty agenda are on display in *America Unequal*.[1] In straightforward if antiseptic language, the co-authors lay out the basic post-1960 trends in social policy, poverty rates, and income distribution. They then weigh competing expla-

[1] Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk, *America Unequal* (New York and Cambridge, MA: Russell Sage Foundation and Harvard University Press, 1995).

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nations for what has happened and explain what they regard as desirable policies to fight poverty.

According to the book's analysis, what has happened goes like this. In the two decades after World War II, real family incomes doubled, income inequality narrowed slightly, and poverty rates declined dramatically. After 1973 there were ten years of stagnation and back-to-back recessions, which produced falling average incomes, greater inequality, and higher levels of poverty. So far so good; the data were playing by the conventionally understood rules. However, after 1983 the nation experienced sustained economic recovery, modest growth in average incomes (largely from increased work hours, not higher wages), and continuing high poverty rates. The poverty trend no longer tracked with aggregate improvements in income, because the distribution of income itself was becoming more unequal.

America Unequal describes a nation where the rising tide of economic growth no longer lifts all boats, because structural economic changes (technological advances, internationalized markets) generate greater demands for higher-skilled relative to lower-skilled workers and thus greater earnings inequality. The argument is that government social programs have sometimes helped offset the basic economic forces (the 1970s), sometimes made their impact worse (the 1980s), but at the core it is structural economic changes that have created the rising earnings and income inequality as well as the persistently high poverty rate of the past two decades. The authors propose offsetting policies to improve employment prospects and earnings of all workers adversely affected by structural economic changes. Their proposals would alter the Earned Income Tax Credit, tax codes, and employment programs so as to ensure that any family with at least one full-time worker will have an after-tax income above the poverty line.

While the proposed reforms may appear "New Democrat" in nature, they echo much of what was said by people like Sar Levitan and other advocates of activist labor market policy in the 1960s and 1970s, voices then generally dismissed by antipoverty movers and shakers. In essence, the renewed attack on poverty proposed in *America Unequal* is a workers' antipoverty agenda. By the authors' calculation this is an agenda encompassing a little less than half of the officially counted 31 million poor.[2] Still, there is enough of the "old" Great Society Democrat left in Danziger and Gottschalk to take the postwar decades prior to 1973 as the benchmark for expected progress. This obviously runs afoul of recent criticisms (Robert J. Samuelson, *The Good Life and Its Discontents*, 1995) that see the expectations of endless economic growth and social betterment of those first postwar decades as a dangerous illusion of entitlement.

On the whole *America Unequal* deals with quite familiar measures of income poverty and inequality. By contrast, in *Black Wealth/White Wealth* we are introduced to the much more neglected subject of wealth distribution and Americans'

[2] Ibid., 158.

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capacities for asset formation.[3] Making extensive use of longitudinal data in the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and interweaving colorful interviews with ordinary people, Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro offer one of the most thorough and thoughtful studies to date on race and the distribution of wealth, perceiving wealth to be the supreme indicator of historical processes undergirding racial equality.

The authors begin by demonstrating how important it is to understand the various dimensions of wealth, wealth's centrality to genuine economic well-being, and its vastly more unequal distribution than income. Not surprisingly, since blacks rank low on socioeconomic characteristics that are associated with high levels of income and wealth (that is, education, occupation, intact marriage with two earners, etc.), blacks are disproportionately among those with little or no wealth. Their situation is even more bleak if one omits housing and considers only net financial assets in the wealth calculation.

One might pause here to take in the larger picture, which the authors must push to the periphery by concentrating on race. One quarter of all white households (and 61 percent of black) have zero or negative financial assets; and 38 percent of whites (79 percent of blacks) lack financial reserves to survive at the poverty level even three months without outside income. Most revealing of all, over half of all married couples with children (54 percent) have insufficient financial assets to support themselves at a poverty line level of living for three months. If economic precariousness is defined roughly as having insufficient financial assets to live for three months at the poverty line, then 56 percent of all white children and 89 percent of black children live in such households.[4]

This more general subject of Americans on the economic edge is important in any debate on economic well-being and public policy, but understandably enough it is not the book Oliver and Shapiro are writing. The center point of their analysis lies in demonstrating that even *after* blacks and whites are matched on all the key factors associated with asset accumulation (education, occupation, age, social mobility, etc.) the differences in wealth remain vast, with approximately three-fourths of the racial wealth differences remaining unexplained by those conventional variables. The authors go on to explain in convincing detail how a triad of forces—particular public policies, discrimination in economic markets, and the historic accumulation of disadvantages in asset formation—have combined to "sediment" black asset poverty into the social structure. The final recommendations are bold and controversial, ranging from government subsidized education and housing asset accounts to racial reparations. Nonetheless, the book has clearly accomplished its goal of presenting a "new perspective on racial inequality." By illuminating the social and policy context that shapes possibilities for accumulating assets, Oliver and Shapiro show the value of a

[3] Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro, *Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

[4] Ibid., 87-88.

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sociological perspective that pushes beyond standard economic descriptions of poverty and income distributions.

The Winner-Take-All Society deals with those at the top, where massive income rewards most readily translate into massive wealth possibilities.[5] However, this is not a book about the rich and famous. It is about the process of winning economically in America and the rewards that entails. As the title rightly avows, this process is increasingly pervasive so as to implicate the whole society.

By now, many readers will be familiar with the "winner-take-all" language that has been picked up in some of the popular media. However, within the book's lively, popular writing style is a solid core of ideas deployed by two well informed social scientists, Robert Frank and Philip Cook. The basic notion is that there are markets that proffer topside rewards vastly out of line with any marginal differences in actual performance. In transmitting this idea the popular media has focused on superstar athletic or entertainment figures, but the book clearly shows the issue to be a broader one concerning markets that distribute disproportionate shares to many people in a range near the top ("winner-take-all," however, is a more saleable slogan). As the authors acknowledge, much of this is a follow-on from the late Fred Hirsh's tragically foreshortened work on *Social Limits to Growth* (1976), which highlighted a modern society's disposition to base rewards not on absolute performance but on performance relative to others. It is in the huge disproportion between the best or near best and everyone else that the lottery quality of today's America takes hold.

The main thrust of Frank and Cook's analysis is to show that such topside-biased markets have spread (largely they suggest because of technology) to ever more areas of American life with ever more spectacular rewards to those above. The natural result of such markets favoring first-class passengers is a spreading inequality of income and wealth as those below in cabin and steerage class fall behind. However, the authors extend the discussion of inequality to no less important concerns for massive inefficiency in resource use (such markets attract far too many contestants for far too useless extremes in consumption and investment) and a degradation of important cultural values (a celebration of fluffy quick success over enduring qualitative merit).

In the end, the authors declare the good news that the economist hard-heads' "big trade-off" between equality and efficiency does not face us at every turn. In our world of expanding and wasteful winner-take-all markets, there is a great deal of leeway whereby policy choices can promote both more equality and more efficiency. The authors' major proposal is a progressive consumption tax to help bring social and economic relationships back into a truer alignment. Shades of sumptuary laws. It seems that within the jaded veneer of postmodern America, the old yearning for republican virtue can still twitch with life.

Is there anything tying all this together? Perhaps so. We may be witnessing, in various guises, a return to a concern for the ordinary (dare we still use the

[5] Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook, *The Winner-Take-All Society* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

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term?) bourgeois qualities of democratic life. Let us think again about the three books under review in combination: anti-poverty concerns focused on those who work or will work; racial equality concerns looking, not to great fortunes or radical social transformation, but to middle class wealth prospects for those who play by the rules of democratic capitalism; pro-market concerns disparaging the perverse outcomes of corrupted market processes. Anyone who can pull together such petty bourgeois forces may well catch the next wave of ascendance in American policy and politics.

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The Politics of Expertise in Congress

The Rise and Fall of the Office of Technology Assessment

Bruce Bimber

"This is a very nice work on a government agency that deserved to be better known and appreciated, because it was one of the great success stories of modern American governmental innovation."
— *Sanford Lakoff, University of California at San Diego*

Nowhere in the U.S. government is the marriage between expertise and politics more normatively troublesome and empirically obscure than in Congress. The legislature is asked to be both expert and representative, to act on the best available information and judgment about policy problems while being responsive to, and reflective of, constituents' demands. This book examines the relationship between technical experts and elected officials, challenging the prevailing view about how experts become politicized by the policy process.

Bimber presents a theory about the connections between institutional structure and the strategies of experts who participate in politics. He tests this theory by tracing the interaction between Congress and the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), a recently abolished legislative branch agency created in 1972 to estimate the consequences of new technologies and free Congress from complete dependence on the executive branch for information and policy analysis. In addition, he provides comparative portraits of Congress's remaining support agencies—the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Office, and the General Accounting Office—and argues that the legislative context for the politics of expertise reveals patterns that have been overlooked in studies of expert knowledge and executive-branch policymaking.

"This is the most insightful and persuasive account of the way experts interact with politicians. Bruce Bimber's absorbing tale of the success—and demise—of the Office of Technology Assessment will fascinate everyone interested in the labyrinth of legislative policymaking. He throws light on most of the nooks and crannies of lawmaking to show how information drives the legislative process. In the process, he is able to show that 'neutral competence' is a necessary, though not sufficient, part of policymaking."
— *Roger H. Davidson, University of Maryland, College Park*

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Book Reviews

Serious Money: Fundraising and Contributing in Presidential Nomination Campaigns
by Clifford W. Brown Jr., Lynda W. Powell, and Clyde Wilcox. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995. 184 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $19.95.

If at this late date anyone needs a demonstration of the law of available data and its power to shape the agendas of inquiry, scholarship about American campaign finance will do nicely. The literature on political action committee (PAC) contributions to candidates is ample and varied; inquiry on individual contributors is skimpy and fragmented. Why? PACs (and party committees) must make full public reports of their receipts, expenditures, and political contributions under federal law. Under the same law, individual contributors are not required to report; we know of them only as recipient candidates report on them, often incompletely.

Now, at last, comes a book on individual contributors. Its analysis rests on sample surveys of individual contributors to candidates for the Democratic and Republican presidential nominations in 1972, 1988, and 1992. A panel of 1988 respondents reinterviewed in 1992 enriches the analysis with data on repeaters and on the recruitment of solicitors from contributors. The data, in other words, were not readily available, and the authors had to collect them in the old fashioned way. They supplemented those surveys with other data sets and with interviews with expert fundraisers. The result is a landmark book: the first extensive study of individual contributions in American campaign finance.

Even though the goals are loftier than a description of the individual contributors, the pool itself is not ignored. It is largely made up of the usual suspects: educated, affluent, partisan white males who have a strong tendency to be repeat contributors. But there is far more. Contributing is set in a dynamic schema in which the potential contributors in the pool are mobilized and in which, therefore, solicitors and organizers of the mobilization take their important place. Solicitation through personal networks contrasts with impersonal direct mail solicitation; and campaigns, it turns out, vary greatly in the mix of the two they use. In 1988, for example, the populist candidates—Jesse Jackson, Jack Kemp, and Pat Robertson—relied most heavily on the impersonal solicitations. As for the solicitors and their networks, the book taken as a whole offers by far the fullest portrait of them I have seen.

The main solicitors and recruiters of solicitors are, of course, the candidates. The two chapters on their role stand out in a book that has no weak chapters. Their fundraising "resources"—that is, the home-state base, the holding of public office, access to ethnic, racial, and religious communities—are fully explored. And so, too, is their part in recruiting solicitors and organizing the whole effort.

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The book's many excellences do not end there. There is everywhere an awareness of the strategic choices and imperatives the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) creates for soliciting individual contributors. Moreover, while the authors are aware of the normative issues their data raise, they do not belabor the reader with devil theories or heavy-handed moralizing. Although they have resisted the temptation to sprinkle racy anecdotes through the pages, they do share the illuminating or ironic observation. I am in their debt, for example, for bringing to my attention Barry Werth's wonderful description of access as "that demure cousin of influence" (p. 60).

Finally, the authors write with clarity and unusual grace for a scholarly monograph. The book is not long, but it is long enough, and its reasonable length testifies to the authors' restraint in not exploring every possible relationship in their data. In sum, this is one of a short shelf of indispensable books on American campaign finance—indispensable both for its findings and for its sophisticated way of looking at the entire business of soliciting and contributing campaign money.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

The Very Best Men, Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA *by Evan Thomas. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1995. 427 pp. $27.50.*

U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform *by Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmitt. Washington, DC, Brassey's, 1995. 315 pp. $25.95.*

Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955–1992 *selected and edited by H. Bradford Westerfield. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995. 489 pp. $35.95.*

The idea that intelligence, or any other political process or institution, is at a "crossroads" is usually an overstatement. Today, however, there is good reason for using that somewhat dramatic description of the current state of U.S. intelligence as it enters the post-cold war world. Of the three volumes here reviewed, the one so titled addresses the future in terms of defining the terms of a debate (really more of a many sided discussion) over reform of institutions. In the words of the authors, "the real question is not whether intelligence will be a factor in the future but whether the large intelligence bureaucracies spawned by World War II and the cold war continue to suit U.S. national security needs" (p. x). From that starting point, one can scarcely do better than to begin with Evan Thomas's book on the early years of the CIA, although as its title signals and the account confirms, the key development of the early postwar/early cold war years was more the derring-do of a few of the best and brightest than of the large intelligence bureaucracies that developed in later decades. The third volume under review presents a wide range of articles dealing both with practical and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession as candidly discussed on a classified basis within CIA and the intelligence community from the mid-1950s to the 1990s, now declassified. It is a fascinating look, if not exactly into "the CIA's private world," at least into serious efforts within the U.S. intelligence world to grapple with problems of intelligence collection and analysis.

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Together, these three books tell us much about the past, present, and future of U.S. intelligence and the nature of the intelligence process. They are quite different in nature, but complement one another well, and usefully provide different perspectives.

Evan Thomas faced two difficulties in undertaking to write a biographical-historical account of the early years of CIA. First was the problem of obtaining the necessary data, and second was to go beyond existing histories of CIA and several other excellent accounts, in particular those by Burton Hersh (*The Old Boys*), Robin Winks (*Cloak and Gown*), and Peter Grose (*Gentleman Spy*). Thomas has succeeded in developing a well informed and insightful portrait, in part through access to some newly declassified official files, but much more through extensive and evidently well considered interviews (with sources identified, although sometimes in multiple citings within one note, and fortunately only rarely anonymous attribution). It is a well written, well developed tale of the ventures into the intelligence world and subsequent adventures in clandestine intelligence of four Ivy League leading figures in the successes and failures of the years from 1947 to the early to mid-1960s. The four protagonists of the tale were Frank Wisner, Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, and Desmond Fitzgerald, all now deceased. These are names very well known in the intelligence world, if not so widely to the general public, as key figures in U.S. intelligence operations. They come alive through Thomas's deft biographic historical accounts, and so does the milieu of Washington at the height of the cold war. The exploits of these men included covert operations in Europe, Southeast Asia and China, the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba, and in Bissell's case the successful development of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. As the publishers rightly acknowledge, "it is the story of American hubris, of the corruption of good intentions, of four brave and flawed men who dared too greatly." Above all, Thomas has succeeded in evoking the spirit of these men and of the ethos of CIA in that era.

There are some errors in *The Very Best Men*, but not of consequence. For example, the DD/I in the 1950s was not the Deputy Directorate/Intelligence (p. 190) but in effect (and later in name) the Directorate of Intelligence; in the 1950s it was simply referred to by extension of use of the title of its chief, the Deputy Director [of CIA] for Intelligence—the DD/I. The Paris Summit of May 1960 was not canceled until the leaders met (p. 219). William Bundy was not assistant secretary of state in April 1961, but the senior deputy assistant secretary of defense (p. 252). More important, Nikita Khrushchev did *not* in 1962 "provide his socialist comrade [Castro] with nuclear-tipped missiles"—they remained firmly under Moscow control. And manuals (earlier) supplied by U.S. spy Colonel Oleg Penkovsky described the time needed to ready missiles for firing, but did not show that "the United States still had a little time before the missiles were made operational" (p. 290). But such occasional errors in detail do nothing to vitiate the portrait of the CIA that Thomas paints.

Westerfield has done a good job of selecting a wide range of newly declassified articles from the CIA classified journal *Studies in Intelligence*. They reflect the high quality and professionalism of the contributors and by extension of CIA and the U.S. intelligence community. The articles deal with many problems of HUMINT (Human Intelligence—that is, people as sources), clandestine intelligence collection and evaluation, counterespionage, intelligence analysis, and intelligence estimating (although surprisingly less on the last named). Some articles are capsule case studies, including one on the notorious case of the mishandling of Soviet defector Yury Nosenko in the 1960s. It is too early to have declassified accounts of the mishandling of Vitaly Yurchenko in the 1980s and Soviet spy Aldrich Ames in the 1980s–1990s. Incidentally, CIA now publishes an annual unclassified issue of *Studies in Intelligence*, in addition to four classified issues. As Westerfield correctly notes, two areas of intelligence interest and activity are sharply underrepresented even in the original classified versions:

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articles on SIGINT (signals, including communications intercept, intelligence), and Covert Action operations. Partly as a result, intelligence analysis may be overrepresented. But we should be grateful for the information and insights that this wealth of declassified discussions provides.

In some respects the contributors to *Inside CIA's Private World* illustrate the maxim that in intelligence the sum should equal more than its parts. Without attempting to cover all the many facets of the intelligence process, the wide range of discussions of multiple aspects in this section of thirty-two articles does help to convey the overall pattern of the process. Problems of interpreting photographic images, evaluating volunteer agents, gearing intelligence collection to analysis, and analysis to policy making are all addressed not in a formal way but indirectly through discussions focused on the parts, yet adding up to the mosaic that constitutes the intelligence process. One of the most interesting and informative articles is a discussion by a veteran operations officer of the tension between clandestinity in espionage and production of current intelligence. Another focuses on the collector's role in evaluation of information; a third on assessing reporting by the Directorate of Operations. Others discuss the hazards of single-outcome forecasting, and Bayes' Theorem as a probabalistic guide for intelligence analysis. Historical reviews survey economic intelligence work in CIA and many more specific case studies of intelligence analysis.

The volume on "agendas for reform" of U.S. intelligence is, as intended by its authors, directly keyed to current decisions on the future. It includes chapters broadly outlining the role of intelligence, with particular attention to relationships with other elements of the U.S. national security organization, and to the nexus between intelligence and policy making. Particularly useful are chapters on "The Tradecraft of Analysis" by Douglas MacEachin, a former deputy director for intelligence, and on "Estimating the Future?" by Joseph Nye, a leading academic and one-time head of the National Intelligence Council. In a number of cases, following the pattern of a Working Group to which papers were presented, an article is accompanied by two or three commentaries by other participants, with a mix of scholars and intelligence practitioners (some participants qualify as both).

One way in which *U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads* demonstrates its timeliness is in the relative attention given to various aspects of the subject. Covert action, for example, is given only one of eighteen chapters. In the 1970s it would probably have dominated a similarly designed study. Economic intelligence and the relationship of intelligence to law enforcement each receive much more attention than they would have even a few years ago. Combating proliferation of nuclear and other dangerous weapons is appropriately given considerable attention (including a particularly useful account by David Kay, the former chief UN inspector of Iraq's nuclear weapons program following the Gulf War). There is some unevenness in the contributions and in gaps between them. For example, an informed discussion on the future of Defense intelligence is not related to a later chapter on intelligence and the revolution in military affairs which, although not without merit, is left hanging at the end of the book. Nonetheless, over all the book certainly makes a contribution to what should indeed be a major debate on an important subject of public policy.

Inside CIA's Private World and *U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads* each include useful attention to the persisting problem—highlighted recently by the Ames case—of making counterintelligence, especially counterespionage, effective without extremes that make U.S. intelligence/espionage ineffective. The chapter in *Crossroads* by William Hood, a veteran of OSS counterintelligence and long a close associate of James Angleton in managing CIA counterintelligence, discusses the problem from the standpoint of a sympathetic review of Angleton's career and accomplishments. Richards Heuer, in *Private World*, presents a devas-

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tating, detailed account of the excess of counterintelligence suspicion in the Nosenko case. Both are well worth reading and pondering.

One interesting internal debate among several contributors (in particular Jennifer Sims, Abram Shulsky, and Ernest May) within the *Crossroads* book is whether intelligence should be defined as "information for decision-makers," or as "secret information" requiring clandestine acquisition. The question is far from academic, as it bears on the extent to which intelligence analysis and estimating should encompass melding secret and open sources of information, or whether that function should rest elsewhere in the policy-making structure. Put in a different way, there is a persistent problem in defining the relationship between intelligence and policy making in ways that make intelligence collection and analysis most relevant and helpful to the policy makers' needs, without in the process becoming "policitized" and distorted to suit the policy makers' preferences. If not fully answered, at least that problem is raised and addressed in this book.

Together, these three books not only contribute to understanding and discussion of the role of intelligence and the intelligence process, but also bear witness to the growing realization that intelligence is a part of foreign policy formation and execution that can no longer be regarded as a more or less self-contained adjunct or separate arena of world politics.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
Brookings Institution

Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States *by Uri Bar-Joseph. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. 392 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $18.95.*

It is commonplace that bureaucracies do not merely implement policy given from above but also try to pursue their own policies. Uri Bar-Joseph rightly emphasizes such intervention by intelligence bureaucracies as a special case. Their secret nature makes their oversight more difficult and their intervention especially dangerous.

This book has two parts: four case studies on intelligence intervention in politics and a theoretical discussion, which focuses as much on political intervention in intelligence. The case studies are more successful. Bar-Joseph presents facts well. Most valuable are the less well known cases examined: the 1954 Israeli "Unfortunate Business" and the 1920 British "Henry Wilson Affair." Bar-Joseph is much less successful in extracting theory from the facts.

The 1954 Israeli "Unfortunate Business" centered around a rogue operation by the Israeli Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). Faced with British intentions to turn the Suez Canal Zone over to the Egyptians, DMI activated agents in Egypt to launch terrorist attacks on civilian targets. DMI hoped that the consequent disruptions would somehow disrupt the turnover. While some incendiaries were set off, the attacks had no larger effects and the Israeli agents were quickly captured. A controversial point is whether the DMI got belated authorization from Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon. However, Bar-Joseph makes clear that such authorization, if it occurred, came after the operation had started.

The 1920 British Henry Wilson Affair revolved around the then top British Army officer, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. Communications intercepts indicated that the Russian Trade Mission was covertly interfering in British politics. Wilson pressed the prime minister to expel the Russians. When he refused, Wilson tried to organize a collective resignation of

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British military and intelligence leadership, which would include revealing the damning intercepts. Despite getting some mixed support, including from Winston Churchill, Wilson was not successful.

Arguably, the intervention in these cases was as much by the military as by intelligence. In the 1920 British case, "The driving force behind this maneuver was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson" (p. 263). Similarly, the 1954 Israeli case occurred at a time when "standard operating procedure" in the Israeli Defense Ministry was "bypassing higher authorities, misleading superiors, and ignoring their directives" (p. 216). The distinguishing feature of DMI's "Unfortunate Business" was not the intelligence connection but that it was so unsuccessful.

This last raises the main theoretical problem with the book. It focuses on cases where either operations went bad (the Bay of Pigs and the Unfortunate Affair) or on politically incorrect intelligence interference with domestic affairs (two British cases). Bar-Joseph briefly notes, however, that the same CIA official using similar methods was responsible for both the disaster of the Bay of Pigs and the development of the U2, "the CIA's most significant achievement during the 1950s" (p. 133). Bar-Joseph draws no implications from this. Similarly, the book makes passing reference to Churchill's unauthorized links to intelligence agencies during his years in opposition fighting appeasement. Was that intelligence intervention in politics?

Finally, Bar-Joseph recommends the multilateral-constitutional system of legislative as well as executive intelligence oversight under which he categorizes the "CIA since 1975" (p. 67). However, discussion of the Reagan administration concludes, "never before in the history of the CIA was the intelligence process so systematically corrupted" (p. 33). Does this contradict his recommendation, represent an acceptable tradeoff, or merely mean that no safeguards are perfect? Bar-Joseph does not tell us.

RICHARD I. BRODY
Center for Naval Intelligence

The Voice of the People: Public Opinion & Democracy *by James S. Fishkin. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1996. 204 pp. $20.00.*

The dust jacket of political scientist James Fishkin's book calls it "The book behind the PBS National Issues Convention." For those with short memories: The National Issues Convention was the mini-townmeeting called early in the 1996 presidential primary season. It was designed to demonstrate that average citizens can make intelligent judgments about complex political issues after becoming well informed and discussing the issues in face-to-face gatherings. Though extensively televised, the National Issues Convention slipped quickly from public attention. One reason was that it had not revealed spectacular changes in the participants' opinions. Does the book deserve oblivion as well? The answer is a resounding "No."

Predictably, *The Voice of the People* presents James Fishkin's ideas about the importance of periodically assessing well-informed public opinions about the issues of the day. Such opinions emerge when citizen panels receive ample relevant information about public issues that concern them and are encouraged to discuss these issues among themselves and with experts. In contrast to the often poorly informed views of average people whose voices are aggregated by public opinion pollsters, the "deliberative" polls reporting the views of informed

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citizens are the essence of sound public opinion. They are what democratic theorists had in mind in their visions of government of the people, by the people, for the people. The book also describes the initial experiments with Fishkin-type citizen panels in England, and the precursors and plans for the U.S. experiments that subsequently took place in the spring of 1996.

But the book does much more than report these experiments. It puts the whole issue of creating and institutionalizing democratic self-government into historical perspective. It makes it clear that the notion that self-government requires well informed citizens who have taken the time to discuss these issues at length is not just James Fishkin's latter day pipedream. Rather, it is an idea that runs through the writings of the major Founding Fathers and has resonated in the works of political theorists ever since. Fishkin's examples run the gamut from political thoughts and practices in ancient Greece to George Gallup's development of public opinion polling and Ross Perot's ideas about push-button electronic democracy.

Obviously, this is not a book about just one major event—the 1996 National Issues Convention. It is a book about a fundamental problem of American democracy, or any democracy for that matter. It probes what government by public opinion was intended to be at its inception and raises the question whether it is still true that sound civic engagement requires knowledge and discussion based on first-rate information. An affirmative answer raises questions about the best way to implement the idea in this century and the next. Fishkin's deliberative poll is one answer. As the author is well aware, it has major shortcomings, such as the difficulty of assembling a reasonably representative panel of citizens along with appropriate spokespersons to inform the panelists about sensitive political issues. There also remains the question whether the whole enterprise is worth its high-dollar costs when the 1996 panelists changed their initial opinions only minimally after participating in the experiment.

If Fishkin's approach is not the answer, what is? Making the views of ordinary people a valuable ingredient of policy making will always remain a major challenge. Anyone trying to meet it, either by supporting Fishkin's approach or opposing it and moving in different directions, will find this slim, well-written volume an invaluable launching pad for further thinking and discussions.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

Good Intentions Make Bad News: Why Americans Hate Campaign Journalism *by S. Robert Lichter and Richard E. Noyes. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. 320 pp. Cloth, $58.50; paper, $22.95.*

Watchdog or pit bull? Which is the appropriate metaphor for the American media? The authors lean to the latter, at least in the area of presidential politics, where they find the media invariably arrogant and often wrongheaded in the coverage of presidential races.

Lichter and Noyes base their findings on a detailed analysis of the way the media covered the 1988 and 1992 races. The study is limited to the major television networks' handling of the 1988 campaign and the same networks in 1992, plus in that year the CNN and public television coverage, as well as a select few print sources (*New York Times, Washington Post,* and *Wall Street Journal*).

The authors cite a distinctive difference between the coverage of the two campaigns by the networks. They say TV news executives, shamefaced after 1988 by the way the media

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let the candidates drag the campaign down into nasty sound-bite irrelevancies, decided 1992 would be different. The media would force a confrontation of the real issues.

It was different but not all that much better, argue Lichter and Noyes, because the media's agenda was not necessarily the public's agenda. There was an inordinate emphasis on the "character" issues, inevitable perhaps when Bill Clinton's personal life was exposed and the whiff of scandal was too overpowering for newshounds' noses.

There was also the relentless focus on the "horse race" aspects of the campaign: who's ahead, by how much, who was gaining or losing, and what issues or personalities seemed to make a difference?

Finally, the media collectively was just plain wrong on the single major substantive issue of the race—the economy. Both print and television regularly emphasized all the somber economic notes they could find in 1992, even as all the standard indicators showed solid upward movement. The big loser in this downbeat reporting job was, of course, George Bush.

What lessons are to be drawn from this analysis? Noyes and Lichter emphasize three areas: It should be the candidates' prerogative to set the agenda of campaign issues. The media should back off from that role and be content to report fully and objectively what each side has to say on the issues. The media should also control their passion for the horse-race aspect of the campaign and spare the American public the manufactured excitement of who's ahead and why.

Finally, it would be enormously helpful if the two major parties could reclaim control of the nominating process they witlessly surrendered to the populace and the media starting in 1968.

The prescriptions are unexceptional—and probably unattainable. While politicians may be devoted to God, motherhood, and the flag, members of the media are devoted to God, motherhood, the flag, and the First Amendment; there is no way they are going to surrender their right to speak out on all matters political, as they see fit.

In truth, the media industry is a fractious, quarrelsome lot, given to more self-criticism than most professions and driven also by a need to make a dollar serving its perception of public needs. When enough of the public turns away from news on the tube and stops reading newspapers (as many now seem to be doing), changes will be made. It's a disorderly and imperfect system. Indeed, as Winston Churchill said of democracy, it's the worst possible system—except for all others.

JOHN J. SMEE
Fordham University

Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam *by Lloyd C. Gardner. Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 1995. 610 pp. $35.00.*

"Explaining American involvement in Vietnam is not . . . simple, of course," Lloyd C. Gardner rightly notes in the opening pages of his book (p. xiii). Vietnam was an immensely complicated and ambiguous war that consumed many soldiers' lives and many politicians' careers, including, most famously and tragically, that of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Gardner of Rutgers University sets as his task to explain why LBJ was drawn into and eventually destroyed by what Johnson came to call "that bitch of a war."

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Gardner believes the answer lies primarily in Johnson's attachment to the gospel of economic development, an attachment rooted in LBJ's formative New Deal experiences. Johnson, he writes, shared "a profound conviction about the power of the federal government to promote economic development as an antidote to regional and class struggles—even as far away as Vietnam" (p. xv). "What the New Deal had accomplished, and even more what his generation had discovered about the federal government as a force for economic change, became the promise and obligation that held Johnson fast to his fateful course" in Vietnam (p. 7). LBJ had *lived* this ethos of development during the New Deal and Fair Deal years.

Gardner's stress on the economic dimension of American diplomacy will be familiar to readers of his many other books. All stress to varying degrees a common theme: that twentieth-century U.S. leaders considered the American experiment dependent upon a hospitable climate abroad for the expansion of American ideas, especially the equation between free markets and free men. And LBJ was no exception, argues Gardner. In fundamental ways, he reflected the values and assumptions of his predecessors and successors, the architects of the American Century.

Gardner's economic emphasis is convincing—up to a point. Johnson, like most of his countrymen, harbored extraordinary faith in the power and allure of American munificence. "If one could go to the moon, and if one could help grandma with new medical miracles," as Gardner aptly writes, "surely it should be possible to convince Ho Chi Minh to accept a dam on the Mekong River instead of residence in Saigon" (p. 23). The People of Plenty surely could not fail. But America did fail in Vietnam, tragically. And this failure was rooted in more than misplaced faith in material bounty. It also stemmed from ignorance of Southeast Asia and arrogance about the reach and impact of American power, however, well intentioned its application.

While Gardner's interpretive framework is familiar, several of his insights are refreshing and persuasive—for example, his argument that LBJ's "unbridgeble" credibility gap was not an intention to deceive the nation about the extent of U.S. involvement in the war and, later, about how well the war was going; rather "it was between arguments for the war and a reality that did not correspond to the famous Munich analogy" (p. 536). This disparity seems more obvious (and painful) in the light of hindsight.

While there is never a last word in the writing of history—least of all in the contentious realm of Vietnam scholarship—*Pay Any Price* represents a worthy contribution to the field and illustrates one of the many different ways to approach and understand the epically complex tragedy that was Vietnam.

BRIAN VANDEMARK
U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis

Inside the Arab World *by Michael Field. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995. 424 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $15.95.*

Field attempts to cover a wide range of issues in this ambitious book about the Middle East, yet he fails to explain the complexities of the region and to give more than a superficial and biased analysis. Field, a journalist by training, lacks a complete grasp of the history of the region. There are some stark and significant omissions in his accounts of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He misinterprets the uniform Israeli support for the peace process and ignores the

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existence of the Israeli right wing, which clearly deserves more attention than a mere footnote about American Jews living in the territories. Field misses the point that while the Arab–Israeli conflict is a central issue in the Arab world, it is not the sole issue dividing the Arabs. In fact, many experts would assert that it is one of the few issues that unite the Arab World. He makes grandiose claims that, in the absence of the Arab–Israeli conflict, there will be no cause for dissent and conflict in the Arab world. He fails to point out that many of the conflicts between the Arab states and Iran and Iraq have little if anything to do with Palestine. Beyond the rhetoric of blaming the Palestinian conflict for the ills of the Middle East, there is little substance to his claim.

There is a bias underlying the book that apologizes for British policies in the Middle East. Field writes that the Gulf countries and Iran profited considerably after Britain and the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company worked out a 50–50 split of oil revenues. What he neglects to mention is that the British were forced to concede the concessions after the Mussadiq revolt in Iran. Prime Minister Mussadiq is not even mentioned in the book, even in the chapter which discusses the Iranian revolution. It is impossible to understand the Iranian revolution and its position vis à vis the West without understanding the British MI-5 role in toppling the democratically elected prime minister in 1953 after he deigned to assert Iran's right to control its own resources.

At the outset, Field makes a bold and erroneous claim that "had it not been for what happened in Palestine, the post World War II years might have been the beginning of a period of happiness and prosperity for the Arabs" (p. 50). This is a facile interpretation of the wide range of problems the Arab World faced due, in no small part, to the advent of colonialism and the manner in which Britain exploited the Middle East's natural resources, including oil, cotton, and agricultural products. Because of Britain's hunger for Egyptian cotton, many productive agricultural areas were switched to producing single cash crops. Over time, this contributed to Egypt's shift from a net food exporter to a food importer and exacerbated Egyptian foreign debt. Field actually states that had it not been for Palestine, "it is possible that many young nationalists would not have been so resentful of the continuing British presence in the region, nor of the fact that their homelands had been divided . . ." (p. 53). This is blatantly untrue. The Egyptian nationalist party, the Wafd and Saad Zaghul's opposition, predated the conflict in Palestine.

His misunderstanding of the region's complex history is demonstrated by his accounts of Egypt. Field states that the transition from Gamal Abdel Nasser to Anwar Sadat was smooth. Additional research would have yielded the existence of an alleged Soviet-backed coup attempt by General Abdel Hakim Amer, as well as the fact that Sadat was not respected until the 1973 crossing of the canal. Field neglects to properly analyze the dynamics of Egypt's switch to the Western sphere of influence. He mentions that Egypt was motivated by the prospect of American economic assistance. He neglects the important detail that, in doing so, Egypt was able to abrogate a multimillion dollar debt to the Soviet Union, a seminal point in helping Sadat decide in America's favor.

One of the major problems of the book lies in generalizations about the Arab world that can be constructed as orientalist. These cultural (and racist) generalizations abound throughout the book: "If their [Arab] countries go to war they are not going to worry much about the morality of the conflict . . . as long as they win" (p. 91). "Most Arabs would be prepared to tolerate bad government . . . if that meant defeating the national enemy" (p. 159). "Human life is not something of great value" (p. 161). And that Arab leaders "accept that life was cheap in their part of the world" (p. 390).

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A further irritant in Field's journalistic style is his refusal to cite sources. Throughout the book, Field cites "inside sources," making some rather unbelievable statements. In the absence of footnotes, this information supporting the above cultural theories rings untrue and unconvincing.

Unlike some commentators who are up front and honest about their biases and cultural assumptions (for example, Samuel Huntington's much maligned *Clash of Civilizations*), Field makes similar and outrageous assumptions but hides behind a false cloak of journalistic objectivity and the statement that "none of this analysis is meant to be patronizing" (p. 169).

MIA BLOOM
Columbia University,
Harvard University

In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s *by Michael S. Sherry. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995. 595 pp. $35.00.*

For the better part of a generation, military historians have been pushing back the boundaries of their subdiscipline, edging over into social, economic, cultural, and political history in an effort to connect their work to that of their colleagues in those other areas. Michael Sherry carries this trend to a logical culmination, treating the entire range of American history during the last half-century as an aspect of military history, broadly construed.

The broad construction is crucial to what Sherry is about. He identifies "militarization" as a social process akin to industrialization; like industrialization a century earlier, militarization touched and transformed nearly every aspect of American life from the late 1930s on. It steered the economy in the direction of war production, both during the actual hostilities of World War II and the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and during the much longer periods of the cold war when hostilities threatened but didn't quite break out. It fostered a political atmosphere in which candidates of both parties paid unthinking obeisance to national security, very often at the expense of other issues. It shaped perceptions of social and cultural affairs, so that everything from education to entertainment to the rights of women and homosexuals was debated in terms of—and even more often in the language of—military struggle.

Sherry would be the last to claim novelty for his interpretive framework; C. Wright Mills and other early students of the militarization of American life are duly credited. And at times throughout this long book, the reader starts to wonder whether by explaining everything in terms of militarization, the author winds up explaining nothing. But Sherry invariably retrieves his cause by the telling detail (how the creation of national radio networks, for example, fostered an audience for foreign affairs among a generation brought up on locally owned and oriented newspapers) and the neat phrase (the "high-tech American Pax Aeronautica" of the postwar age). And in the end the accumulation of information has a powerful effect. Sherry is right: modern America really *has* a fixation with war.

This is a critical study, and Sherry is nothing if not critical. Yet his criticism tends to fall most heavily on institutions rather than on individuals. Readers who like their villains bound, gagged, and handed over for summary punishment will feel shortchanged. An evident liberal, Sherry nonetheless concedes that Richard Nixon was an idealist (after a fashion) and that Ronald Reagan had something to do with the end of the cold war.

The closest Sherry comes to fingering a culprit for the numerous ills that accompanied the militarization of American life is to point at the American people—in particular, at their

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persistent refusal to confront the consequences of their desires. American militarization, Sherry says, reflected two driving forces: the external pressure of Soviet armed strength and of related international developments, and the internal dynamic of Americans' conflicted expectations of government. Americans recognized the need for a more active government, but their inherited distrust of government prevented them from embracing government activism openly. "Usually wanting their government to do more, while claiming they did not, they repeatedly looked to war or its surrogate to overcome their own distrust of governmental action" (p. 503). This device succeeded in the short run, but the inherent dishonesty that made it work doomed it to long-term failure when the bills for two generations of militarization came due at the cold war's conclusion.

Sherry's book can be read as an opinionated survey of American history since the 1930s, or as an extended essay on the nature and meaning of twentieth century American life. Either way it works marvelously.

H. W. BRANDS
Texas A&M University

The Cuban Missile Crisis *by Mark J. White. Houndmills, Basingstoke, England, Macmillan Press, 1996. 256 pp. $45.00.*

This is a solid and sophisticated study of the Cuban missile crisis with a fresh and engaging angle, although it breaks no new ground and does little to challenge existing interpretations and judgments of its genesis and management. The jacket copy erroneously promises "a cluster of new findings and arguments" concerning Nikita Khrushchev's motives for putting missiles in Cuba, Senator Kenneth Keating's sources, President John F. Kennedy's bellicose intentions early in the crisis, and the origins of the "Trollope Ploy"—a promise which, in any case, misrepresents the sober antisensationalism of the book itself.

Mark White asks two questions: Why did the crisis happen? How was it defused? He answers these by looking closely at the role played by a handful of figures: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Robert Kennedy, Keating, Adlai Stevenson, and Dean Acheson. No study of the crisis could omit the first two, but White chose the others for what they represented rather than for their centrality. Stevenson and Keating bore the standards for American liberalism and anti-Castro Republicanism respectively; Acheson, RFK, and Stevenson were the primary advocates of the air strike, blockade, and diplomatic options. White deftly uses the interplay between these figures as a vehicle for exploring "the general issues surrounding the confrontation over Cuba" (p. x). The technique is extremely effective at demonstrating how personal histories, beliefs, and character traits can work through domestic politics to shape foreign policy choices. This longitudinal and thematic approach contrasts sharply with standard "snapshot" treatments of the Cuban missile crisis, and herein lies the book's major contribution. While this design skews the analysis of the crisis in a rather traditional direction, White tells a compelling tale within his restricted domain. As in the overwhelming bulk of the literature, American figures and American politics predominate; Soviet figures and politics get cursory treatment; and Cuba gets none at all.

Of the various characters in the play, the Kennedy brothers receive the most skillful treatment. White is at his best detailing their strengths and weaknesses, probing their complex relationship, and lifting the veil of mythology that surrounds them. They emerge neither

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heroes nor villains, but—appropriately—a bit of both. White's treatments of Keating and Acheson are not as rich, but will be informative to many students of the missile crisis, since neither features prominently in standard accounts (although we *still* do not know where Keating got his information on Soviet missiles). White's treatment of Khrushchev as a character is fairly typical, but his account of Khrushchev's motives for deploying missiles to Cuba is problematic. It ignores the weight of testimony suggesting that neither Berlin nor China featured significantly in Khrushchev's calculus, yet it credits both. It also overlooks Khrushchev's powerful emotional reaction to the deployment of U.S. missiles in Turkey.

White's almost hagiographic treatment of Stevenson is the least satisfactory aspect of the book. Stevenson surely deserves our sympathy for having his character assassinated by the Kennedy brothers, and he deserves our admiration for thinking seriously early in the crisis about the kinds of mutual concessions that might be required to resolve it. But his proposed opening quid pro quo for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba—quitting Guantánamo Bay and withdrawing Jupiter missiles from both Turkey and Italy—was, as White acknowledges, politically naive. Stevenson's proposal hardly counts as a "realistic" missed opportunity, nor does Stevenson qualify as "the unsung hero of the missile crisis" (p. 184).

White's research effort is very impressive. In addition to covering almost all of the vast secondary literature, he has combed the available documentary record and conducted numerous interviews. The book itself is a valuable scholarly resource. Outright errors are rare, and only one might be considered important (White uses a 25 October 1962 cable from the British permanent representative to the UN to the Foreign Office as evidence against Dean Rusk's claim that on 27 October JFK instructed him to prepare the ground at the UN for a Turkish–Cuban missile trade).

All in all, students of the missile crisis will find this book a fascinating, useful, and enlightening addition to a crowded field—though not for the reason stated on the jacket.

DAVID A. WELCH
University of Toronto

Words of Welfare: The Poverty of Social Science and the Social Science of Poverty *by Sanford F. Schram. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1995. 242 pp. Paper $18.95.*

It is hard to think of any other U.S. policies constructed more on myths than those concerning poor women and their children. Sanford Schram's book provides a cogent explanation why. Using both left political economy and postmodern methods, Schram "de-encodes" welfare policies and their role in political discourse over the last several decades to help explain why they have been both ineffective and venomous. Schram's main point is that politicians' use of symbolism and fear play a prominent, if not critical, role in obfuscating the real issues of poverty, but the work of well intentioned social scientists and poverty research has fueled the politics. Poverty researchers under a cloak of objectivity—using rigorous empirical science and adhering to individual rational behavior models—have provided the fodder for politicians who thrive on promoting the rhetoric of dependency, illegitimacy, and welfare cheats.

Schram's book is divided into three sections. The first dissects the discourses of poverty research. He begins with a critique of the "economistic-therapeutic-managerial" disembodied

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approach to poverty research, used by liberal luminaries such as Robert Haveman, David Ellwood, Mary Jo Bane, and William Julius Wilson, and charts the political abuses of their work. Schram then takes on the new euphemisms of poverty, in particular "homelessness"—a completely constructed term that manages to circumvent the underlying problems of finding affordable housing and living wages in the 1980s and 1990s. Relying on postmodern and feminist standpoint theories, Schram argues that few if any poverty researchers actually take the perspective of what it is like to be poor and as a result miss crucial contextual and conceptual aspects of poverty.

In the second section of the book, Schram discusses the inadequate policy responses to poverty, not a surprise given the inadequate analysis of it. One chapter provides an in-depth discussion of the proliferation of privatized responses to hunger (food banks and food pantries). A second chapter discusses the political construction of the poverty line, and a third chapter provides a particularly useful guide to the ways in which 1980s- and 1990s-style welfare reformers and social scientists have rewritten social policy history, especially as it relates to the recent devotion to time-limited benefits.

The third section gets to the heart of the failure of welfare policies over the last several decades. Relying on the work of Murray Edelman, Schram argues that the most recent welfare reforms have been conducted as a form of political symbolism. It is a kind of "vision thing." But in this case the agenda is to focus on individual initiative and responsibility and at the same time to divert the public attentions from the underlying problems of the economy that would make it possible to work one's way out of poverty. Schram makes it easy to understand why and how facts play a perverse importance in welfare reform debates and legislation. "One of the greatest ironies of the Family Support Act of 1988 is that it is based on hard data and solid research that do not support the legislation in many respects" (p. 140). In the final two chapters, Schram turns to the real reason for poverty—especially among single mothers. He discusses the significant structural changes in families and the economy that preclude families from becoming economically independent. He largely focuses on what he calls "postindustrial policy"—the fact that the U.S. economy cannot provide breadwinning jobs to all those who need them.

In these times of horribly regressive and destructive welfare reform, this book provides a much needed political analysis of welfare policy and research.

RANDY ALBELDA
University of Massachusetts–Boston

Intensive Care: How Congress Shapes Health Policy *edited by Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein. Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute and The Brookings Institution, 1995. 316 pp. Cloth, $38.95; paper, $18.95.*

In this collection of essays, Mann and Ornstein have brought together the collective wisdom of scholars and observers of health policy making from a number of vantages to discuss the role of Congress and its allied institutions in the policy process. The first several chapters discuss how the organizational structures of Congress help to shape health policy making, and the last three chapters discuss in detail what happened with the 1988 attempt to reform Medicare catastrophic coverage and the Clinton health-care reform effort. Taken together, the essays provide a broad picture of the role of Congress in the health policy-making process.

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The introductory chapter written by the editors provides a brief and useful summation of the chapters to follow. The first essay, by C. Lawrence Evans, looks at the committee system in Congress and how jurisdictional overlap among a number of committees affects the health policy process. Evans argues that jurisdictional fragmentation is probably unavoidable and that its effects vary by issue. He concludes that "the key impediments to major reform are not jurisdictional" (p. 50).

Joseph White discusses how the budget process has come in recent years to constrain the process of formulating policy. He clearly outlines the budget process and, to illustrate its effect, discusses AIDS policy as well as the 1993–1994 health care reform debate.

Mark Peterson's essay attempts to look at the way Congress uses information in developing policy. While acknowledging the complexity of his task, Peterson does a good job of discussing how members of Congress deal with the huge amount and different kinds of information presented to them in the course of a policy debate. His chapter includes a good discussion of the role of congressional agencies such as the Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting Office, and the Physician Payment Review Commission in shaping the health policy debate.

The final chapter in the first section of the book, by Mark Nadel, shows how the congressional oversight function has increased in importance in recent years. He concludes that "although oversight leads to continual changes in existing programs, it played only a minor role in the ultimately futile struggle to enact health care reform in 1994" (p. 140).

In the second half of this book, Julie Rovner and Allen Schick provide detailed discussions of the development and repeal of the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Care Coverage Act and of the 1993–1994 debate over health care reform. Rovner argues that the complexity of the health care system in this country makes it difficult for Congress to explain proposed changes in the system to the public. Furthermore, because Congress is overly sensitive to citizen complaints, it is difficult to make policy change, such as major health care reform, that creates clear losers as well as winners.

Allen Schick attributes the demise of health care reform in 1994 to a number of factors, including the weakness of the president's popularity, the inherent difficulty of comprehensive reform, the lack of Democratic leadership in the congressional debate, the failure of committees in Congress to formulate legislation that could pass in the full House or Senate, the unification of congressional Republicans, and the exclusion of Republicans from the legislative development process.

This book is very helpful in understanding the congressional role in the health care reform debate in 1993–1994. Unfortunately, because of the changeover to Republican control, some of its lessons may be limited. Each author has made an attempt to discuss the differences in a Republican Congress, but because the book was published in 1995, these discussions are somewhat speculative. It is still a valuable book, however.

ANNE REISINGER
Columbia University

Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment *edited by John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995. 337 pp. $39.95.*

This welcome book, scholarly yet eminently readable, was the outgrowth of cross-disciplinary discussions that took place at the 1990 meeting of the Advisory Committee of the Harvard

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Center for Risk Analysis, a group of thirty self-styled risk professionals from the world of academia, government, business, and nonprofit organizations. Graham, the Center's director, is a public health specialist, whereas Wiener is an expert on environmental law.

In addition to introductory and concluding chapters on confronting and resolving risk tradeoffs, the book features nine case studies dealing with the subjects of drugs ("Estrogen Therapy for Menopause," "Clozapine Therapy for Schizophrenia"), auto safety ("Licensing the Elderly Driver," "Saving Gasoline and Lives"), food and drink ("Eating Fish," "Seeking Safe Drinking Water"), and toxic waste ("Recycling Lead," "Regulating Pesticides," "Protecting the Global Environment"). Since either Graham or Wiener is a contributor to all but one of these chapters, the book has a unity and seamless quality rarely found in edited books. To their credit, most of these essays have both a historical perspective and an international dimension, even though the book's emphasis is more on method than content. None deals directly, however, with perhaps the most enduring public health risk issue, the use of quarantines to fight the spread of infectious diseases such as AIDS. Neither do any make more than a passing reference to the thorny issue of whether or not to curtail such popular but dangerous substances as alcohol, tobacco, firearms, marijuana, and other recreational drugs.

One would be hard pressed to find a more important topic than risk tradeoff. Whether addressing the health of individuals or the ecosystem of the planet, Graham and Wiener advocate a proactive, holistic approach rather than heuristic, piecemeal reactions to emergencies-of-the-month, such as various cancer scares, on which Americans appear to be too fixated, the editors believe, compared to microbial diseases. Using tables, figures, graphs, and probability theory, Graham and Wiener unfold a conceptual framework, called Risk Tradeoff Analysis or RTA, but admit there is no magic recipe for resolving risk vs. risk situations. As they demonstrate, there are no cure-alls nor panaceas for protecting public health and the environment, only risk tradeoffs. In fact, there is much precedent for suspecting that today's miracle drug, pesticide, or recycling procedure may be tomorrow's ecological nightmare.

In the quarter century since America's first Earth Day of 1970, ordinary citizens and national decision makers alike have become more environmentally conscious and, for the most part, have recognized that market forces, left unregulated, are potentially ruinous to the environment. The time has come, Graham and Wiener confidently declare, to develop a new pragmatic paradigm for risk policy that rejects inactivity and embraces enlightened intervention. Their practical approach is all well and good, but the Harvard Center's Advisory Committee could benefit from the input of a few more philosophers (especially in the field of ethics) and futurists (especially those with an "Earth First" mentality).

As cogent and impassioned as their arguments are, Graham and Wiener's vision may be an unrealistic ideal, given the chaotic state of the world, with its nation–state system and profit-fueled economy. The most disinterested public servants on the planet may be no match for its modern robber barons. As Andrew Hurley demonstrates in *Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana, 1945–1980* (1995), within a capitalist system there is an almost inherent inability to protect the landscape against rapacious industrial polluters, even under the most ideal of circumstances. Skepticism aside, this is an important, even pathbreaking book. The editors deserve special praise for supplying a comprehensive bibliography and both a subject and an author index.

JAMES B. LANE
Indiana University Northwest

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Shaping America: The Politics of Supreme Court Appointments *by George L. Watson and John A. Stookey. New York, Harper Collins, 1995. 259 pp. Paper, $23.00.*

The coauthors of this ably designed and well written book conclude their instructive presentation and analysis with the truism that "Who is on the Court is an important political question" (p. 223). Although hardly an earth-shaking verity, it does, of course, point to the heart of the matter. Along the way, the authors provide an admirable and close to exhaustive account of the fascinating and enduring politics of Supreme Court appointments. They do so with commendable insight, with a no-nonsense approach to the inherent problems, and with admirable historical acumen. Their command of the apposite literature is happily evident throughout the tome's pages, and their judgments evince a thorough grasp of the frequently misunderstood or deliberately distorted process.

Seven chapters address the work's thrust ranging from the politics and language of Supreme Court appointments to the conviction that since they do not regard the nomination and appointment procedures as "broken," there is really no reason to "fix" them. That may well be true, and it is almost certain that we shall see no meaningful or significant changes in the system. However, as the authors' own studies clearly manifest, certain alterations should at least be explored and probably recommended. One could be a return to the Watergate Committee system of having majority and minority counsels question witnesses, thereby reducing the current all but open-ended litany of repetitious senatorial queries. Another might be a fair limit to the number of individual and advocacy group witnesses; there is no constitutional right to limitless (and often redundant) testimony. Yet, given the nature of the political process, a dramatic overhaul is hardly in the cards.

The authors provide an especially compelling account of the role of advocacy groups and their potent networking. Increasingly influential actors in the confirmation drama, their link to senatorial staff should probably have been emphasized even more. That link not infrequently appears to neutralize or even bypass the senators themselves. *Shaping America* is also to be commended for its very thorough explication of the role, structure, function, and procedure of the Senate's Committee on the Judiciary itself. What it does not do sufficiently well is its treatment of the American Bar Association's Committee on Judiciary, which assuredly merited more than the relatively meager pages it was accorded; a more current and accurate description of its classification-evaluation system would have been helpful.

Obviously, the selection of Justice David Souter as a counterpoint to Justice William Brennan is also clearly out of date and inapplicable, as the authors began to suspect in their footnote 1 (p. 4), but do not pursue. Far from neutralizing, let alone vitiating, Justice Brennan's jurisprudence, Justice Souter has now all but embraced it wholeheartedly and indeed predictably. A far more realistic example to buttress their point (pp. 3–6) would of course have been the replacement of Justice Thurgood Marshall by Justice Clarence Thomas or any of President Roosevelt's New Deal appointments to replace one or more of the four old guard "horsemen."

Shaping America is a welcome addition to the literature on the Supreme Court nomination and appointment process, one from which not only the profession but the general public will surely profit. It is replete with valuable and informative explanatory as well as analytical data.

HENRY J. ABRAHAM
University of Virginia

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The Two Faces of Political Apathy *by Tom DeLuca. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1995. 294 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $18.95.*

In their seminal critique of pluralist methodology, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz argued that there are two faces of power. The first face of power—A causes B to do something that B would not otherwise do—is overt. We can observe such power being exercised. The pluralists erred by not recognizing a far more subtle second face of power. When society creates certain values, expectations, and roles that lead to popular concern about some problems while other problems are defined as being nonpolitical, power is also being exercised.

Tom DeLuca has reconceptualized the Bachrach and Baratz framework and applied it to political apathy. For DeLuca, the first face of apathy is free will—an individual understands the choices and what is at stake but chooses not to participate. The second face of apathy "is a state of mind or a political fate brought about by forces, structures, institutions, or elite manipulation over which one has little or no control" (p. 11). If people are taught to believe that their participation makes little difference, or if their experience teaches them that their participation counts for little, they may cease to participate even though they may maintain an abiding concern about their community.

In addressing this second face of apathy, DeLuca looks to both classical liberal political philosophers as well as to more recent theorists like C. Wright Mills, Herbert Marcuse, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas. The breadth of this book is impressive as DeLuca focuses his critical eye on a seemingly endless variety of approaches that theorists have taken in trying to explain why individuals in a democracy exercise their freedom not to be active citizens. His analysis of formal theorists' attempt to wrestle with the problem of nonparticipation is particularly incisive.

DeLuca assumes that the uninvolved in America are an untapped progressive force who, if they came to understand their true, objective interests, would organize and force the political institutions of this country to promote greater political and economic equality. Although DeLuca's emphasis on finding ways of furthering equality through expanded participation is laudable, he ignores the empirical literature comparing the political attitudes of participants and nonparticipants. Specialists in public opinion are not of one mind as to how nonparticipants differ from those active in the political world.

Since apathy does not just happen, but is largely the consequence of the second face of power, who is at fault? DeLuca offers a familiar indictment of American society: "corporate domination of the economy limits, channels, and constrains democracy" (p. 96). He sees apathy as a natural consequence of market economies and warns that the demands of a new economic world order promise to make things worse, not better. But DeLuca's real anger is not directed at corporate America, but at political science itself. He begins his book by attacking Bernard Berelson and his colleagues for their argument in *Voting* that a certain amount of nonparticipation is actually functional in a democracy. Too many participants could overload the system and mass politics could be dangerous. There have certainly been others in the discipline who have warned against mass politics or tried to rationalize relatively low levels of participation as normal, but DeLuca mistakenly treats Berelson's 1954 book as if it was still mainstream thinking in political science.

DeLuca is far too selective in his reading of the empirical literature. Recent behavioral research on political participation, which he shows little interest in, has not been driven by the normative assumptions of Berelson or the others who have raised the specter of mass participation. His wholesale indictment of the discipline is unwarranted and unjust.

JEFFREY M. BERRY
Tufts University

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The Ninth Amendment and the Politics of Creative Jurisprudence: Disparaging the Fundamental Right of Popular Control *by Marshall L. DeRosa. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1996. 216 pp. $32.95.*

This book is an attack on the Supreme Court's use of the Ninth Amendment as a basis for the establishment of unenumerated rights. Such use undermines what the author calls "the traditional model of federalism in which the States had meaningful policy prerogatives within their respective jurisdictions" and shifts the constitutional scheme "to a model of nationalism in which the States are merely administrative extensions of the United States Government" (p. vii).

DeRosa offers a quite readable overview of how the expansion of Ninth Amendment jurisprudence tracks the growth of unenumerated rights in this century. I like the fact that DeRosa concentrates on how polity, or political system, principles like federalism and the power of judicial review relate to questions of individual rights. The most interesting chapter contrasts M. E. Bradford's southern conservative affirmation of unenumerated rights with that of liberal Ronald Dworkin. DeRosa argues that Justice Antonin Scalia's bow to Dworkin's "Ideal Principle" in some hard cases, but not in others, demonstrates his inconsistency. DeRosa faults Dworkin for rejecting popular control over the articulation of unenumerated rights, for failing to see a role for states in the articulation of fundamental rights, and for supporting Supreme Court establishment of unenumerated rights.

DeRosa views Dworkin as being ideological, because his "theory" is based on a policy agenda. One can legitimately ask whether DeRosa is not subject to the same criticism. This book offers little new to the engaged scholar of constitutional law. At no time is there a full discussion of what DeRosa calls the traditional vision of federalism. Nor is there a careful analysis of what the Founders meant by popular control, of what constitutes the Supreme Court's "majoritarian difficulty," or of the legitimacy of natural law underpinnings of law. More often than not, the author asserts, rather than carefully argues, the validity of his assumptions. Many of the chapters are simply descriptive. DeRosa describes Roscoe Pound's argument that the Ninth Amendment can be a key instrument in utilizing social engineering in the promotion of social interests. He does not offer a new reading of Pound or a detailed refutation of his position. DeRosa describes Justice Arthur Goldberg's reliance on the Ninth Amendment as a basis for the right of privacy in the *Griswold* case. He concludes that Goldberg understated the federal context of those unenumerated rights, and in so doing, adds to the "stream of rationalizations for creative jurisprudence." On questions of abortion and homosexual rights, DeRosa states his dislike of the Supreme Court's undercutting state-based, popular control over public morality. The Supreme Court is viewed as "The loose cannon on the deck of American federalism" (p. 104). Nor does DeRosa support the U.S. Supreme Court's giving Congress a "virtual carte blanche" for legislating more restrictive gun-control policies.

Finally, DeRosa's failure to provide an analysis of the impact of the civil war amendments on the increase in unenumerated rights or to offer alternative views on the role of the states, the nation, and the Supreme Court in the definition of individual rights, or to discuss the expansion of unenumerated rights (to vote, interstate travel, and courts) under the fundamental rights and interests strand of the equal protection, makes it impossible for him to put his argument about the Ninth Amendment in a broader historical and ideational context. It limits the usefulness of this book in helping a general, informed reader or a scholar to address important contemporary issues of state, national, and Supreme Court power in the definition of unenumerated rights.

RONALD KAHN
Oberlin College

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They Only Look Dead: Why Progressives Will Dominate the Next Political Era *by E. J. Dionne. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996. 352 pp. $24.00.*

Combining the knowledge of a major Washington observer with the insight of a student of American history and political philosophy, E. J. Dionne offers a distinctive view of contemporary politics. Beyond gridlock and Newt Gingrich lies a new cycle in U.S. politics, he argues, a return to the Progressive traditions forged by Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. The wish may be father to the thought.

Dionne sees America facing four simultaneous crises: the global economy's threat to jobs and opportunity; loss of popular attachment to government; uncertainty about traditional moral values of family, work and community; and absence of a clear international mission after the cold war. Continuing the earlier theme of *Why Americans Hate Politics*, Dionne castigates the political parties for evading the needs and wants of a citizenry "gripped with a quiet anxiety rooted in worries about real things" (p. 31). At the same time, he hopes that politicians have begun to recognize the right problems, although they still lack coherent policy answers.

Writing with the skill of a journalist and the perspective of a scholar, Dionne focuses on the ideas and ideologists that frame our national debate. He is particularly insightful in his analysis of the Republican party. In a "Quiet Revolution," the Republicans have seemingly overcome a philosophical division between "moralists" and "libertarians." Sometimes, the two factions agree on a common program, particularly reduced taxation and the consequent restriction of the national government. Inevitably, however, these ideologies conflict, as illustrated by such issues as abortion and feminism.

As against William Kristol, Dionne effectively argues that "liberty and virtue require not only freedom from government coercion, but also the active support of a government that understands not only its limits but also its obligations" (p. 299). As for Gingrich, he dismisses the Speaker's pretentious futurism as "a counterrevolution built on an old evolutionary materialism" (p. 207), a century-old revival of the Gilded Age.

In his political analysis, Dionne sees the electorate as seeking effective government, not less government. He interprets both the 1992 Democratic victories and the 1994 Republican landslide as alternative searches for capable leadership by the "Anxious Middle," the critical electorate that is "radical in its disaffection with the status quo," yet "quite moderate or pragmatic on the issues that so excite liberals and conservatives," and "in love neither with the market nor with government" (p. 86).

Democrats can still win the national debate, Dionne believes, and his book is a political manifesto as well as a political analysis. Through case studies of health care and other major legislation, he describes the party's fumbles, particularly in the "dysfunctional" 103rd Congress and the early Clinton administration. Unlike the commonplace insider, he finds the major problem of the Democrats to be intellectual, not operational. The Democrats will only succeed when they return to their Progressive roots, when they are willing to defend the proper use of government to address both the economic and the moral concerns of the voters, including health, economic opportunity, welfare, family life, and campaign finance reform.

But Dionne's solution is also the problem. He pointedly analyzes a Democratic party that is riven and inchoate, but expects it to achieve a grand intellectual synthesis. He correctly describes a president who is politically skilled in campaigns but uncertain of the purpose of electoral victory. He sees Progressivism as the best approach to contemporary problems, but provides limited reason to believe that such sentiments will be effectively marshaled. Unless

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we assume historical inevitability, a decent response to America's crises is not assured. We can only hope Dionne will not join the other philosophers who might better have been kings.

GERALD M. POMPER
Rutgers University

Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations
by George W. Downs and David M. Rocke. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 159 pp. $29.95.

George Downs and David Rocke's new book on the intersection of domestic politics and international relations is an important and exciting contribution to the burgeoning game theory literature on the subject. Moving beyond the two-level game metaphor both in terms of analytical rigor and in terms of subject matter, it focuses on how uncertainty about aspects of a state's domestic politics can affect international behavior and institutions. The main chapters present and analyze formal models on three topics: the initiation and duration of war, the nature of retaliation norms in international trade regimes, and the appropriate extent of multilateral institutions.

The chapter on war employs a principal-agent model and looks at the question of how the citizens of a state can influence their leaders' decisions on war and peace by threatening removal from office if things turn out badly. Two key findings are presented. Leaders who launch a war that goes badly will typically be removed from office by the citizens, and this threat will deter some leaders from initiating unpopular wars to begin with. The unfortunate side effect, however, is that once a war begins to go badly and a leader realizes that he will not retain power unless victory is obtained, he will have nothing to lose by continuing to prosecute the war in hopes of a long-shot victory. Hence long, drawn out, futile conflicts may result until the leaders can be removed either constitutionally or through revolution.

The chapter on retaliation in trade disputes poses the question, why are trade regimes such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tarrifs not as fully open and cooperative as they could be and enforced by relatively mild, "proportionate" retaliation strategies? After all, as the authors show, a fully cooperative regime enforced by draconian punishment strategies would make all parties better off. The problem, as they see it, is the possibility of "involuntary" defection motivated by domestic interest groups. Most states are subject to demands for protection from domestic groups that vary in strength over time. Even severe international retaliation could not always overcome the pressures generated by such demands. Hence, a system based on severe, lengthy punishments for each defection would quickly break down into permanent noncooperation. By positing a lesser level of cooperation and briefer punishments, the system manages to accommodate the occasional involuntary defection without self-destructing.

The chapter on the scope of regimes presents a model of environmental cooperation and focuses on the issue of whether to include a "less-developed" state in a pollution control regime, when there is uncertainty over whether it is capable of living up to the demands made by the regime. A dilemma arises because punishment strategies designed to deter defection from the regime may be triggered when the less developed state fails to live up to the bargain for involuntary reasons, making the punishing states worse off than they would have been if they had simply allowed the less developed state to free ride in the first place.

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Downs and Rocke do a very good job of spelling out the empirical implications of the formal analysis. Though the modeling itself is somewhat complex at times, it is always linked to real-world or easily imaginable problems. While united by a concern with uncertainty and institutions, the book is perhaps not as well integrated as it might be. Some of the early material, such as the realist and psychological traditions discussed in the first chapter and the analysis of updating, signaling, and reputation from Chapter 2, receive little attention thereafter. Also, the model on war bears little relation to the other two. However, the book significantly advances our understanding of the problems it addresses and is especially well worth the attention of those interested in the problems of war, cooperation, institutional design, and multilateralism.

ANDREW KYDD
University of California at Riverside

Zhirinovsky: Russian Fascism and the Making of a Dictator *by Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova. Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1995. 256 pp. $25.00.*

Vladimir Zhirinovsky's outlandish pronouncements and nonsensical public behavior often defy rational inquiry. Nonetheless, a journalistic cottage industry has emerged that seeks to impute rational motivations and intentions to Zhirinovsky's past and present. Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova's biography, which narrates both the perverse political antics and social history of Zhirinovsky, is a case in point.

As the book's title baldly asserts, the authors set out to explain Zhirinovsky's emergence as would-be dictator and progenitor of Russian fascism. In so doing, they offer a hodgepodge of anecdotes to trace the phenomenal rise to prominence of Russia's best-known reactionary figure. Cobbled together here are a psychoanalytic treatment of Zhirinovsky's youth in Kazakhstan and Moscow, a breezy description of his various political campaigns, and a brief treatment of Zhirinovsky's influence on Boris Yeltsin's policy initiatives the last two years.

Yet in trying to fashion an explanation of Zhirinovsky's development from abused youth to alienated student, and from anticommunist nationalist to present day fascist, the text ends up prisoner to a teleology that begs more questions than it answers. In so doing, it overstates the strength of Zhirinovsky and his party on the contemporary political stage. It is certainly correct to note, as Solovyov and Klepikova do, that Yeltsin's turn toward the right (in military, economic, and cultural terms) derives partially from the Liberal Democratic party's first place finish in the December 1993 parliamentary elections. However, Zhirinovsky's success is clearly based more on personality than program and has translated neither into increased public support nor a serious legislative record. His frequent endorsement of imperialistic and racist policies is viewed more and more in Russia not as the defining conditions of a new fascist movement, but rather as the ad-hoc ravings of an increasingly isolated (though not marginal) politician. As his party remains bereft of the institutional moorings prerequisite for political efficacy, Zhirinovsky has become a caricature of the notable "holy fool" in Russian history. In short, rather than "the making of a dictator," one could argue we find the undoing of a demagogue.

Solovyov and Klepikova do far better when elucidating the myriad contradictions and fabrications that Zhirinovsky has advanced in the recent past. They weave together stories (from both his writings and public outbursts) to paint an exceedingly disturbing (yet compel-

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ling) portrait of Zhirinovsky the man. An audience in search of empirical examples of Zhirinovsky's manifold stunts and shenanigans will be amply satisfied. However, those seeking a more analytical portrait along the lines of a David Remnick or Stephen Handleman will be dismayed by the repeated forays into reductive psychological explanations, and the irritating and self-conscious practice of incorporating quotes from literature and philosophy (most often embarrassingly out of context) into the narrative of the text.

Finally, in their attempt to forge a linear narrative of Zhirinovsky's rise, the authors employ the Russian concept of *vozhd* (leader) as "key to understanding Zhirinovsky and his successes" (p. 19). According to them, Zhirinovsky's appeal can be traced to fulfilling the *vozhd's* central responsibilities: order, strength, and decisive leadership. Yet their sloppy employment throughout the text of this conceptually rich historical term ends up not only confusing the reader, but marring their overall analysis of Zhirinovsky's development. After reading their text, one feels that the idea of some eternal Russian need for domination and authority should be at last put to rest.

LEONARD BENARDO
Open Society Institute–New York

Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition *by James Lee Ray. Studies in International Relations. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1995. 243 pp. $39.95.*

This book represents a significant contribution to the growing literature on the democratic peace proposition, which establishes that stable democracies do not fight each other. The book starts with an excellent review of the democratic peace literature, particularly emphasizing methodological problems. The author criticizes, first, that the consensus according to which democracies are as conflict-prone as other political regimes (while unlikely to fight each other) rests on empirically shaky grounds. Second, focusing solely on pairs of states rather than wars exaggerates the number of independent observations so that the significance of the democratic peace becomes questionable. Third, the distinction between the structural or institutional constraints explanation and the cultural or norm-based account is theoretically flawed, and the available evidence does not support one explanation over the other.

The next chapter of the book covers global trends in regime transitions. The author points out that the literature on regime transitions focuses too exclusively on domestic-level factors, thereby neglecting global effects. He then presents results of a study partitioning the variance in democracy scores in the international system from 1825–1985 so as to separate systemic from national-level effects. If anything, the study yields the result that international influences are negligible for regime transitions to democracy. But the method is based on the questionable idea that international effects should produce the same results across countries. Any scholar familiar with the second image reversed literature could have told the author that systemic forces usually interact with domestic structures leading to different outcomes across cases.

The next chapter contains an excellent analysis of alleged wars between democracies. The author uses a simple and elegant measurement of democracy emphasizing electoral systems that confer suffrage to at least 50 percent of the adult population, involve at least two independent parties, and produce at least one peaceful power transition between opposing

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groupings. James Lee Ray then convincingly shows that none of the twenty wars between alleged democracies (among them Athens vs. Syracuse, 415 B.C.; the American Civil War; the Spanish–American War, 1898; World War I) can be regarded as a plausible challenge to the democratic peace proposition.

Chapter five of the book takes up this point and compares the 1898 Fashoda Crisis over the Sudan with the Spanish–American War in order to examine whether regime characteristics and their perception by the opposing parties had anything to do with the peaceful outcome in the Fashoda case as compared to the violent resolution in the Spanish–American dispute. The results are mixed insofar as the author appears to concede the Fashoda Crisis to realist arguments about the military balance between France and Britain rather than to the joint democracy proposition. Unfortunately, this part of the book is preceded by a large superfluous chapter on the relative merits of quantitative (large-N) versus qualitative (small-N) research. The author's argument is based on two questionable assumptions—first, that the quantitative-qualitative divide is about large-N versus single cases (rather than comparative case studies), and second, that it represents an epistemological divide between nomological approaches and hermeneutics, with those favoring the latter being less interested in generalizable explanations. In contrast, most scholars using interpretive methods would probably agree with the author that "small-N and large-N studies . . . are genuinely complementary . . ." (p. 154).

Despite these flaws, the book represents a major step in crossing the quantitative-qualitative divide in the literature on the democratic peace, since it shows convincingly that the method chosen must depend on the question asked. While the democratic peace proposition has mainly been established by large-N studies, investigating the causal mechanisms linking joint democracy and peace appears to require historical and comparative case studies.

THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN
University of Konstanz, Germany

Disintegration or Transformation: The Crisis of the State in Advanced Industrial Societies
edited by Patrick McCarthy and Erik Jones. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995. 202 pp. $45.00.

This book collects eight rather discursive essays and an introduction on an inherently interesting topic; but rather like the states it discusses, it cannot decide if it will disintegrate into its component pieces or be transformed into a more coherent argument.

The editors' introduction argues that the usual suspects, including but not limited to postmodern identities, regionalism, globalization, the end of the cold war, the reemergence of mass unemployment, the obsolescence of the Keynesian welfare state, and immigration have forced states to change themselves. The editors argue that states are becoming "bargaining states," mediating international economic and political pressures on select domestic groups, and projecting the interests of those groups outward. They use Robert Putnam's two-level game metaphor to operationalize this concept, but it seems to me they are really talking about Philip Cerny's "competition state."

However, the editors themselves argue that while the states under scrutiny here all manifest some similarity in symptoms because they all carry out the same functions, their crises have unique origins and etiologies. Consequently, they eschew a concluding chapter, apparently unwilling to force these disparate crises and analyses into any common mold.

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While the chapters all individually offer insights into recent politics, collectively they reflect this thematic silence. They address the central theme primarily by providing potted but eclectic histories of state formation, and then discussing how political parties have mediated rising international constraints or pressures on domestic social groups. Then they all follow their own logic, fastening onto one or more particular local problems or changes without much effort to connect to the other chapters. Thus the chapter on the United States, by David Calleo, looks at the declining ability to abuse the dollar's international position; on Japan, by Michael Green, the absence of any compelling vision for post-cold war economic and security policy; on Italy, by Sergio Fabbrini, the absence of any centripetal forces to hold the state together; on France, by Julius Friend, the emotional and social welfare costs of declining sovereignty; on Germany, by Dana Allin, the moral dilemmas of power for a state that has abused power in the past; on Canada, by Gregory Marchildon, the weakening of an already fragile central state and national identity; on Belgium, by Erik Jones, the collapse of consociationalism and corporatism; and on Britain, by Patrick McCarthy, Margaret Thatcher's inability fundamentally to transform the British state.

The chapters focus only intermittently on the state per se, and more regularly on those who occupy (and abuse) offices within the state. The chapter on France is clearest about the state's inability to function as it has in the past and about administrative responses to increasing domestic disfunctionality, and about the costs of derogation of sovereignty to Europe. In contrast, the chapter on Britain essentially ignores Thatcher's fundamental changes to the fabric of the British state, changes made in response to the very forces the editors describe as central.

Arguably, the state today finds itself in a situation similar to other periods of extreme stress for the modern state, all of which generated new forms of legitimation, new relationships between state and citizens, new economic roles for the state, and new responses to external threats. All of these, however, also had some new institutional expression. If the chapters or a conclusion had been used to sketch out some of these emerging institutional answers to or evasions of the problems that the editors lay out in the introduction, it would be easier to answer the questions posed by the book's title.

HERMAN M. SCHWARTZ
University of Virginia

The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism *by Kevin J. Middlebrook. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 463 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $18.95.*

This is an excellent and challenging book about organized labor and politics in modern Mexico. It is also a substantial and interesting essay on an important theoretical (and practical) question: How does a political elite maintain broad popular support even while, over decades, it constrains broad popular movements?

In an original and wise turn, Middlebrook addresses the question in terms of a new, historically charged concept that he adds to Juan Linz's list of authoritarian regimes—"postrevolutionary authoritarianism." Emerging after a serious revolution, this form of authoritarianism is distinctive in three ways: agents of "mass actors" are prominent in the new regime; the political elite continually asserts the legitimacy of its position by glorifying the revolution

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in which the mass actors organized; both the postrevolutionary government and its party need institutions for the continual mobilization and control of mass action, in electoral and other operations. In postrevolutionary Mexico, the labor movement was the most easily mobilized mass actor. Consequently, the government and some powerful labor organizations—not the labor movement as a whole, but only certain of its organizations—developed mutually beneficial alliances: the government gave material and legal favors, and the labor organizations gave political loyalty, which explain the stability and durability of the regime. The central argument of the book is therefore that neither a state-centered nor a society-centered approach alone can account for the regime. It takes both approaches to explain the elite's enduring support from the labor movement and certain labor organization's enduring strength, even when workers in general lost rights and real income. So the theory that Mexican politics is corporatist evaporates.

As the basis for his argument, Middlebrook provides some essential history, much of which comes from his own research in Mexican archives. He narrates the accumulation from the 1910s through the 1930s of the government's administrative capacities to control formation of unions, internal union affairs, and strikes. He analyses the alliances in the 1920s and 1930s between the government and the then most favored labor organizations, first the Confederación Revolutionaria de Obreras y Mexicanos (CROM), later the Confederatión de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM). And most impressively, he examines the renegotiation of the alliance between the government and the CTM during the early cold-war crises between 1947 and 1951. This is the best labor history of Mexico in any language in sixty years, since Marjorie Ruth Clark's *Organized Labor in Mexico* (1934).

Regarding the state-centered approach, Middlebrook demonstrates through rigorous analysis that a difference in administrations usually made little and often no difference in the incidence of official interference with unions. He also demonstrates how only a society-centered approach can clarify the new divisions in the labor movement in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly the militant unions in the auto industry. Combining both approaches, he explains persuasively how the government maintained the CTM's loyalty through the prolonged economic crisis and painful industrial reorganization of the 1980s.

The last chapter is an examination of the government-CTM alliance during the Salinas administration. Middlebrook neatly explains why the CTM accepted economic reforms it opposed, but helped stymie political reforms. He concludes that in the foreseeable future the CTM will probably defend authoritarianism and resist democratization.

But at least two major questions remain: Granted that "alliance" is a fair word for deals between the government and the CROM in the 1920s and the CTM in the 1930s, is it fair for the deals between the government and the CTM since the 1950s or has the CTM become practically a part of the regime? How well do concepts of democracy derived from theories of the state apply to institutions in civil society, for example, the labor movement? Should we expect labor organizations naturally to support democracy?

JOHN WOMACK, JR.
Harvard University

Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis *by Timothy J. Colton. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995. 939 pp. $45.00.*

Big books address big questions. Timothy J. Colton's landmark study of Moscow asks why the Soviet Union failed. And further, what are the prospects that its principal successor state,

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Russia, will consolidate democracy? To answer them, he explores the transformation of Russia's capital city in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, understanding what happens there offers a template for understanding what happens elsewhere. For Colton, Moscow the "model city" is Russia writ small. His discussion of the Soviet period is something of a political pathology for which he coins the term "disjointed monism": governance lacking any political pluralism yet paradoxically lacking effective central coordination as well. In rich detail he shows us the contradictions of Soviet socialism: despite the Bolsheviks' creation of a "flint-hard" statism, Moscow remained undergoverned; for all the paeans to planning, improvisation characterized Moscow's evolution in the 1920s and 1930s; underneath the monumentalism of Stalin's "vanguard city" lay the reality of an impoverished daily life; in "classless" Moscow privilege flourished. Though most of the book deals with the Soviet period, the last hundred pages or so offer valuable insight into the present. Colton shows us how Moscow's revolutionary embrace of democratic radicalism gradually gave way to rule by "reformist apparatchiks" who function within a "hypermayoral" institutional setting. He concludes by setting forth a list of questions that emerge from his analysis, which he feels must be successfully answered if Moscow—and Russia—are to consolidate democracy.

This book is a remarkable achievement by Colton who is a professor of government at Harvard University and the director of its Russian Research Center. To begin with, he draws on an extraordinary range of source material, including newspaper accounts, literature, political biography, interviews with major players who are still living, official documents, aggregate and survey data, and archival materials only recently made publicly available. The latter were culled to present an unprecedented picture of the inner working of the *nomenklatura* system (Table 7 on p. 427), to name but one example. Newly available information is also employed to reveal the interactions between major players in "high politics" in the late Stalin period. The abundance of details would be overwhelming if the book were not enlivened by the author's writing style, which is invariably erudite and occasionally gripping. Frequent and well placed illustrations, maps, and tables also help the reader to follow the textual analysis. When the author injects his personal judgments of persons or events, they are restrained, appropriate, and judicious. For all these reasons, the book under review is certain to become a standard and a point of departure for any future works on Moscow.

There is so much that is good about this book that critical comments seem querulous. Still, the book may disappoint some political scientists who are looking for research that serves primarily to advance theory. The work at hand is clearly theoretically aware and brings theory to bear on explanation, but it is not theoretically driven. Rather, it is straightforwardly chronological starting from Moscow's "frontier town" beginnings. Also, despite being well written, the book is long and likely to be daunting to the reader less interested in the minutiae of Russian urban politics. This is unfortunate because, although it is hard to describe a work of more than 900 pages as synthesizing, in fact the author has performed a service by pulling together so much information and making it accessible to an audience of nonspecialists and specialists alike. For the latter, the book is a treasure trove of information and an exceptional reference work. It will be found on the shelves of all serious students of Russia.

JEFFREY W. HAHN
Villanova University

Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and its Legacy *edited by John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley. University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. 340 pp. Cloth $55.00; paper, $18.95.*

During the past fifteen or so years, our understanding of the Greek Civil War has been significantly enriched because of the skill with which a truly international (Greek, American,

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British, German, Scandinavian, Australian) cohort of younger scholars has reinterpreted old issues and exploited the new archival sources that have become available. The book under consideration is an excellent case in point. It begins with two general essays by John Iatrides and George Mavrogordatos that meaningfully place the Civil War within the broader context of modern Greek history, elucidating especially the ways in which the tensions of the 1940s were linked to, but differed substantially from, those produced by the National Schism, which divided Greece between Venizelists and royalists during World War I and much of the interwar period. The rest of the book focuses on three more specific issues—the reasons for the ineptness and miscalculations of the left from 1944 onward, the nefarious effects of the erroneous policies with which the Greek right responded to the leftist challenge, and the impact on the war of the many vicissitudes in Yugoslav, Bulgarian, Albanian, and Russian diplomatic policy. No space is wasted in going over once again such well known aspects of the war as the military operations or the Anglo-American intervention in it.

The two articles on the left nicely complement each other. Hagen Fleischer, an outstanding German scholar, examines the complex relationship between the communist and noncommunist sectors of the National Liberation Front (EAM), showing how the latter, far from being mere puppets of the former, often sought to influence policy, even during the 1945–1947 period of the "second" EAM, when its noncommunist sector had become weaker because of the departure of several key groups after the abortive December 1944 rising in Athens. Ole L. Smith, a Danish scholar, follows with an equally compelling essay which subtly unravels changing Greek Communist party (KKE) perceptions (or rather misperceptions, as they were almost always wrong) of the domestic and international situation between 1945 and 1949, and shows how these led to disastrous strategic and tactical decisions. These misperceptions were sometimes understandable, for the international context in particular was extraordinarily complex and constantly changing. But many of them might have been avoided had the KKE leadership, especially Party Secretary Nicos Zahariadis, been less chaotic and more competent.

But chaos and incompetence were not the exclusive preserve of the left, as the impressive article on "The Changing Structure of the Right, 1945–1950" by David H. Close, an Australian scholar, shows. The chief rightist formation, the Popular party, failed on at least three counts during its periods in power: to check the growing rightwing terrorism that was driving many leftists toward renewed rebellion in 1946, to organize an effective war effort once large-scale hostilities had begun in 1947, and to transform itself into a modern conservative party capable of playing a constructive role in future Greek politics. The failure of the parliamentary right permitted the extra-parliamentary right, especially the military and court circles, to gain more power than they otherwise would have. Some of this same ground is covered from a constitutional and administrative point of view in a good but all too brief essay by Nicos Alivizatos. More effective is Stavros Thomadakis's thoughtful article on the Greek economy, which emphasizes the deleterious consequences that the lack of a coherent economic policy, under both rightist and centrist governments, had for Greek society. Economic chaos helped precipitate the war, and the war provided excuses for putting off economic reform, thus preserving the old, narrowly based, speculative economy and retarding Greece's adaptation to more modern forms of capitalism.

The last section of the book is on how rapidly fluctuating Soviet and Balkan policies affected Greece. The focal points are Yugoslav-Soviet relations and the Macedonian issue, through which Tito sought to fulfill his greater Balkan ambitions prior to 1948. Peter Stavrakis offers the stellar article of this section, as it combines a clear analysis of the Balkan situation with interesting comparisons to Stalinist policy in other parts of the world and does a particu-

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larly effective job of relating the vicissitudes in intra-Iron Curtain diplomacy with the decisions being taken by the KKE in Greece. Ivo Banac's essay on the Tito-Stalin split is also excellent, but cuts itself short before it can adequately explore the ramifications of the split on the Greek Civil War. Evangelos Kofos's article on the Macedonian question does not fall into any such error and so is a perhaps more useful addition to this already valuable book, which can be strongly recommended both to the specialist and to the general reader.

EDWARD MALEFAKIS
Columbia University

The Best of What We Are: Reflections on the Nicaraguan Revolution *by John Brentlinger. Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1996. 374 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $17.95.*

What became of Nicaragua following a decade of war and U.S.-sponsored aggression? Why did the Sandinista government lose popular support despite its significant social reform accomplishments? These questions emerged following the 25 February 1990 election that replaced the Sandinista President Daniel Ortega with the opposition candidate, Violeta Chamorro. Nicaraguans had much to think about before casting their vote; economic blockade, threat of war, and struggles for daily survival seemed to culminate into a simple vote.

John Brentlinger uses an interesting mix of personal journal entries, interviews, revolutionary songs and poems, and historical data to shed light on these questions. Whereas U.S. journalists tended to distance themselves from Nicaraguans, reporting in a consumable, noncritical form that legitimized U.S. aggression toward Nicaragua, Brentlinger uses an observer-participant approach and interviews ordinary people over extended periods of time. In so doing, he is able to uncover the subtext buried in the U.S. media blitz that ignored the role of the United States in the contra war.

Brentlinger vividly captures the sights, smells, and noises familiar to Nicaragua; indeed, our senses are stimulated as he analyzes Nicaragua's struggle for national liberation through the accounts of many Nicaraguans. His narrative is rounded out with dissenting voices that opposed the revolution, as well as self-critical Sandinistas. Though at times a bit overstated, Brentlinger describes the social gains achieved under Sandinista leadership, such as the literacy crusade, housing improvements, and women's rights. Moreover, Brentlinger discusses some contradictions and problems that whittled away at Sandinista support, including the excessive and often unnecessary property confiscations during the agrarian reform; the persistence of vertical styles of command within the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FLSN); the questionable lifestyles and personal conduct of some FLSN leaders; initial errors with various social sectors, such as the Miskito Indians; and the continued conscription of young men into the Sandinista army.

Although the Sandinista revolution failed to achieve the anticipated material benefits, and the FLSN party eventually lost public confidence, Brentlinger concludes that Nicaragua was nonetheless transformed in significant ways that "are hard to measure and prove, but they correspond to my experience and are affirmed by virtually all the informed people I know" (p. 327). First and foremost, the Sandinistas toppled the repressive Somoza dictatorship and formally established a political system that dramatically broadened democratic political participation. Moreover, the Sandinistas introduced a new economic program, a mixed economy, that was state-led but never abandoned capital. The mixed economy aimed to

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transform the social relations of production and resist the United States control over its economy. Key to the Sandinista economic program was an agrarian reform that transformed the land tenancy structure to favor the rural majority. Specifically, land was redistributed in which the holdings of large landowners was reduced to 6 percent of cultivatable land, while small landowners gained 35 percent of the land.

The book explores the Nicaraguan revolution from an important vantage point by placing the experience of ordinary Nicaraguans at the center of analysis. In so doing, Brentlinger's blend of narrations and reflections go a long way toward unpacking the meaning and consequences of the Nicaraguan struggle for sovereignty, national identity, and economic self-determination, and point future inquiry on post-revolutionary Nicaragua in the right direction.

CYNTHIA CHAVEZ METOYER
California State University, San Marcos

An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics *by Donald W. Shriver, Jr. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 233 pp. $27.50.*

Donald W. Shriver is president emeritus of Union Theological Seminary in New York and professor of applied Christianity. Shriver who writes of forgiveness is not Reinhold Niebuhr, for whom justice was a more realistic ethic for politics than love. For Niebuhr love was the ultimate norm, but justice in politics was its approximation. For Shriver, forgiveness appears to be both an ultimate and proximate norm.

To make such a comparison is not to diminish Shriver's contribution. He is appalled at war's destruction and devastation in the twentieth century, with its more than 100 million deaths. He calls on history, the Greeks, and the Hebrew Bible to test his ideas of forgiveness. He explores various forms of forgiveness in politics, such as forbearance from revenge and empathy for the enemy's humanity. His aim is to reveal the presence of forgiveness throughout political history and to demonstrate that forgiveness can turn political enmity into political neighborliness.

From ancient Greek and Hebrew texts, Shriver extracts what he calls an ethic of just vengeance. While revenge must be subjected to restraints, society requires some kind of institutionalized and lawful response to wrongdoing. However, "just vengeance" is not forgiveness. The forgiveness petition in the Lord's prayer and the association of Jesus's teachings with the early Christian community are sources of the Christian idea of forgiveness. Beginning with Augustine's controversy with the Donatists, however, a debate erupted that continued through the Middle Ages. With Augustine everyone was called on to forgive and be forgiven, whereas the Donatists claimed there was a distinction between forgivable and unforgivable sins. With the Enlightenment, the focus shifted from groups to the individual. Because more people were killed in twentieth-century wars than in the preceding five-thousand years, Shriver asserts that only a brazen moralist would think of commending just war theory for modern conflict.

The weight of Shriver's normative theory is unlikely to be his most enduring contribution. Compared with Niebuhr, his abstract propositions about forgiveness in politics don't overwhelm the reader. Once he leaves philosophy behind, however, and turns to three case studies, the strength of his argument becomes clearer. They are "Vengeance and Forbearance: Germans and Americans," "Enmity and Empathy: Japan and the United States," and the

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subject of his greatest expertise—"Justice and Forgiveness: Equal Citizenship for African Americans."

In Germany, he addresses national guilt, Nuremberg, and Bitburg. He provides new insights on Germany's postwar advances. His "new information" reminds us how many contemporary observers neglect the study of the Federal Republic. In discussing Japan and the United States, Shriver writes of the mutual dehumanization of the enemy and Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima as undigested memories. Finally, he explores the history of the several civil rights movements: the earliest expressions of slavery, the freed slaves meeting in a "Colored People's Convention" in Charleston in November 1865, and the civil rights movement from 1955–1968 in Montgomery, Greensboro and Nashville, Birmingham and Selma.

In conclusion, Shriver poses a series of questions: the place of apologies, forgiveness too soon or too late, and the nation's coming national trial by diversity. For such questions, forgiveness provides the key. It is a new and fragile concept in American politics. Others may view it with less hope than Shriver, yet he gives impressive examples of the need to understand it even when we focus on justice. Finally, he guards against the temptation of some civil rights leaders—and he is clearly a major figure in civil rights—to translate principles from civil rights directly onto the world scene without recognizing the differences in context and community.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON
University of Virginia

The Origins of Social Knowledge and the Origins of Modern Social Policy *edited by Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 332 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $18.95.*

This volume's ten papers examine interrelations among state, social knowledge, and social policy within the leading industrializing nations through 1930. The book roughly is to social ideas, policy, and politics about what Peter A. Hall's *Political Power of Economic Ideas* (Princeton, 1987) has been to economic ideas, policy, and politics, only theoretically more self-conscious, wide-ranging, and *au courant*. It includes a half-dozen relatively empirical papers as well as several more integrative efforts.

On the more empirical side, Anson Rabinbach provides a densely detailed comparison of the origins of the idea of "social risk" and the idea's functions for the emergence of industrial-accident policy in Germany and France. Rabinbach's discussion of risk epitomizes the larger work's concern for social knowledge as socially embedded in institutional, organizational, and group—in this case industrial, legal and medical group—context. It also touches on the book's general concerns for state agencies, commissions, and universities, as well as for "private" universities, associations, and amateur circles. (In these general terms, Germany proves relatively statist while state and civil society seem comparably important and barely distinguishable in France.)

Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Ronan Van Rossem contribute a rich comparison of the German *verein für sozialpolitik*—a voluntary association of state administrators, politicians, and academic specialists from Germany's state university system—and the British Fabian Society—an association of private-sector academics and activists who exploit general social connectedness for access to a relatively permeable British state. Libby Schweber distinguishes

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between the similarly nonstatist social bases of British and U.S. "Progressive" reformers (the former relatively amateurish, the latter relatively academic), detailing implications of this distinction for both social reform of unemployment insurance and the academic institutionalization of sociology. John R. Sutton likewise examines two relatively nonstatist societies with a look at how the better allied U.S. Children's Bureau has an advantage over the Canadian Council for Child Welfare. The Bureau's more expert, authoritative intellectual allies (academics versus charity activists) give the Children's Bureau an early edge in the (pre-war) framing of children's issues. In another look at similar cases, Stein Kuhnle explains differences in post-Bismarckian (1890s) Scandinavian social insurance legislation in terms of variations in the development of national statistical offices (crucial for framing "risk" problems and calibrating solutions). Sheldon Garon contrasts dramatically different state agencies, the highly expert, autonomous and reformist Social Bureau of Japan's Home Ministry and the far less autonomous, but far better connected British Board of Trade. He also contrasts dramatically different degrees of contextual reinforcement—Social Bureau isolation from a strong labor movement and from Japan's fascist ascendancy versus Board of Trade social connectedness and access to moderately strong trade unions. Context trumps "administrative capability" where these two cases of regulatory development in the area of industrial-labor relations are concerned.

On a more theoretical note, Ira Katznelson stresses how, due to the new Liberalism (of L. T. Hobhouse, John Keynes, etc.) "Utilitarianism was made social" and welfare concerns were extended to "the whole community" (p. 36). Indeed, Katznelson brilliantly begins to detail how well the new liberalism both subsumes and limits "socialist" reforms within capitalism. (It legitimates collective goods, but by confining political transactions to ones among "state," "market," and "citizen," it averts attention from deep structures of capitalism and state). Björn Wittrock and Peter Wagner sketch out a model of social policy reform. In this, two "institutional transformations"—one toward democratic/bureaucratic nation states, the other toward research universities—each specified by local traditions and events (for example, France's centrism and Revolution) complement conventional stress on industrialization, democratization, and political group conflict. Distinctions between strong and weak states bifurcate long-term social policy processes. Social reforms extend the idea of community.

Rueschemeyer and Skocpol introduce the volume with a strong focus on social knowledge as causal nexus, and conclude with essays into the origins of secular social knowledge, the bases of intellectual social authority, the possibly central importance of state fact gathering capabilities, the subtlety of social knowledge's class functions, each essay aimed at stimulating new research and debate. It should become a central text for every disciplinary perspective on politics and policy and a stimulus to cultural and new institutional turns within sociology and political science.

ALEXANDER HICKS
Emory University

"We Have Just Begun To Not Fight": An Oral History of Conscientious Objectors in Civilian Public Service during World War II *compiled by Heather T. Frazer and John O'Sullivan. New York, Twayne Publishers, 1996. 248 pp. $28.95.*

The eighteenth volume in Twayne's Oral History Series examines the experiences of some 12,000 participants of the Civilian Public Service Program in the United States during World

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War II. The program represented an attempt by both the historic peace churches and the federal government to avoid the persecution of conscientious objectors as had occurred in World War I. Men adamantly opposed to any cooperation with the government went to prison. Men willing to accept induction into the military in noncombatant roles received 1AO status. The Civilian Public Service Program represented a compromise position between these two extremes. It consisted of conscientious objectors unwilling to join the military but prepared to serve in civilian roles in "projects of national importance."

The reality that met the first inductees into the program was anything but projects of national importance. Herded into Civilian Conservation Corps camps in the deep woods—the director of Selective Service, Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, sought to protect the program and the conscientious objectors by hiding them from the public—the men found soil conservation the most meaningful enterprise but mere weed pulling the common reality. As time went on projects diversified, but the hope of many of the most idealistic that they could assist in rebuilding a war-scarred world dissolved when a congressional rider forbade expenditure of federal monies to send conscientious objectors overseas. Work as orderlies in mental hospitals, volunteering as guinea pigs for medical experiments, and antiparasite work in the American South and Puerto Rico represented the avenues in which participants sought to give meaning to their efforts. Some, under social pressure from family and friends and the economic pressure of receiving no pay for their labors, accepted induction into the military. Others, increasingly disturbed about any compromise with their pacifist ideals, deliberately courted imprisonment. The program did not conclude until 1947, about the same time that the last wartime draftees received their release from military service.

Beginning in the late 1970s, historians Heather T. Frazer and John O'Sullivan of Florida Atlantic University interviewed over one-hundred participants, while colleagues, friends, and students interviewed another twenty-five. Out of these, Frazer and O'Sullivan selected eighteen interviews (two were with husband and wife so twenty individuals were involved) that illustrate some of the diversity of the experiences of participants in the program. The compilers grouped the interviews into six categories: organization and functioning of the Civilian Public Service Program; the experiences of the members of the historic peace churches; the experience of the selectees who were not members of those churches; men who decided, after entering Civilian Public Service, that it represented too much of a compromise with their ideals and went to prison; selectees who sought more meaningful national service than was originally available; and, finally, reflections on the meaning of the experience.

Unfortunately, Frazer and O'Sullivan omit any discussion of the provenance of these interesting texts. When and where were the interviews conducted? Are they presented as transcribed? How were they edited? Were some subjects interviewed more than once? If so, are any of the texts composites of more than one interview? If heavily edited, did the interviewee have an opportunity to examine any changes made by the editors? I am agnostic as to whether the original texts should have been altered but insist that the compilers need to spell out their criteria. They also need to indicate their plans for the ultimate disposition of their tapes and transcripts so that other scholars might eventually make use of the originals. These concerns aside, this handsome volume will interest students of World war II, the peace movement, American religions, and mental health.

EDGAR F. RAINES, JR.
U.S. Army Center of Military History

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The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, The Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics *by Dan T. Carter. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1995. 572 pp. $30.00.*

What was the Wallace phenomenon? No history of the Great Society and its aftermath could be written without reference to George Wallace's appeal to northern voters and his abortive 1968 campaign. But was he, as Martin Luther King Jr. told a reporter after Wallace's famous stand in the schoolhouse door, "perhaps the most dangerous racist in America today . . ." (p. 156)? It is the merit of Dan T. Carter's penetrating and eloquent biography that he shows the truth of King's observation and why Wallace's significance transcends his role as a flamboyant protest candidate.

Carter observes that Wallace "was the most influential loser in twentieth-century American politics" (p. 468). His influence rested on two achievements. First, Carter shows with discerning detail just how Wallace changed the political discourse of racism. Indeed, Wallace might be said to have invented, or at least nationalized, a language of racial conservatism that eventually seeped into campaign speeches of both Republicans and Democrats. If Wallace's rhetoric clearly attracted those intent on defending white supremacy, his talent was to cloak racial animosities and opposition to racial equality in pungent homilies about overweening, tyrannical judges, oppressive bureaucrats, and the threat to the freedoms of ordinary people posed by the federal government. Wallace's ascendancy as a national figure coincided, as Carter notes, with diminishing public confidence in the federal government. In this context, Wallace was instrumental in replacing FDR's equation of an expanding federal role with collective economic progress with the idea that federal power diminished the freedom of white citizens. Carter aptly refers to this phenomenon as the "southernization of American politics."

Wallace's second accomplishment was to make Richard Nixon dance Jim Crow whenever he "played his fiddle" (p. 465). If Republican political ascendancy after the 1960s has depended on their willingness and ability to cultivate the votes of white southerners, it was Wallace, perhaps more so than Barry Goldwater, who led them to it. Some of the best and most revealing passages in Carter's narrative describe the threat Wallace posed to Nixon after 1968 and how Nixon embraced the racial conservatism Wallace was defining. Nixon, of course, tried many stratagems to remove Wallace from the competition. He secretly funneled $400,000 into the campaign of Wallace's opponent in the 1970 Alabama gubernatorial race. And he launched an investigation into the kickbacks and bribery that were commonplace during Wallace's tenure as governor. But when Wallace won the Democratic primary, Nixon shifted hard to the right, jettisoning his Family Assistance Plan because it conflicted with his southern strategy. There is a straight line from Wallace through Nixon to the ascendancy of southern Republicans to the leadership of the United States Congress in 1996.

What motivated Wallace? How do we understand the man? Carter's answer is disturbing. Carter's detailed portrait of Wallace demonstrates he was not driven by deep hatred of African-Americans or passionate belief in the cause of white supremacy. Although Wallace was a certifiable racist and a tawdry figure given to petty corruption and unsavory alliances with the Ku Klux Klan, above all else he was a politician of unquenchable ambition and consuming opportunism. His defense of Jim Crow, his cultivation of northern racial animosities, and his cunning use of racist imagery in elections—Wallace's television ads in his 1970 gubernatorial campaign against Albert Brewer Jr. make the Willie Horton ad look like child's play—were but the means to quench his thirst for electoral victory.

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This portrait rings true enough, but one wants more of an analysis of Wallace's character and the formation of that character than Carter supplies. And the book raises but does not address the question of whether a society riven by racism can ever surmount it so long as politicians are tempted to exploit racial divisions. But these are minor quibbles in a superbly written and researched book that is a must read for anyone concerned to understand recent American politics.

MICHAEL K. BROWN
University of California, Santa Cruz

Congress and the Rent-Seeking Society *by Glenn R. Parker. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996. 217 pp. $37.50.*

Rent-seeking has undergone a striking transformation in the past thirty years. Originally developed as a model of the politics of regulation, it has recently become a metaphor for all politics. The result is a vision of the democratic polity as a Madisonian nightmare, in which politics reduces to the scramble for rent governmentally created special privileges. Glenn Parker wants to convince us that this is only the tip of the iceberg, that rent-seeking does more than saddle us with bad policy.

Parker argues that rent-seeking's direst consequences may be indirect, coming through changes in the sort of people who go into politics. His argument is simple. In the past, Congress offered a variety of what he calls intrinsic rewards—power, serving the public good, and so on. However, recent increases in rent-seeking have destroyed the reputation of Congress and with it these rewards. As a result, Congress no longer attracts those who respond to intrinsic rewards; instead, it attracts those who respond to more venal considerations. Thus, rent-seeking sets us into a vicious circle, as changes in the composition of Congress change the level of rent-seeking, changing the composition of Congress, and so on.

Parker's analysis has much to recommend it. His idea of intrinsic rewards offers a richer view of what makes politicians tick than most rent-seeking analyses. Moreover, he addresses an important question—what drives politicians? Unfortunately, Parker weakens his findings by retaining some of the more dubious features of the rent-seeking paradigm.

The most obvious problem with rent-seeking is its neglect of institutions. By focusing on the benefits that policies provide to interest groups, rent-seeking models give important insights into the demand side of the political market. But they tell us nothing about the supply side of that market. Indeed, they implicitly assume that only demand matters, that politicians can offer any policy they want. But this is seldom the case. Few real politicians can adopt any policy; most find their choices constrained by the institutions of governance. Moreover, these institutions are not fixed. They change often and radically. For example, during the period that Parker analyzes, these changes ranged from the widening of the franchise to the reorganization of Congress. Surely these played some role in the transformation of political behavior that Parker hopes to explain. Yet he makes no mention of them.

The careful reader will also have serious reservations about the evidence that Parker does discuss. The book is full of regressions meant to support his argument. Many of them are hard to interpret. For example, on p. 87, Parker uses the pages in the Federal Register as a measure of the size of the rent-seeking pie that is available for distribution. What are we to make of this regression?

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Parker is almost certainly right to claim that politicians behave differently now than in the past. He may even be right when he says that economistic models can explain these changes. Yet his account would have been better had he looked somewhere besides rent-seeking for an explanation. My candidate would be an account offered a century ago by George Washington Plunkitt of Tammany Hall. When asked why politicans were more honest in the past, he replied that they weren't: they didn't steal as much because they just didn't have as much to steal. In other words, "the supply side did it."

ANDREW RUTTEN
Cornell University

Congress and the Governance of the Nation's Capital: The Conflict of Federal and Local Interests *by Charles Wesley Harris. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1995. 294 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper $19.95.*

This is the first comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the federal government and local government in Washington, DC under the current home rule charter. Harris analyzes congressional intervention into District affairs from the standpoint of national interest versus local interests. He shows that the primary source of intervention has not been to protect legitimate federal interests but rather to assert the parochial concerns and moral views of members of Congress.

Chapters 1–3 discuss the adoption and operation of home rule. Adopted in 1973, the unique governing arrangement allows for an elected mayor and city council. DC residents elect one nonvoting delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives. District residents have no vote in the Senate. In addition, Congress retains significant oversight over District affairs. It has the authority to review all legislation adopted by the District government. Congress is authorized to conduct comprehensive line-item review of the DC budget. These oversight mechanisms, Harris argues, underscore the District's "precarious form of limited home rule" (p. 60).

Chapters 4–7 examine official challenges and vetoes of District legislation by Congress. Chapter 4 analyzes congressional challenges in seven policy arenas: revenue measures, land use, public safety, health and human services, general government, civil liberties and rights, and public works and transportation. What the cases show is that for the most part, the motivating factor behind congressional challenges to legislation adopted by the DC government originated from parochial concerns of members of Congress, not national interest.

Chapter 5 examines the three acts officially vetoed by Congress. Two cases—an act restricting the location of foreign embassies and the other concerning building height regulations—were found to be legitimate conflicts between national and local interests. Congress's veto of the DC Sexual Assault Reform act of 1981, however, was precipitated by the moral views of particular members of Congress. The bill was generally aimed at broadening criminal penalties for sexual assault and diminishing penalties for sex between consenting adults. It was viewed as a victory for many women's groups and the city's politically influential gay community. Powerful interests (including Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority), however, successfully lobbied Congress to overturn the bill. The democratic principle of self-determination was put aside as "members of Congress were unwilling to take the political heat on the city's behalf in the face of intense lobbying by a powerful interest group" (p. 115).

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Chapter 6 examines how conflicts of interest between the federal and District governments have found expression in the congressional budget process. Through riders and budget provisions Congress can give detailed instructions to local officials and overturn DC laws. For example, Congress has repeatedly used appropriation bills to ban the use of federal funds for abortion. Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush went even further. Through the use of the veto they successfully prohibited the District "from using its own funds for abortions" (p. 153). Congress has used the appropriations process to "take bold actions to challenge local policies, backed up with threats to freeze both federal and local funds" (p. 156).

Chapter 7 examines the politics of land use in the District. Harris shows how local growth opponents (especially preservationists) have turned to Congress or other agencies of the federal government to block downtown revitalization projects that had been approved by the District government.

Chapter 8 focuses on the various proposals designed to strike a balance between federal and local interests. Harris provides a comprehensive discussion of the arguments advanced on statehood and other proposals. Although Harris acknowledges the limited national support for making the District the nation's 51st state, statehood, he maintains, "would be the quickest and most forthright way to establish the full political rights of residents of the District" (p. 233).

Chapter 9 reviews capital city governance in several foreign countries that have federal systems of governments. His survey reveals that of all the residents of federal capitals in the countries of the Western world, only those in Washington, DC lack representation in the national legislature.

Chapter 10 offers conclusions concerning conflicts between Congress and the DC government. Drawing on the analyses of previous chapters, Harris concludes that the federal government intervenes in DC affairs most often for reasons other than to protect a legitimate national interest. Despite home rule, Congress dominates the public affairs of District residents at the expense of the democratic principles upon which the nation is founded.

Congress and the Governance of the Nation's Capital is a thoughtful commentary on local governance of the U.S. capital. It raises serious questions about democracy and self-determination.

MARION ORR
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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

America Votes 21(1994): A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics *compiled and edited by Richard M. Scammon and Alice V. McGillivray. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Books, 1995. 498 pp. $142.00.*

Directory of International Organizations *by Hans-Albrecht Schraepler. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1996. 465 pp. $65.00.*

The Essential Neoconservative Reader *edited by Mark Gerson. New York, Addison-Wesley, 1996. 467 pp. $27.50.*

The Gorbachev Bibliography *edited by Joseph L. Wieczynski. New York, Norman Ross Publishing Inc., 1996. 275 pp. $65.00.*

How to Research Congress *by Fenton S. Martin and Robert U. Goehlert. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Books, 1996. 107 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $19.95.*

How to Research the Presidency *by Fenton S. Martin and Robert U. Goehlert. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Books, 1996. 134 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $19.95.*

Japan and the Japanese: A Bibliographic Guide to Reference Sources *compiled by Yasuko Makino and Mihoko Miki, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1996. 168 pp. $65.00.*

Native American Political Systems and the Evolution of Democracy: An Annotated Bibliography *compiled by Bruce E. Johansen. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1996. 184 pp. $65.00.*

The Post-Soviet Handbook: A Guide to Grassroots Organizations and Internet Resources in the Newly Independent States *by M. Holt Ruffin, Joan McCarter, and Richard Upjohn. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1996. 414 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

Separation of Powers Law: Cases and Materials *by Peter M. Shane and Harold H. Bruff. Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 1996. 1060 pp. $85.00.*

Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Research Guide *compiled by Donal J. Sexton, Jr. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1996. 163 pp. $69.50.*

Social Indicators of Development 1996 *by the World Bank. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 397 pp. Paper, $26.95.*

The State of the States, Third Edition *edited by Carl E. Van Horn. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996. 234 pp. $24.95.*

Technology and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons *by Richard Kokski. New York, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1996. 351 pp. $55.00.*

The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990–1996 with an introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Blue Book Series, Volume IX *by the United Nations. New York, United Nations Publications, 1996. $29.95.*

U.S. National Security Policy and Strategy, 1987–1994: Documents and Policy Proposals *edited by Robert A. Vitas and John Allen Williams. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1996. 320 pp. $75.00.*

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

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